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Abstract 
 
New studies that focus on the air bombardment of civilians in Italy during the 
Second World War regard the Italian home front as a privileged ‘observation post’ 
from which to study the relationship between Fascism and society during the 
years of the collapse of Mussolini’s regime. Yet the role of propaganda, on the 
specific aspect of people vulnerability to total war, in influencing that 
relationship, has received little attention.  
The main aim of this work is to reconstruct the narrative of bombing and of 
civilians’ life in Italy during the first phase of the war (1940-1943) as it emerges 
from reports, stories and works of invention in the Italian media. These have been 
compared with both the public reaction and the regime propaganda that had 
constructed some of the most powerful ideological tenets of the Italian Fascism 
during the 1930s, first of all the myth of air power and the creation of a ‘new 
man’.  
Investigating  specific sections of the home front and situating the breakup of the 
Italian morale at the time of the first serious setbacks of Mussolini’s armies at the 
end of 1940, this research focuses in particular on the effectiveness - or otherwise 
- of government policies in steering the media and cultural activities that reflected 
life in wartime Italy.    
Drawing mostly on primary sources such as government papers, personal 
memoirs, censored letters and confidential reports, the study argues that 
propaganda’s failure to continue to bolster Fascist myths was due both to the 
catastrophic impact of war on civilians’ life and to institutional and political 
flaws. Uneven and inconsistent directives from propaganda controllers reflected 
similar attitudes and policy failures within the regime as a whole, whereas the 
enemy proved increasingly more effective in conveying the message that there 
was no aggression against Italy and that Italians were paying a high price for 
Mussolini’s mistakes.     
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Introduction 
 
Benito Mussolini, rather paradoxically for a dictator whose rule was marked by 
his mission to imprint onto modern Italians the martial spirit of a glorious past, 
took the unusual part of peace broker and procrastinator in the looming European 
crisis of the late 1930s. Returning to Italy from Munich in September 1938, he 
was greeted as the man who had forced Germany, Britain and France into a 
peaceful solution to the Czech crisis. Nearly one year later, when Hitler’s invasion 
of Poland led the British and French to declare war, the Duce kept his country out 
of the war as a result of military unpreparedness and reports of widespread anti-
war and anti-German feeling among the Italian people. For almost 20 years, 
Fascism had boasted of its fighting credentials and, since 1922 when Mussolini 
had come to power, the regime had sought military confrontation with the 
democratic European powers – emerging almost unscathed from the aggression of 
Ethiopia in 1935 and from backing Franco’s rebel troops against Spain’s 
legitimate government in 1936-1939. Yet, when he finally decided to join Hitler 
in June 1940 – betting on the swift Axis submission of Allied forces – Mussolini 
took the nation into the first real ‘total war’ of its history. Like defenceless 
Ethiopians killed by the mustard gas bombs dropped by Italian aircraft in 1936 or 
the people slaughtered in the Basque town of Guernica by a Nazi-Fascist air raid 
on 26 April 1937, civilians in Italy suddenly came within the range of Allied 
bombers. The home front was no longer a place where fear and death rebounded 
only on bereaved soldiers’ families, as had happened in the Great War. 
Vulnerability, insecurity and a sense of impending danger came to homes and 
factories, unsettling everyday life. 
A war that involved civilians on a previously unknown scale was the 
litmus test for Fascism’s ‘public ethic’, described by Emilio Gentile as a 
compound of discipline, virility, comradeship, ‘warrior spirit’ and ‘total 
2 
dedication to the national community’.1 For 15 years Italians had been swamped 
by a colossal drill of collective self-deception that camouflaged with myths and 
parades the lack of real organisation and technical progress. Indeed, when Italy 
entered the war almost nothing that both civilian and military authorities had 
discussed over previous decades in terms of infrastructure and anti-aircraft and 
civil defence measures had been accomplished. The fact that the government and 
the party had orchestrated wide-ranging campaigns to alert the public to the 
danger of air war through meetings, courses in schools, pamphlets and posters, led 
many Italians to a realisation that the tests and experiments in which they had 
taken part since 1935 were ineffective, ostentatious and ritualistic. Besides, 
propaganda work was constrained by two conflicting needs – to mobilise citizens 
without arousing widespread panic.
2
 However, the novel aspects of modern war 
and their daunting implications for civilians were clearly perceived as early as 
September 1939, when confidential reports from party informers described 
widespread anxiety about the likely employment of air forces against Italy.
3
 
Knowing his compatriots were lukewarm about the prospect of war, 
Mussolini committed Fascist propaganda ‘to raise by degrees the temperature of 
the Italian people’.4 The MCP translated the Duce’s will in directives to the media 
that, despite a formal posture of neutrality, aimed at acclimatising the public to 
wartime precautions and restrictions and, crucially, to the struggle alongside Nazi 
Germany against the European democracies. The dictator’s resolution to enter the 
war did not imply that Italians had suddenly become a nation of warriors, and the 
need to influence the population through an uninterrupted fictional account 
remained. While the role of propaganda and the media in Fascist Italy has been 
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(2004), p. 343.  
2
 Claudia Baldoli, ‘Il regime e la minaccia dall’aria’, in I bombardamenti aerei sull'Italia: politica, 
stato e società (1939-1945), ed. Nicola Labanca (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012), pp. 102; 114-115.   
3
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nella seconda guerra mondiale (1 ottobre 1937-10 giugno 1940), ed. Edoardo and Duilio Susmel 
(Florence: La Fenice, 1959), pp. 374-375. 
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carefully studied, less attention has been focused on its impact during the years in 
which the regime was most significantly tested, and even less on the 
representation of the home front and civilians as victims of total war.
5
 The gap 
between what the media reported and the facts has been recorded in scholarly 
studies that have over the last decade taken the impact of bombing in the Second 
World War, and specifically the bombing of Italy, beyond the boundaries of 
military history to disentangle its political, social and cultural facets.
6
 This work 
details how such a gap developed and widened, despite the regime professing 
frankness in its communication policies since 1940. 
In particular, the aim of this research is to consider the Italian media 
representation of the home front under enemy bombing and of Italian air force 
activity during the Second World War until Mussolini’s fall in 1943 against the 
propaganda that had, since Mussolini’s ascent to power, been orchestrated to 
strengthen the founding ideological tenets of Fascism – first of all the theory of 
the ‘new man’, and Italy’s primacy in the ‘domain of the air’. When the regime 
faced the test of total war, both of these tenets turned out to be groundless myths. 
In order to provide a wide spectrum of that representation, the analysis of the 
‘media’ in this research has included not only the press, radio, newsreels and 
documentaries, but also the most widespread forms of popular culture, such as 
cinema, theatre and songs. Control over all media was centralised under the MCP 
which grew increasingly into a vast and complex bureaucracy drawn mostly from 
the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Interior. Any kind of material intended for 
                                                 
5
 See Pierluigi Allotti, Giornalisti di regime. La stampa italiana tra fascismo e antifascismo 1922-
1948 (Rome: Carocci, 2012); Franco Contorbia (ed.), Giornalismo italiano, voll. 2 and 3, (Milan: 
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Bollati Boringhieri, 2005).  
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information or propaganda purposes - articles in the press, photographs, films, 
documentaries, posters, leaflets, booklets, songs, shows, plays - came within its 
reach. 
By the end of the 1930s in Italy the process of full control over the media 
was complete. In 1926 a law had ended the freedom of the press and from 1927 it 
was forbidden to establish new titles. The Fascist Party directly controlled many 
newspapers. The Duce or his hierarchs owned other dailies, for example Il Popolo 
d’Italia in Milan (Mussolini), Il Regime Fascista in Cremona (Roberto Farinacci), 
Il Resto del Carlino in Bologna (Dino Grandi) and Il Telegrafo in Livorno 
(Costanzo and Galeazzo Ciano). As for the nominally independent press, 
Mussolini arranged for publishers, industrialists or financiers close to the regime 
to acquire or maintain ownership, as in the case of the two major newspapers of 
pre-Fascist Italy, Corriere della Sera and La Stampa. Also, the Duce had the last 
say when a new editor was to be appointed. As a consequence of this process, the 
distinction between information and propaganda, which had been extremely thin 
since the second half of the 1920s, became almost invisible in wartime Italy.
7
 
Periodic meetings (usually weekly) of the MCP or its chief of staff with 
representatives of the press emphasised topics to be dealt with and events which 
were not to be reported.
8
 These instructions were summarised, updated and 
disseminated every day to newsrooms and to prefects in the Italian provinces.
9
 
This thesis shows how the inner workings of the MCP during the Second World 
War were affected by the coexistence of a high level of personalization (the Duce 
and his Minister made all important decisions, even on trivial details) with an 
hypertrophic bureaucracy staffed mostly by civil servants coming from other 
departments and journalists who could not find a job in the press. A continuous 
flow of detailed instructions, more than general directives based on a firm policy, 
inundated prefects and editors in chiefs, who had in turn to instruct their 
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5 
subordinates. Orders often did not arrive on time or lost their original intent. From 
the end of 1942 only self-censorship prevented newsrooms from divulging 
information about military defeats and the disastrous state of the home front. 
Moreover, forms of centralized and empirical (almost case-by-case) screening - as 
was the case with  the theatrical censorship exercised by Leopoldo Zurlo 
examined in chapter 4 -  seemed to produce a better outcome than a professed 
ideological control.     
Fascist authorities boasted that the press - unlike cinema, theatre and 
books - was not subject to preventive censorship but, as a matter of fact, 
newspapers had to comply scrupulously with the MCP’s orders on pain of 
suspension from publication for one or more days. The directives were often 
meticulous, repetitive and prone to campaigns in which serious issues –for 
example the prohibition of mentioning Jewish or American authors and film 
directors in newspapers – mixed with erratic fixations like the obsession with the 
proper pronoun for addressing strangers. Although it is mostly from this angle that 
MCP orders have been anthologised and looked at in studies of the media under 
Italian fascism, these do convey an idea of the censors’ working style and 
procedures.
10
 Yet, it is the less folkloric and picturesque stream of instructions 
coming from the MCP which show how the regime became estranged from its 
people in its last years.   
The instructions of the MCP, as Mario Isnenghi has observed, did not just 
contain lies, but entailed a constant work of rewriting facts, transforming them 
into a ‘surreal world’ that aimed at forcibly replacing people’s everyday lived 
experience.
11
 Gaetano Silvano Spinetti, a young MCP press officer at the time, 
wrote in his diaries that the atmosphere during the conferences at the Ministry was 
like a classroom, as journalists showed ‘no critical thinking’, were quarrelsome 
with each other and always nodded when taking instructions. ‘I was appalled’, he 
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recalled, ‘that men who had been active in democratic journalism were so tame at 
receiving such meticulous orders’.12 Editors seldom voiced disagreements with 
the Ministry’s instructions. On 30 October 1942, for example, the editor of 
Corriere della Sera, Aldo Borelli, wrote to Alessandro Pavolini, Minister of 
propaganda from 1939 to 1943, to protest that the censors had vetoed five articles 
in a row, despite the fact that ‘they did not report anything dangerous’.13 
War propaganda had only one chief – the Duce himself, who frequently 
summoned the Minister of Popular Culture. The actual work of control and 
censorship was rarely negotiated with other centres of power – mostly with those 
essential in wartime, like the military authorities, whose approval was requested 
before journalistic material was published from the fronts, or the Fascist Party, 
which supervised the work of civilian assistance. The fact that there was no 
institutional check from outside appeared to be an advantage over the enemy, 
whose propaganda policies had to endure a more complex route from government 
to parliament, from media to its audiences: the British prime minister and his 
government had to answer questions in parliament while newspapers and the BBC 
had to balance the imperatives of a country at war with the freedom of the press to 
which Britons had been long accustomed. Therefore, Italian propaganda appeared 
to have an organisational advantage, as its modus operandi seemed swift and 
undiscussed, but the enemy’s output was unburdened by the most invasive 
government pressures. 
Some aspects of Fascist activities from the Ethiopian campaign onwards 
borrowed from techniques adopted in Liberal Italy during the Great War when, 
for the first time, cinema, theatre, sports events, exhibitions and conferences of 
intellectuals and journalists became the vehicles of mass propaganda, and when 
secret funds managed by the Ministry of Interior were employed to pay 
collaborators, informers and journalists. These techniques were perfected during 
the Second World War by the MCP, which in 1943 alone spent 200 million lire on 
                                                 
12
 G. Silvano Spinetti, Difesa di una generazione. Tutti fascisti, antifascisti, traditori, traditi 
(Rome: Edizioni Polilibrarie, 1948), pp. 43-50. 
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press contributors and conference speakers.
14
 During the Ethiopian war the press 
had learned how to get information from the official bulletins that, suitably 
doctored, served to conceal inconvenient facts whilst reporting a ‘heroic and 
transformed war’.15 In addition the activity of the Istituto LUCE, which produced 
photographic and filmed material mostly focusing on the battlefront, was based on 
the same organisational experiences from the Ethiopian and Spanish campaigns.
16
 
What Italian propaganda had to learn from scratch in the Second World War was 
how to deal with a domestic front that had been sheltered until then – except for a 
few areas in the North targeted by enemy air raids in the First World War – by 
direct blows from the enemy. 
The MCP’s organisational model followed the pattern of German 
propaganda and its master, Joseph Goebbels. Pavolini, the most ‘political’ and 
long-lasting of the Fascist ministers of propaganda, imitated his Nazi opposite 
number in institutionalising a personal and regular contact with newspaper 
editors.
17
 A secret protocol of the Pact of Steel signed on 23 May 1939 decreed a 
permanent collaboration bqetween Italy and Germany in the fields of press, 
propaganda and information, whereas the Istituto LUCE and Universal Film 
Aktiengesellschaft (Germany’s largest film company, under government control 
from 1933) had an agreement over the exchange of newsreels and documentaries 
as early as 1929.
18
 Yet, cooperation between the two was no idyll. The Germans, 
for example, could not stand the way that, in spite of rigid controls, the Italian 
press leaked news that Berlin treated as military secrets. Goebbels’ people 
rechristened the Italian bulletins spaghetti-Berichten because they were, according 
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 Patrizia Ferrara, ‘Dalla Grande Guerra al fascismo: l’evoluzione degli apparati di propaganda in 
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1992), pp. 686-687.  
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to them, long and unsubstantial. As for Pavolini, he tried to preserve Italian press 
correspondents in Berlin from bribery and pressures granting them a higher salary 
than their colleagues at home.
19
 Also, the Italian minister of propaganda made an 
effort to impose more discipline on the machine, which was particularly prone to 
rumours and leaks. In November 1941, for example, when he realised that secret 
instructions from the Ministry to the media were being leaked to foreign 
embassies in Rome, he ordered an enquiry and set out new rules to achieve greater 
confidentiality.
20
  
Beneath the surface, comparing the minutes of Goebbels’ conferences to 
Pavolini’s, it is possible to find – alongside a few things in common, such as a 
tendency to patronise audiences with long monologues regarding their close 
relationships to their respective bosses – many differences in terms of 
effectiveness and the power of persuasion towards the public.
21
 Also, the disparity 
in the available technology and propaganda means was huge. Germany, for 
example, had a much larger film industry and a far broader radio network than its 
ally. The cost of receivers and widespread poverty limited the impact of state-
controlled radio in Italy, where in 1939 there were 1.2 million subscriptions in 
comparison with 13 million in Germany. Fragmentation and rival power centres 
were also a constraint on Italian propaganda in comparison with Germany.
22
 
Unlike the Nazi machine and Goebbels’ unrestrained hegemony, which was only 
partially undermined by his personal rivalry with the Foreign Minister Joachim 
von Ribbentropp, in Italy the relationship between the media and its controllers 
faced behind-the-scenes interference. In theory, the Ministry had concentrated 
extensive powers, stretching across all forms of propaganda, but in practice it had 
to maintain good terms with government members, the Party, Fascist hardliners 
and other bodies such as the office for press and propaganda established by the 
military supreme command. As a central institution, the MCP was also obliged to 
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rely on local bureaucracies. Instructions to the press were sent by telegraph twice 
a day in code to the provincial prefects where the newspapers were published.
23
 
Those were typical processes in Fascist institutions, where a nominal 
concentration of powers did not prevent the multiplication and overlap of 
competences.
24
 From the first year of the war, for example, tensions had mounted 
between the MCP and the military, as the latter wanted exclusive power to 
authorise or censor anything to be published in Italy about the war. A compromise 
was only reached in May 1942, when Pavolini and General Ugo Cavallero agreed 
that the supreme command could approve any material concerning the military 
aspects of war.
25
 
The BBC Italian service and the messages disseminated in Italian cities by 
Allied aircraft were powerful counterweights to Fascist propaganda on the home 
front. The intensive use of air-borne leaflets and radio counter-information – two 
new elements which had been absent in the Great War – overcame physical 
distance and allowed for the targeting of civilians in enemy countries.
26
 Leaflets 
quickly proved effective. As early as August 1940, police informants suggested 
that these reflected the true feelings of Italian people toward the war and Germany 
much better than did ‘articles in our newspapers’.27 The increasing numbers of 
people who listened to Radio Londra, as the BBC Italian service was popularly 
called in Italy, knew (and circulated among relations, neighbours and friends, 
which the regime was most concerned about) what Italian media distorted or did 
not report at all. On the eve of Mussolini’s decision to enter war Italian authorities 
attempted to jam the BBC bulletins, as Colonel Stevens, a former British military 
attaché to Rome, had begun his news commentaries to Italy on 22 December 
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1939. For a little while in April 1940, Radio Londra employed Carlo Maria 
Franzero, an Italian writer who worked in Britain as a journalist.
28
 
Italy tried to react by organising counter-propaganda broadcasts. In June 
1940, the MCP decision to reduce airtime for cultural and entertainment 
programmes in order to grant more time to those with an accentuated 
propagandistic content was criticised even within the Party. For example, Critica 
Fascista, the journal of the Minister of National Education Giuseppe Bottai, 
observed that Italian radio was not doing enough for the ‘education of the citizen 
at war’.29 Italian authorities countered the influence of Radio Londra with a 
repressive approach (listeners to foreign radio stations were threatened with 
prosecution and imprisonment) combined with the characterisation of Italian 
counter-propaganda on the radio as mainly one-man shows performed by 
controversial figures like Mario Appelius, whose vehement and viscerally anti-
British tirades in the crucial phase of 1942-1943 gave rise to criticism within the 
regime itself and finally persuaded Mussolini to dismiss him. Control over radio 
information was total, stronger than that exercised over newspapers. The news 
could be compiled only by assembling reports from Stefani, the Italian official 
press agency, or picking material from the dailies. Journalists working for radio 
were not on the same level as their colleagues employed by the printed press, as 
they were not allowed membership of the professional register established by 
Fascism. Authorities were particularly careful with the new medium because of its 
power to reach huge audiences, much wider than that of the papers.
30
 
In wartime, censorship kept a more careful eye on newsreels too. They had 
been shown in the Italian cinemas since 1927, making a critical contribution to the 
construction of the Duce’s popular image and the circulation of the Fascist myths. 
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The LUCE institute, which had been founded and placed under government control 
in 1925, was the efficient organisation that presided over the regime’s 
photographic and cinematographic propaganda. Following a decree issued in 
1926, all cinemas in the country had to screen the LUCE films. One year later 
newscast made its debut: a ten-minute Giornale Cinematografico kept Italians 
abreast of all the latest deeds of Mussolini and his hierarchs. In the first ten years 
of activity the work of LUCE was mostly focused on domestic issues, stressing 
Italy’s advances in agriculture, industrial output, public works and architecture. 
From the Ethiopian campaign of 1935 more effort was put in increasing popular 
consensus towards Mussolini’s imperial ambition, and emphasising the ever 
closer relationship with Hitler as well as Italy’s growing estrangement from the 
democratic powers. In the Second World War, as the next chapters will show, the 
LUCE material became increasingly reticent both about military operations and life 
on the home front, as people had to face a reality that was less and less feasible for 
authorities to disguise.
31
  
Overseeing the press, radio, cinema, theatre and the whole publishing 
industry, the propaganda machine aimed at contributing to the regime’s effort to 
counter civilian demoralisation during the Fascist war, since this was a critical 
factor for both the outcome of conflict and the persistence of Mussolini’s popular 
support. The usual caveats of studying authoritarian and totalitarian societies 
apply to the sources employed in this work for the reconstruction of the popular 
reaction to war propaganda, such as confidential reports.
32
 Those sources have 
been used while mindful of the reservations expressed about their reliability in the 
literature on Fascism.
33
 Yet, as Philip Morgan has argued, although official 
                                                 
31
 Gabriele D’Autilia (ed.), Luce: l’immaginario italiano (Rome: ERI, 2014); Federico Caprotti, 
‘Information Management and Fascist Identity: Newsreels in Fascist Italy’, Media History 
3(2005), pp. 177-191.  
32
 For an up-to-date summary of the debate on public opinion in Fascist Italy, see Emilio Gentile, 
Paul Corner and Christopher Duggan, ‘Two New Books on Fascism. A Review, the Authors’ 
Responses and the Reviewer’s Comments’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 5 (2014), pp. 665-
683.   
33
 According to Luigi Ganapini, confidential reports are not only ‘partial’, but also ‘suspect 
sources’ for the history of Fascist Italy, because they contain information and opinions influenced 
by ‘an often unintelligible’ human, social and political situation. Their authors, Ganapini argued, 
were ‘anonymous individuals stringing together rumours, gossip instrumental in party feuds, 
12 
records from police or party sources might ‘convey a perspective on people and 
events peculiar to the role of the organisation reporting on them’ and obstruct 
historians from distancing themselves from a ‘top-down perspective’ of popular 
behaviour, the evidence of informant material is ‘sometimes so cumulative as to 
be compelling’. In particular, it is difficult ‘to doubt their accuracy, in the late 
1930s’, when confidential reports detailed discontent about rising prices, 
shortages and war.
34
 The same careful attention in reconstructing popular attitudes 
is given to sources like personal diaries and memoirs, in particular those not 
coeval with the war years. The spontaneity of censored letters, another valuable 
resource, allow researchers to grasp how news and rumours were received and 
circulated, and how they affected morale. In 1942, some 9 million letters were 
posted every day. The 60 percent involving soldiers were all censored, whereas 
only 30 percent of those sent between civilians were opened. Mussolini himself 
received a summary of the censored correspondence.
35
 These letters show that, in 
comparison with the Great War, from 1939 onward there was no longer an 
antithesis between ‘the hell of the trenches and the oasis of peace that was home’: 
even soldiers felt the breath of air power on their houses and their families.
36
 
Besides official sources in the Italian and British archives, in order to form 
a reliable framework for the propaganda output in 1938-1943, a wide section of 
national and local daily newspapers, illustrated magazines, newsreels, 
documentaries, feature films, broadcast summaries, songs and scripts have been 
examined, alongside directives from the Duce, instructions from the MCP and 
interventions by other authorities in the regime. Analysis of British media and 
institutional activities aimed at the Italian public has helped with a focus on the 
effectiveness – or otherwise – of Mussolini’s apparatus in this area, while 
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reference to German sources has been useful in comparing the working styles, 
campaigns and topics of the Nazi and Fascist media machines. These sources have 
been explored together with the memoirs, diaries and correspondence of those 
involved in the propaganda organisations and of ordinary Italians. It is important 
to understand that censors and journalists left little testimony of their experience 
at the time – both professions tending to obliterate their cooperation with the 
regime and contribute to the huge effort of self-acquittal in which Italians engaged 
after 1945, rather than examining their roles and assessing their support of 
Mussolini’s construction of consensus. Although in Fascist Italy there was no 
form of systematic and transparent gathering of popular attitudes other than 
information coming from police and PNF sources, many more documents are 
available that can reconstruct the Italian people’s perception of propaganda 
material since the regime’s hierarchies, from Mussolini downwards, heavily 
utilised confidential reports and thus were committed in keeping a functional 
network of informers. 
The material analysed shows that there was no clear-cut development or 
distinction in chronological or logical phases in war propaganda. This work 
argues that Fascist authorities, Mussolini included, muddled along because they 
were unused to making plans and did not modulate their activities according to 
popular feeling or reaction. The first chapter shows, for example, that preaching 
of hatred against the enemy and framing of the British air raids as barbarous was 
not confined, as Renzo De Felice among others has argued, to the last part of the 
Fascist war, but were stereotypes in the regime’s propaganda as early as the nine 
months of non-belligerence.
37
 Indeed, the four priorities that Eric Lehman has set 
apart in the Italian framing of enemy air raids (illustrating the terrorist use of 
bombing; documenting the destruction of civilian buildings to show that the 
enemy and not the regime was to blame for the deterioration of quality of life; 
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emphasising the damage to monuments; highlighting acts of heroism to boost 
morale) could be found from 1940, as this work will explain.
38
  
The first chapter, in particular, compares Fascist Italy’s construction of the 
myth of air power to the condition on the home front in the second half of the 
1930s, and shows that Italy was in fact lacking the means and morale to fight 
when war approached its shores. Chapter 2 deals with the mistakes the regime 
persisted in making during the difficult  transition from non-belligerence to war 
and how these were translated in propaganda material. Civil defence and 
evacuation, in particular, have been analysed as policy failures and emblematic 
factors of weakness exposed by the first enemy air raids and influenced by 
popular attitude in subsequent years. The idealised media representation of key 
figures charged with responsibilities on the home front, compared with their 
actual standing in the community or their effective place in wartime Italy, made 
clear Fascism’s inability to exploit its organisations to establish a functional and 
credible machine for civil defence. 
The third chapter presents attempts by Fascist propaganda as early as the 
first year of hostilities to deny that war was a disruptive break with the deeply-
rooted rhythms and habits of Italy, while at same time it was describing in the 
crudest terms the terrible consequences of German air raids over English cities. 
Blows to Italian morale came from the ruinous participation of the Regia 
Aeronautica in the Battle of Britain and the successful British attack on the fleet 
at Taranto, despite media efforts to divert attention from the doubts and fears that 
were gradually spreading among the population.  Chapter 4 highlights the 
increasing inability of Fascist propaganda to deliver a consistent message when 
new military setbacks in 1941 widened the breach in people’s morale. Trumpeted 
by the media in the first year of war as examples of the inexorable discipline 
imposed by the regime, trials of crimes during blackout were increasingly under-
reported, as the authorities feared the implicit message of subversion conveyed by 
the hyperactivity of the special tribunal charged with judging such crimes. 
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Sources show that feelings of insecurity and mistrust towards the Fascist 
hierarchy did not translate into forms of public dissent. Nevertheless they 
undermined morale as they  were increased by conjecture and rumour that media 
distortion and lies generated among the population. The work of censors was 
more effective in keeping under control written material for feature films, shows 
and entertainment in general – all forms of popular culture that met with great 
success during the first years of war. 
Chapter 5, investigating the MCP’s activity, the work of the media and the 
public reaction in the final phase of Mussolini’s war, shows that with the 
worsening situation on the home front in 1942 owing to enemy air raids, the 
weakness of Italian propaganda appeared increasingly part of the broader failure 
of Fascism. In 1943 the MCP inflated the routine of messages criminalising the 
enemy and made intensive use of fabricated stories. Failing to present a plausible 
and coherent narrative for the suffering of civilians, it was unable to stir waves of 
hatred against the enemy, producing instead material which aroused disillusion 
and anger against the Duce and the regime.  
17 
Chapter 1. Towards the Air War: Propaganda, the Media and Public 
Opinion, 1938-1939 
 
Italians who went to the cinema in the spring of 1938 to see the British film 
Things to Come, based on a script by H. G. Wells and set in a fictional city hit by 
a sudden air raid, knew that thousands of their compatriots were fighting in Spain 
to help Francisco Franco overthrow the Republican government and that a few 
years earlier Italian soldiers had fought in Africa to conquer Ethiopia and bestow 
on King Vittorio Emanuele III the title of Emperor. They probably were not aware 
– since the Italian media were prone to portray troops and airmen as chivalrous – 
that in both wars the Italian army had employed powerful tools of destruction to 
curb the enemy’s resistance: during that spring Mussolini’s and Hitler’s aircraft 
were bombing Spanish cities in order to terrorise civilian populations and subdue 
their confidence and morale. A number of Italians also remembered that enemy 
aircraft had bombed northern Italian cities during the Great War.
1
 What most 
Italians did not imagine was that such weapons would be used against them in 
their own country and on an unprecedented scale within a few months; they were 
led to view the catastrophic air raids portrayed in the British movie as pure 
science fiction. Comments in the press considered Things to Come as being 
completely out of touch with reality. ‘If such a script’, one anonymous reviewer 
wrote in May 1938,  
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had been chosen for a Mickey Mouse story, it would probably have been delightful … Starring 
Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy, it would have been an excellent comic movie. Instead, the 
comedy,which develops against the author’s will, has that taste of parody which always 
accompanies works of imagination lacking in imagination ... Imagine that, in 1940 –touch wood – 
war breaks out.
2
 
 
At the end of September 1938 the start of a new European war seemed to have 
been avoided and the Fascist regime used fictitious diplomatic success to disguise 
Italy’s inadequate preparation for war. Returning to Italy from Munich, where he 
had taken part in the meeting between Hitler and the British and French prime 
ministers Chamberlain and Daladier, Mussolini was greeted as the arbiter of the 
agreement which ended the Czech crisis.
3
 As most Italians celebrated a short-lived 
peace, the subject of the ‘future war’ was confined to military and intellectual 
circles, seldom attracting the attention of a wider public.
4
 In the summer of 1938 
the Turin daily newspaper La Stampa made an attempt at popularising the subject 
of the air war by serialising a biography of Giulio Douhet, the precursor of 
modern studies on the topic and a forceful advocate for an autonomous air force in 
the Italian military, and whom Mussolini and Balbo adopted as an inspirational 
figure without carrying out his ideas in practice.
5
 
The aim of this chapter is to compare the propagandistic constructions of the myth 
of war, primarily the myth of air war, in Fascist Italy to the real conditions and 
actual preparations on the home front in the years preceding June 1940. A country 
ideologically conditioned for war was in fact lacking in the means and morale to 
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fight. Under cover of turning out for meetings, parades and exercises, people 
harboured an opposition to war which the regime did not manage to overcome but 
which also did not evolve into organised and effective opposition or dissent.            
 
1.1 Civil Defence in Pre-War Italy   
During the 1930s the Italian authorities had striven to establish an apparatus 
charged with the organisation of air raid protection and specific training for 
civilians in case of incursions and gas attacks. Mussolini had personally warned 
his compatriots against such dangers, adopting a clear stance which should have 
alerted Italians to probable future government policies on civil defence and the 
domestic front in the event of war. The Duce had extolled the importance of air 
war and praised Italian aviation in a speech to the Senate on 30 March 1938 that 
focused on the Italian military situation and was amplified by the media (all the 
EIAR stations, the State broadcaster, transmitted it live), but he had also warned 
that,  
 
as far as passive defence is concerned, the best option consists in evacuating from the centres of 
population all those who, and they are a great many, are not obliged to live there. From now on I 
say that all those who can organise their life in smaller cities, in villages, in the countryside, would 
do the right thing not waiting for the eleventh hour. Tomorrow, everything that is going to hold up 
the traffic could be forbidden. So much the worse for the improvident and the latecomer.
6
    
 
Italy’s campaign for the Ethiopian conquest and its support for the rebels in the 
Spanish Civil War had had the effect of alienating the country from France and 
Britain and making the relationship with Nazi Germany closer and more 
demanding.
7
 From October 1936 a Berlin-Rome Axis had ratified increasing 
cooperation between the two regimes. A full military and political alliance, the 
Pact of Steel, followed on 22 May 1939. A month earlier the Duce, prompted by 
Hitler’s annexationist policies and reassured by the immobility of the other 
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European powers, had invaded and taken Albania.
8
 Italy’s aggressive nationalism 
was reflected in the regime’s martial rhetoric and in propaganda efforts to 
construct and make credible the image of a strong nation under the Duce’s 
command,
9
 but preparation for an efficient system of civil defence seemed even 
more faltering and belated than the attempt to adapt the outdated Italian military 
to the needs of total war.           
 The UNPA (National Union of Anti-aircraft Protection) had been legally 
established in 1934 as a public body entrusted with the task of supplementing the 
activities of the military authorities in charge of anti-aircraft protection, 
disseminating information about the true dangers of air war, and cooperating in 
implementing protection measures under the supervision of the Ministry of War. 
Two years later new regulations stated that planned urban tunnels had to be used 
as permanent anti-aircraft shelters and that new residential buildings must be 
provided with shelters – although it was not long before the public bodies 
entrusted with the task of building council houses obtained an exemption from 
that obligation. It was only in 1938 that a regulation governing the construction of 
public shelters was enacted. In 1939 the fire brigades, traditionally organised on a 
local basis, were nationalised and placed under the control of the Ministry of 
Interior. Comprehensive rules on the war duties of the capifabbricato (wardens of 
apartment blocks who were Fascist party members) and on anti-aircraft protection 
for industrial plants were issued only in November 1940, when Italy had been at 
war for five months. This sequence of regulations did not appear to be matched by 
tangible improvements in practice and, according to Amedeo Giannini, the jurist 
entrusted in 1938 with the task of teaching a course on the legal system of anti-
aircraft protection at the University of Rome (in 1938 the Ministry of National 
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Education enjoined every Italian university to give lectures on anti-aircraft 
protection), should have been ‘more organised and systematic’.10 
 In 1939 evacuation plans for the largest cities were drawn up, stipulating 
that only selected groups of people should remain in urban centres (soldiers; 
workers assigned to war production, utilities, public transport, fuel deposits and 
pumps; anti-aircraft protection personnel; government employees). But these 
plans were not publicised and were executed slowly, thwarted by politicians and 
civil servants worried that they might reveal the regime’s weakness and cause 
public concern. In addition, ministers in the central government and prefects at 
provincial level issued decrees stating that the eventuality of the plans being used 
‘must be excluded’, as a ritual to ward off of bad luck.11These delays and 
organisational hold-ups were a significant aspect of the overall inefficiency 
which, despite the passage of new laws and the institution of appropriate bodies, 
marked the Italian people’s preparation for civil mobilisation in case of war. An 
inter-ministerial Supreme Defence Commission set up in 1923-1925 met annually 
under Mussolini’s supervision and on several occasions dealt with the problem of 
the protection of infrastructures and civilians from air raids. However, in the field 
of civil mobilisation it exercised ‘no appreciable executive functions, which 
remained vested in the armed forces and in their rivals for influence and authority, 
the key civilian ministries’.12    
 Most Italians were well aware of this situation and regarded the prospect 
of Italy entering war with growing concern. On 2 March 1939, in Milan, a police 
informant reported on people remarking that, ‘instructions have not yet been given 
to build proper shelters in case of air raids’, and that, ‘the overwhelming majority 
of citizens have not been provided with gas masks’. Giovanni Battista Marziali, a 
committed Fascist who came from the party ranks and took office as prefect of 
Milan on 22 August 1939, confirmed these judgements a few days after his 
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arrival, writing in a report to the head of police, Arturo Bocchini, that, ‘most 
people do not have enthusiasm for war’ and that citizens had noticed ‘the 
inadequate preparations for passive defence’ in a city ‘nearly entirely lacking in 
anti-aircraft shelters’.13           
 
1.2 Keeping Up Appearances: Anti-Aircraft Experiments and Media Reports 
On the eve of the Second World War the Italian press had been under the strong 
hand of Fascist control for at least 15 years. A specialised division of the MCP – 
the  powerful government agency which oversaw the media, cinema, theatre, arts, 
and publishing, with a staff of nearly 1,600 people – supervised the newspapers 
and sent them daily detailed instructions on how to deal with current affairs and 
other regime-sensitive topics. Once a week, or whenever it was deemed necessary 
to discuss urgent matters, either the minister (who was in constant and direct 
contact with Mussolini) or his chief of staff would meet editors and the most 
influential commentators to discuss the political situation and convey the Duce’s 
will.
14
    
 In 1939 there were no longer significant differences between the Fascist 
press (owned by the party or by prominent party figures) and the independent 
newspapers of pre-Fascist Italy which had been brought into the regime’s orbit 
either through intimidation or through the forced transfer of property to more 
complaisant owners: only small nuances differentiated them, such as the degree of 
warmth shown in their propagandising of the alliance with Hitler. The overall 
circulation of Italian dailies at this time was 4,500,000 copies. Il Popolo d’Italia, 
the newspaper founded and owned by Mussolini, had a readership of around 
230,000, boosted by compulsory and deferential subscriptions. The Corriere della 
Sera, based in Milan but with a national readership, averaged a daily circulation 
of 597,000. The Turin-based La Stampa distributed 300,000. Il Messaggero sold 
200,000 copies, mostly in the capital. All newspapers, in chronic financial trouble 
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and affected by paper shortages, received funds from the government. In the same 
year, Italian radio had 1,200,000 subscribers (the equivalent of 6 million listeners) 
– a small number in comparison with the 13 million in Germany and the 9 million 
in Britain that is partly explicable by the prohibitive costs of subscriptions and 
wireless sets.
15
  
 Media appeal was undermined by illiteracy levels (21 percent of Italians 
could not read).
16
 Yet the main reason for the comparatively low newspaper 
circulation and radio audiences was credibility. In May 1939 an informer from 
Forlì reported hearing influential people buying a newspaper and saying, ‘give me 
six lire of gossip’ or ‘give me six lire of lies’.17 A contemporary foreign observer, 
a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor in Italy, wrote that, ‘people of 
all classes laughed at the newspapers’ and ‘the attitude of the average Italian 
toward the press was one either of contempt or of indifference’. People with a 
command of French or German read Swiss newspapers, while L’Osservatore 
Romano, organ of the Vatican, ‘was the most popular newspaper in Italy until the 
Fascist strong-arm squads drove it off the streets shortly before Italy entered the 
war and compelled a strict neutrality thereafter in its columns’.18 A similar view 
was expressed shortly before Italy entered the war by a police informant in Milan 
who, on 18 April 1940, reported that, ‘almost all those who want to substantiate 
their aversion to Germany with facts and reasons refer to news and comments 
which they read every day in L’Osservatore Romano and listen to the four daily 
Radio Londra broadcasts’.19 In the year preceding Italy’s entry into war, police 
and party reports from Rome recorded that newspapers’ exaggerations made 
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readers wary even of genuine news, a disaffection with the press that also 
extended to the radio. 
20
      
 Under the eye of Fascist censorship, newspapers, radio and Istituto LUCE 
covered UNPA and other anti-aircraft activities, such as experiments and tests, with 
ambivalence: deployment exercises and resources were talked up to illustrate 
Fascism’s ability to guarantee discipline and organisation in this as in any other 
aspect of public and private life; at the same time Italians were induced to think 
that the whole mechanism was destined to stay unused because potential enemies 
were aware of the extent of Italian power. In comparison with the activities 
carried out in the first two decades after the First World War, anti-aircraft 
experiments and demonstrations involving civilian populations in the 1930s were 
more regular and systematic. Sometimes they fell under the remit of services such 
as the fire brigades which were routinely praised in official propaganda, for 
example in a newsreel which documented preventive measures against air 
chemical attacks trialled in the port of Trieste. More often, particularly for the 
young, such exercises were occasions for generational integration and ‘political 
socialisation’, such as the tests organised in the winter of 1938 in the Roman area 
of Monte Mario, a frequently chosen location for political and paramilitary 
demonstrations, to train balilla and avanguardisti against air and gas attacks. 
However, such events soon began to attract the attention of a larger circle of 
Fascist leaders and consequently of the media.
21
 
 The ‘propaganda of agitation’, successfully implemented during the 
Ethiopian war, focused on the political and diplomatic factors arising from the 
situation in Europe after the Munich agreement. It was carried out following a 
pattern which had been adopted in the past whenever the media was requested to 
publicise Mussolini’s important choices, and which usually consisted of three 
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elements: justifying the regime’s decisions or policies, stirring up popular 
enthusiasm and exciting public morale.
22
 This propaganda pattern was repeated 
during the months following the German invasion of Poland. Redundancy, 
iteration, and schematisation were the most recurrent stylistic devices used in the 
Italian propaganda narrative in the months before Mussolini’s decision to enter 
the war.
23
 Recurrent clichés – such as the myth of the masses perpetually ready 
for action –were obsessively repeated in the usual magniloquent style, framing a 
fictional world in which the merits of the Fascist people and nations were set 
against the failings of democracies. In 1939 the perception the public would have 
had was of relentless activity in the field of anti-aircraft defence. Newsreels 
liberally showed images of zealous organisers, functioning equipment and 
cooperative crowds under the contented gaze of the district authorities. According 
to the press, for example, in March the densely-populated Turin district of San 
Salvario, which was to be heavily bombed later in the war, performed an ‘entirely 
successful evacuation exercise’.  Not long after, in the Colosseum square, 
Mussolini and Fascist party secretary Achille Starace inspected personnel who 
had been engaged in a two-day test of anti-aircraft defence. Again, a month later, 
the Duce arrived without notice at a Breda factory near Rome which produced 
automatic guns, to inspect in person how the defence system worked. In July, in 
Naples, crown prince Umberto was present at a review of the local anti-aircraft 
detachments made up of 12,000 men and women who paraded with firefighters’ 
trucks and Red Cross ambulances.
24
  
 Keeping up appearances was imperative when foreign observers or 
dignitaries were around. In mid-April 1939, for instance, the German air force 
commander-in-chief Hermann Goering was in Rome to discuss with Mussolini 
and Ciano the situation created by the occupations of Albania and Bohemia, while 
the city was engaged in a showy anti-aircraft exercise and inspection by the Duce. 
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While newspapers reported in the usual assured tone that, ‘the deployment of the 
anti-aircraft militia went off with chronometric regularity and matchless speed’, 
the presence in the capital of the prestigious guest caused anxiety; the organisers 
borrowed exercise personnel and equipment from outside UNPA in an attempt to 
impress. But the sham did not pass unnoticed by the German military attaché in 
Rome, who observed that the anti-aircraft batteries were insufficient and that field 
batteries had to be added ‘to give the impression of a mighty defence’.25 
Confidential reports also pointed to a reality that diverged from the edifying scene 
depicted in the media. On 13 and 15 April 1939, the questore of Rome drew up a 
list of flaws in the anti-aircraft experiments and sent it to the chief of police: 906 
individuals had been fined for infringing exercise regulations; the emergency 
signal had been almost inaudible and mistaken for ambulance and fire engine 
sirens; at the popular market in Campo de’ Fiori traders did not want to leave their 
stalls unattended fearing theft; public employees had come out onto their office 
balconies to enjoy the show.
26
       
 Not only did spectacular displays of men and means not deceive 
sympathetic insiders such as von Rintelen, but they also made little impression on 
Italian public opinion. In 1939 Fascist informants frequently reported that many 
of their compatriots appeared to be afraid of war, mostly on account of their 
country’s vulnerability. In July people in Genoa were reported as predicting that 
their city would ‘suffer the heaviest damages, incalculable damages, in that it is 
infinitely more exposed than other Italian cities to air and maritime attacks’. This 
kind of concern was also noted in the Veneto region where, in April, it was 
reported that women especially feared ‘the air offensive, mindful of the sorrowful 
events in Padua in the other war’.27  
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1.3 Italy and the European Crisis of Summer 1939  
The months between the outbreak of armed conflict in Europe and Italy’s entry 
into the war were a challenging test for key sectors of the regime. The propaganda 
machine, along with diplomacy, party and State bureaucracy, had to adapt to the 
political oscillations of the Fascist leadership, in which even the Duce’s inner 
circle was beginning to raise doubts about the feasibility of war plans with Hitler.  
The authorities’ attitude to civil defence and the preparation of the home front 
mirrored the pessimistic assessment of military capability, wavering between 
exaltation of an unproven readiness and incautious underestimation of the needs 
of total war. Wartime propaganda campaigns were often improvised, following 
changing ideological positions or policies that randomly issued from the regime. 
War propaganda should therefore be weighed against the aptitude and coherence 
of the whole Fascist apparatus. This factor has been largely neglected in the 
literature, even in the most detailed and accurate accounts.
28
  
 During the confused days of late August-early September 1939 the Italian 
media began a propaganda campaign against urbanisation (a constant theme of 
Mussolini’s demographic and social views) as an argument about the necessity of 
staying away from large cities. Newspapers pointed to a recent law which forbade 
migration to industrial areas and large cities to anyone who did not have a job or a 
specific reason to live there.
 
The law was intended to reduce urban unemployment 
and counter the depopulation of the countryside. Moreover, anti-urbanism – 
conceived by the Duce as a restraint on large and potentially revolutionary urban 
masses and consistent, as Carl Ipsen has observed, with Mussolini’s ‘general 
revolt against urban culture’ – served an unintended political purpose in 1939, 
giving authorities and especially propaganda organisers a new tool with which to 
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justify the necessity of emptying the cities and overcrowded areas as a precaution  
against the potential danger of air war. 
29
 
 When the international situation became tenser and the German-Polish 
crisis seemed to foreshadow dramatic developments, the MCP sought to adopt a 
more systematic approach, passing instructions to newspapers on how to present 
the precautionary measures the authorities had adopted as soon as circumstances 
worsened. On 29 August editors were told that newspapers were allowed, ‘also in 
front-page headlines’, to record the measures regarding road traffic, one-course 
meals and evacuation. The censor underlined that, as no bulletin had been issued 
about evacuation, ‘short articles’ should explain ‘how, after general reflection and 
in line with provisions that have been taken everywhere, it is a good idea for those 
who are able  to leave built-up areas, especially women, the elderly and children’. 
The directive suggested that government measures should be highlighted, and 
said, ‘the Nation, even though it retains calm and discipline, is preparing itself for 
the developing situation’. Editors and journalists were advised not to emphasise 
headlines and comments, and to handle the issue as routine business: ‘No 
alarmism’.30 
 The media complied with this order even when a personal message from 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the leaders of the five European countries involved 
in the international crisis openly evoked the spectre of the consequences of air 
war. On 1 September 1939, the day of the German attack on Poland, the US 
president addressed an urgent appeal, requesting an immediate reply,  
 
to every government which may be engaged in hostilities publicly to affirm its determination that 
its armed forces shall in no event, and under no circumstances, undertake the bombardment from 
                                                 
29
 ‘Contro l’urbanesimo’, Corriere della Sera, 27 August 1939; Law of  6 July 1939 n. 1092 
(Provvedimenti contro l’urbanesimo), Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d’Italia, 9 August 1939 n. 185; 
Carl Ipsen, Dictating Demography: the Problem of Population in Fascist Italy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 119. Felice Guarneri, Minister of Foreign Exchange from 
1937 to 1939, confirmed after the war this side effect of the law, recalling in his memoirs that 
‘almost no importance is attributable, within the economic policy of the regime, to the law of July 
1939, which, intending to stem the flow to big cities of destitute and jobless people, basically 
echoed the dramatic appeal Mussolini had made to inhabitants to evacuate without waiting for the 
eleventh hour’. See Felice Guarneri, Battaglie economiche fra le due guerre, ed. Luciano Zani 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 1988), p. 887-888.  
30
 La stampa del regime 1932-1943, ed. Tranfaglia with Maida, pp. 388-399 (instructions of 29 
August 1939). 
29 
the air of civilian populations or of unfortified cities, upon the understanding that these same rules 
of warfare will be scrupulously observed by all of their opponents.
31
       
 
While the appeal was widely reported abroad, together with the response of 
concerned governments, Italian newspapers were forced to disregard it, limiting 
themselves to short (and even inaccurate) news pieces, without referring explicitly 
to the message in headlines and without hinting at the official Italian answer to the 
American president’s letter. 32 A few days later, a vague allusion to the American 
appeal was a pretext to repeat that, ‘the official declarations made to ban any 
military action against civilian population do not mean that the necessity to 
evacuate urban centres has lessened’. The article pointed out that evacuation 
‘must continue without waiting for extreme urgency’, given that, ‘air bombing can 
sometimes achieve different targets from those intended and can endanger 
civilians’, women’s, and children’s lives’.33 Discrediting Roosevelt had been a 
constant fixation of Fascist propaganda even before the war. In 1938 and 1939 the 
MCP circulated several instructions with this aim, laconically summarised in one 
sent to editors and journalists on 17 April 1939: ‘Attack Roosevelt’.34 
Despite all efforts at censorship, in the days before the outbreak of war the 
message the Italian authorities conveyed through newspapers and other media 
remained confused and worrisome for the public. On the eve of Mussolini’s ‘non-
belligerence’ decision, Italians felt frightened and vulnerable. At the end of 
August, readers were informed that the Vatican had distributed gas masks among 
                                                 
31
 Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1939-June 1940, Vol. 2, ed. S. Shepard Jones 
and Denis P. Myers (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1940), p. 352.  
32
 ‘Le Président Roosevelt demande que la population des villes ne soit pas bombardée’, Le 
Figaro, 2 September 1939; ‘Air bombing of civilians. US President’s appeal to five nations’, The 
Times, 2 September 1939; ‘Roosevelt pleads for bombing curb’, The New York Times, 2 
September 1939; ‘Gli Stati Uniti devono rimanere neutrali’, Corriere della Sera, 2 September 
1939; ‘Roosevelt riafferma la neutralità americana’, La Stampa, 2 September 1939 (owing perhaps 
to a flaw in the channel of information from government offices to newsrooms, the Turin-based 
newspaper stated that Roosevelt’s appeal included a request that open cities be spared). In an oral 
statement from the Foreign Ministry to the American ambassador to Rome on 1 September, the 
Italian government replied that, ‘since the Fascist Government after today’s meeting of the 
Council of Ministers has officially declared and announced, “that Italy will not take any initiative 
in military operations”, the possibility which formed the object of the message from the President 
of the United States dated September 1 is therefore to be excluded as far as concerns Italy’ 
(Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1939-June 1940, Vol. 2,  p. 354).   
33
 ‘Lo sfollamento delle città deve essere continuato’, Corriere della Sera, 4 September 1939. 
34
 Flora, Stampa dell’era fascista: le note di servizio, p. 60. 
30 
the Swiss Guards.
35
 On 27 August, Richard G. Massock, head of the Rome bureau 
of the Associated Press, on his way to the censor’s headquarters at the MCP saw 
signs of war everywhere: ‘In the streets one might have thought that Italy was 
going to war. The city was darkened in an all-night blackout experiment’.36 Two 
days later, Galeazzo Ciano noted in his diary that the Duce was setting out ‘a 
series of military and civilian measures of warlike nature, which, in my opinion, 
need not be taken at this time’.37    
 Official instructions were deliberately not clearly defined, with 
newspapers reporting a dispatch from Stefani (the news agency which acted as the 
official voice of the Fascist regime) encouraging people living in large cities in 
Piedmont, Lombardy, Liguria, Tuscany, Latium, Campania, Sicily and Sardinia  
‘who are in condition to do it’ to move to the country or to small towns. An 
anonymous Corriere della Sera columnist pointed out that, ‘the quiet behaviour 
and serene calm of the Italian people in these heated days of European life’ did 
not disguise ‘the gravity of the situation’ and ‘the risk of war’ – an ambiguous 
message which tried to balance the necessity of early warning with an image of a 
resolute and fearless country.
38
 Government instructions were scarce and vague 
and caused discontent even among the most committed Fascist and pro-Fascist 
figures. The uncertainty and hesitation of censors and journalists mirrored the 
disorientation and division noticeable within the Fascist leadership. Giovanni 
Ansaldo, editor of the Livorno-based daily Il Telegrafo and a close friend of 
Ciano, recorded this sentiment at the end of August in his diary:  
 
We are sailing more than ever out to sea. To understand as much, it would suffice to read the 
instructions received by the press, which contradict one another daily. The day before yesterday, 
for instance, the order was: ‘Do not stress the solidarity within the Axis’. This evening: ‘Do stress 
the solidarity within the Axis’. Verbatim.39 
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On 31 August and 1 September Giorgio Pini, the editor-in-chief of Il Popolo 
d’Italia who was in constant contact with Mussolini, reassured the Duce that, ‘in a 
recent unforeseen exercise the whole of Milan was totally blacked out at night, 
with a good demonstration of readiness and discipline’. However, Pini could not 
help complaining that, ‘perhaps clearer directions to the press would be 
appropriate, because strange attitudes are being noticed’. Nevertheless Mussolini 
– who had prevented newspapers from being hawked in the streets because ‘boys 
have a bad habit of shouting false headlines and crackbrained sentences that they 
invent in order to attract people’s attention’ – was convinced that government 
instructions were sufficient and clear.
40
     
 
1.4 Beyond the Authorised Version: Life in a ‘Non-Belligerent’ Country   
On 1 September the council of ministers opted for non-belligerence, the formula 
Mussolini devised to give diplomatic plausibility to the choice of ‘neither peace 
nor war’ and to disguise both the unreadiness of the military and the aversion of 
the Italian people to entering conflict. The following day, newspapers reported 
that Rome ‘will take no initiative in military operations’ and that ‘the adopted 
measures are and will remain simply precautionary’.41 The authorities persisted in 
underlining the precautionary nature of such measures in the attempt to avoid the 
alarming confusion of the preceding days; total blackout measures in large cities 
from 31 August with neon signs switched off, car lights dimmed and shopping 
hours reduced all spread anxiety and fear among the civilian population. 
Therefore precautionary measures were reassuringly described as ‘exercises’ and 
newspapers articles praised the perfect discipline and cooperation of civilians: in 
Rome, traffic conditions were improved and the blackout was working perfectly. 
At the same time, authorities insisted that families with no reason to stay should 
leave the largest cities. Again, these were unplanned directives circulated locally 
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through official announcements and posters which stressed the voluntary nature of 
evacuation: 
 
Voluntary evacuation means you can choose where to go …. Voluntary evacuation means not 
waiting until the last minute, but to give oneself in time while transport is still fully available …. 
Voluntary evacuation is not a privilege reserved in practice only for the wealthy, but a provision 
that affects all social classes. Voluntary evacuation is a real necessity that every family must 
consider.
42
    
 
Yet, in practice, only the rich could leave urban areas by their own means. In the 
last days of August 1939 the families of senior officials, landowners, industrialists 
and traders left  Rome for the Castelli Romani area, Abruzzo, Umbria or other 
nearby smaller places.
43
 Guido Gonella, who wrote  frequent anti-German 
columns as foreign affairs commentator for L’Osservatore Romano, was an eye-
witness to the first evacuation on the day of the Anglo-French declaration of war, 
after a police officer had picked him up from his country house to take him to the 
questura in Rome in line with an arrest order personally issued by Mussolini: 
 
We set out immediately along the Cassia Road, and looking out of the window I could see an 
appalling scene: very long queues of cars were leaving Rome carrying on their roofs mattresses, 
family objects and other useful things for those who had to abandon their homes. It was a sort of 
evacuation from Rome, since it was feared that Germany would go to war at once and that Italy 
would join at the same time.
44
            
  
Further south, in Campania, Enrico Rocca, a Jewish writer and journalist who 
could not work as a result of the 1938 racial laws, recorded a similar scene: ‘Some 
cars go past with blue-screened lights and roofs full of chairs and bags 
recognisable under tarpaulin. Families evacuate the city’.45 In the north in Venice 
the last holiday-makers of the 1939 season suddenly left hotels and holiday 
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homes. The Seventh Film Festival – which had been running for 24 days without 
interruption even when a blackout experiment darkened calli and canals – ended 
abruptly on 31 August. Foreign guests fled and the international jury vanished. In 
the days to follow, news from the German-Polish border forced organisers and the 
authorities to cancel the award ceremony.
46
 The writer Ugo Ojetti, who was in 
Venice at the time, recorded in his diary:  
  
The porter on my floor, Puppin, tells me that in two or three days more than 300 guests out of 600 
had left. War, war, war, requisitions, one course meals, the elderly, women and children requested 
to leave the city and to go to the countryside. Some think that it is a game of bluff. But the 
majority is frightened.
47
   
  
People who left urban areas to find a place in the countryside or in small villages 
often fell victim to profiteers who offered evacuees any form of rented 
accommodation at exorbitant prices. The authorities soon became aware of this 
and, on 6 September, Mussolini personally cabled all prefects that it was 
necessary to quickly crush ‘deplorable and dangerous phenomena’ such as ‘the 
rent profiteering in small centres’.48 Newspaper reports blamed profiteers not for 
breaking the bond of solidarity in a troubled community, but for unfairly 
competing and breaking rules that had been adopted to carry out the Duce’s will. 
In the Rome area, the Fascist Union of Landlords reminded its members of their 
duty to comply with rules on controlled rent. Infringement and abuses ‘would 
demonstrate, especially at the moment, the lack of a basic sense of moral, political 
and union-minded discipline’.49 In the north, La Stampa pointed to ‘the provident 
and well-timed instructions’ sent out to put an end to activities that ‘in the Fascist 
climate cannot and must not exist’, whereas the prefect of Milan issued a decree 
on the matter, praised in the Corriere della Sera for its ‘ethical significance’: the 
greedy exploitation of a situation in which people were confronted with 
circumstances beyond their control was politically and economically 
inappropriate. 
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The evacuation of the large cities, urged by the Regime as a precautionary measure in the general 
interest, cannot turn into an occasion of exaggerated profit without becoming an outrageous abuse. 
It is not fair that city-dwellers should suffer the disadvantages of a provision essential to the 
peaceful life of the Nation, while the inhabitants of small villages benefit from it.
50
   
  
Profiteering and other unlawful practices such as hiding foodstuff or goods 
beyond normal business needs, infringements of blackout rules or more 
imaginative expedients like the unauthorised selling of gas masks (UNPA had a 
legal monopoly on their sale) were seen as an inconceivable crack in the wall of 
discipline and commitment that the official propaganda regularly described in 
reporting people’s attitudes to war restrictions. Newspaper stories about the 
infringement of rules and non-compliance with precautionary measures 
stigmatised them as rare, disgraceful and swiftly punished with exemplary 
sanctions. In Somma Vesuviana, in the countryside near Naples, the federale 
(provincial party secretary) withdrew the party membership card of a man held by 
police after having asked an inflated rent from families fleeing the city. In 
Bazzano, near Bologna, a landlord was arrested for renting two rooms and kitchen 
at 450 lire per month.
51
  
 People who stayed in cities and urban areas did not suffer this kind of 
trouble, but were forced to live with partial and total blackout experiments and 
other restrictions. Citizens in Florence were described as adapting themselves to 
the new rules ‘with a genuine sense of discipline’ and the city, ‘covered with soft 
clear blue lights, follows the rhythm of its normal life as if using a mute’. In 
Bologna, ‘the faint and veiled lights give roads and squares an aspect of quiet 
mobilisation. Citizens have conformed dutifully to directives’.52 In Turin the 
26,000 lamps illuminating the city ‘change colour, go blue’. Homeowners and 
                                                 
50
 ‘Disposizioni del prefetto contro le illecite speculazioni in danno degli sfollandi’, La Stampa, 6 
September 1939; ‘Le case nei comuni minori. Un decreto del prefetto disciplina il mercato degli 
affitti e stronca le esosità’, Corriere della Sera, 8 September 1939. 
51
 Corriere della Sera, 13 September 1939; Lo sfollamento delle grandi città e la disciplina dei fitti 
nei centri di trasferimento’, Corriere della Sera, 7 September 1939; ‘Proprietario di casa esoso 
tratto in arresto’, La Stampa, 9 September 1939. 
52
 ‘Esperimenti di oscuramento’, La Stampa, 1 September 1939. 
35 
capifabbricato were mobilised to prevent tenants from opening windows.
53
 All 
city dwellers had another duty: ‘Not to wait for the eleventh hour’ but to 
immediately ‘provide themselves with gas masks’.54 According to the press, 
therefore, discipline and order reigned in Italy, but in fact evidence of scepticism, 
resistance in adhering to emergency regulations, and profiteering, underlined 
Mussolini’s failure in attaining one of his most valued goals – building what 
Pierre Milza has described as, ‘that belligerent and fanatic race he dreamed of’.55  
   
1.6 A Temporary Relief  
The choice of non-belligerence was a temporary relief for Italians, as even the 
police and party information had to record. The chief of police, Arturo Bocchini, 
reported to Mussolini and Ciano that the country was and remained 
‘fundamentally anti-German’.56 ‘The word “neutrality” has not been spoken’, the 
French ambassador to Rome François Poncet wrote to Foreign Minister Georges 
Bonnet on the night of 1 September, ‘but it is in precisely this way that people 
have interpreted the decision not to take any military initiative’. The diplomat 
observed that the council of ministers’ decision, ‘has marked at once a feeling of 
pleasure and comfort which changed almost immediately the dismayed face the 
capital offered this morning’.57 The authorities insisted on strict observance of the 
precautions but, as another privileged observer pointed out in a memoir written a 
few years after the end of war,  
 
The country was pleased and reassured and nerves were soothed, after some enormously tense 
weeks, during which Mussolini had enjoyed creating an atmosphere of war and unnecessary alarm 
among the public: ordering blackouts, troop displacement, requisitioning and so forth …. there 
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was also an order that by midnight on 3 September, no private cars were to circulate without 
special permission.
58
    
 
On 7 September MCP instructions to newspaper editors explained that, ‘Italy’s line 
of conduct has been clearly marked out in the council of ministers’ statement, and 
it is solely necessary to refer to this, without pointless and detrimental signs of 
impatience and without hysterical conjecture’. The censor stated that Italians 
knew they were ‘so prodigiously protected by the Duce in peace and war’.59 Two 
days later more bombastic and historically contextualised instructions came 
through: 
 
Today’s Italy is not that of 1914: seventeen years of the Regime have made it powerful, respected 
and feared. The Ethiopian conquest, the victorious Spanish campaign, the swift occupation of 
Albania have proved Italy’s great military abilities, our prestige, and our might. The Italian people 
can therefore return to work and live in the usual atmosphere of calm and discipline, while of 
course being ready for any necessity that may be imposed by developing events.
60
   
    
Newspapers sought to conform to the rules. They continued their pedagogic 
function, instructing people on how to behave and comply with the precautionary 
measures, but adopted a less urgent, less martial tone. The Corriere della Sera, for 
instance, made practical proposals to readers, advising them on how to clear attics 
of rubbish and how to prepare an underground shelter. Around the middle of 
September an exercise at Lovere, a village on the shores of Lake Iseo, in which 13 
female volunteers assigned to an UNPA squad succeeded in clearing the Museum 
of the Accademia Tadini in 45 minutes, was an occasion to praise ‘the technical 
and spiritual preparation of women in the mobilisation of the civilian population’ 
and to publicise that performance in a newsreel promoted by the Ministry of 
National Education and screened all over the country. Ingenious systems for 
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protecting paintings, sculptures and tapestries were shown to Minister Giuseppe 
Bottai, among a cheering party of balilla and piccole italiane.
61
  
 Editors and journalists thus had a new opportunity to epitomise ‘the 
thematic and linguistic conformism’ typical, according to Mario Isnenghi, of the 
press in Fascist Italy, squandering in the service of Mussolini’s propaganda the 
lexical heritage built during their professional experience under dictatorship. This 
new language was crowded with awkward oxymorons (‘the orderly alert’ or ‘the 
quiet mobilisation’), redundant adjectives and reassuring metaphors.62 Writers and 
artists were also enlisted to depict life and restrictions during alarms and 
blackouts as a sort of aesthetic and romantic experience. ‘When the lights go off’, 
Anselmo Bucci (a painter and engraver who had volunteered in the Great War) 
speculated in a long article on the literary page of Corriere della Sera, ‘the city 
turns into a work of art …. I bless the faint lighting. At last we can move around. 
In fact it seems that we live again …. In normal times we never see the night’.63 
At the end of the month lighter, sometimes frivolous, news also began to appear, 
such as the caption to a photograph portraying a woman dressed in a checked 
patterned outfit: ‘Fashion does not abdicate in wartime: here is a dress that elegant 
ladies should wear during night warnings’.64  
 Barely a week after Mussolini’s decision of non-belligerence, the foreign 
press noticed that Italy was easing its precautions and Italian propaganda hastened 
                                                 
61
 ‘Togliere il ciarpame dai solai e allestire ricoveri sotterranei’, Corriere della Sera, 13 September 
1939; ‘Tredici donne sgomberano un Museo in quarantacinque minuti’, Corriere della Sera, 11 
September 1939; ‘Esperimenti di protezione antiaerea al Museo di Lovere’, Istituto Nazionale 
LUCE, Documentario, 1939; ‘Esperimento per il salvataggio di opere d’arte’, Giornale LUCE 
B1583, 13 October 1939. 
62
 Isnenghi, Intellettuali militanti e intellettuali funzionari, p. 176; Ilaria Bonomi, ‘La lingua dei 
giornali italiani del Novecento’, in Storia della lingua italiana, Vol. 2, Scritto e parlato, ed. Luca 
Serianni and Piero Trifone (Turin: Einaudi, 1994), pp. 682-690. 
63
 Anselmo Bucci, ‘Illuminazione ridotta’, Corriere della Sera, 6 September 1939 (See Giuseppe 
Marchiori, ‘Bucci, Anselmo’, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Vol. 14 (Rome: Istituto della 
Enciclopedia Italiana, 1972), pp. 762-763. 
64
 Corriere della Sera, 26 September 1939. In January 1940, a Foreign Office memorandum 
noticed that after four months of non-belligerence there was in the Italian press ‘a tendency to 
more impartial news presentation and an improvement in the variety and quality of articles’. 
According to the optimistic compiler of the report, ‘with the exception of the headlines, which are 
still inclined to show a pro-German bias, most of the important dailies give as much space to news 
from Allied sources as from German’ (TNA, FO 371/24960, Political, Southern, Italy, 1940, 
Memorandum Respecting the Italian Press, 17 January 1940).  
38 
to rejoice, underlining that from abroad the media ‘continues to point out the 
admirable tranquillity which reigns everywhere in our Country’.65 On 12 
September, during the regular meeting at the MCP, journalists were told in self-
congratulatory tones that, ‘we receive from several sources, Palazzo Venezia 
included, signals that public opinion is calm’ and that credit for this should go to 
‘the well-balanced stance of the official Agency and newspapers’.66 The press 
reported that sleeping-car trains from Rome to Paris had restarted, international 
shipping had resumed, wooden air-raid shelters had been dismantled, and the 
closing times of places of entertainment had been extended to midnight. Italian 
newspapers tried to stem popular feelings of uncertainty and restlessness. As The 
Times Rome correspondent pointed out, 
 
it is being emphasised that this is not the moment for marking time. The whole Press has been 
mobilised to preach the necessity of Italy’s carrying on and even increasing her normal 
commercial and industrial activities, which must become ever more important as war causes 
devastation in Europe.
67
   
 
On 16 September Mussolini cabled King Vittorio Emanuele to reassure him on 
improved public morale: 
 
From the reports of prefects, police, Carabinieri, federali and so forth it appears that the Italian 
people, after the emotion of the first days, are recovering their usual equilibrium. Small episodes 
of confusion were due to the evacuation from cities, the total blackout, the recall to arms, the 
hoarding of food. All that resulted in a lot of rumours that, like all rumours in extraordinary times, 
rise, spread and die away and are trusted only by that proportion of half-wits which exists in every 
nation. The resumption of ocean navigation, the end of the blackout, the sanctions against 
profiteers and other measures have restored the calm that was only disturbed by the nervous 
crowds of the big cities.
68
  
 
Therefore, according to the Duce, it was not reticent and confusing official 
directions, but anxiety in overcrowded urban areas that was to blame for the 
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previous days’ excited climate. In fact, even once alarm was no longer so 
immediate after the government had declared non-belligerence, Italians were not 
truly relieved and remained pessimistic about their chances of receiving clear 
directions from above. Among those who had agreed to leave their cities, there 
were many who were particularly disgruntled when, in the second half of 
September 1939, propaganda described the situation as quiet or less alarming. 
Mussolini insisted, in a speech given on 23 September to Fascist party leaders in 
Bologna, on the necessity of mobilisation and military preparation, but people in 
Genoa were reported as criticising ‘the chaos’ of ‘orders and counter-orders’ in 
Rome. Many evacuees returned to the city, complaining about ‘the rash alarmism 
created by the government itself in the first days of September that induced them 
to leave facing huge damage and expenses’.69    
 The Italian people kept living through restrictions and precautions with 
anxiety and concern. Family life, hours and habits were unsettled. The peremptory 
tone of official instructions, even more than their unruly and confused practical 
execution, echoed in the recollection of a child who lived in central Italy. As an 
adult, he recalled those months clearly:  
 
Danger was declared for civilians and cities. ‘Silent zones’ were established against rare car horns, 
imposed by large signs of black lettering on squares of white lime painted on walls at the entrance 
from lower to upper Perugia. I can still vividly remember the total blackout ‘dress rehearsal’, 
probably a few months after the war had begun: it was already dark before dinner …. The total 
blackout exercise, which at the start had been received almost cheerfully with a thrill at the 
novelty, left all of us a bit upset: and mummy made us recite aloud together three Hail Marys and 
one Glory Be. In the evening, when dad came back home, the disquieting event was talked about 
again.
70
  
 
1.7 New Men for Irrevocable Choices  
Recalling the atmosphere in Italy during the months of non-belligerence, the 
Italian ambassador to France, Raffaele Guariglia, observed that, ‘the less [Italians] 
were prepared for war, the more [they] wanted to put on a fierce look’.71 During 
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the nine months preceding entry into war, the Duce had in mind a scenario in 
which at least two outcomes were possible, both of which required a wise 
deployment of propaganda to steer Italian public opinion at home and to send 
clear signals abroad. Since Mussolini did not exclude entering the war at some 
point, he considered  it necessary not only to test the reactivity of the military but 
also to put pressure on the domestic front in order to verify the resistance and 
morale of his compatriots. In addition, the Duce wanted to keep the only promise 
he had made to Hitler when he confessed that Italy could not directly take part in 
the war – committing himself to support Germany and showing the world that 
even a ‘non-belligerent’ country could act as a disciplined and steadfast nation. At 
the end of August 1939, indeed, the Führer had been relieved at Mussolini’s 
decision of neutrality, but had asked him to intensify preparations for war in order 
to deceive the enemy.
72
 The German military attaché in Rome noted in his 
memoir that, seeing the movement of military transport and increasing imports 
and preparations of material for anti-aircraft protection set in motion by 
Mussolini, the other European powers did not know what to think of the Italian 
attitude and could not predict what Mussolini would actually do.
73
 ‘Not being able 
to wage war’, Ciano maliciously hinted, ‘he makes all the necessary preparations 
so that in case of a peaceful solution, he would be able to say that he would have 
waged it’.74                
 With those aims in mind in October 1939 Mussolini, unsatisfied with 
the conduct of several civilian and military figures during the previous difficult 
months, decided on a change of guard in key party and government positions to 
adjust the regime to the new international situation, replacing the most 
controversial or worn-out men with more trusted and younger politicians. Ciano, 
who had a decisive say in the reshuffle thanks to his familiar and political bonds 
with the Duce, seized the opportunity to promote his most trustworthy associates, 
who shared the foreign minister’s mistrust of Hitler and his will to avoid a war 
alliance with the Germans. Among other changes Achille Starace, the party 
                                                 
72
 De Felice, Mussolini il duce. II. Lo stato totalitario 1936-1940, p. 664. 
73
 von Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, pp. 71-72.   
74
 The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943, p. 133 (entry of 30 August 1939).  
41 
secretary who had devised the most choreographed Fascist rituals that showed 
Mussolini deceptive images of a country enthusiastically ready for war, was 
replaced by Ettore Muti, who had served as an airman under Ciano in the 
Ethiopian campaign and had fought in the Spanish war. The undersecretary of 
Foreign Affairs, Giuseppe Bastianini, was sent to London to replace the 
ambassador Dino Grandi. Alessandro Pavolini took over from Dino Alfieri at the 
MCP. Both Muti and Pavolini were very close to Ciano. Alfieri had been deputy 
minister for press and propaganda and had handled the campaign in 1935-1936 
preparing Italians for the conquest of the Empire, for which service he had been 
put at the head of the new MCP in 1937, holding the office for two years. 
Mussolini made him Italian ambassador to the Holy See to make room for 
Pavolini at the ministry.
75
 Alfieri’s successor, an early member of Florence action 
squads and a journalist turned politician, continued the propaganda of non-
belligerence and devoted himself to the task of interpreting Mussolini’s wishes. 
Since he had not risen to prominent roles in the Party or in the press beforehand, 
Pavolini’s promotion to ministerial rank was mostly attributed to his closeness to 
the foreign minister. According to Giovanni Ansaldo – himself a leading member 
of Ciano’s clique, and therefore open to suspicion of jealousy, yet a shrewd 
observer of the Italian journalistic milieu – Pavolini was  
 
a kind of young literary arriviste, a man who started his career organising … the Balilla in 
Florence. More intelligent, more well read and more informed than Alfieri, yet he is less frank, 
less loyal and less gentlemanly. He will be not an easy minister for the press, because he certainly 
has friends to ‘place’ as editors.76 
 
Under Pavolini’s guidance, without sacrificing its highly centralised bureaucratic 
model, the Ministry assumed a more aggressive image and a more combative 
stance, mainly due to the character and temperament of the new minister.
77
 From 
the very beginning of his tenure, Pavolini aimed at making clear one fundamental 
directive: to contain and fight, mostly on the domestic front, the ‘oscillations’ and 
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‘disbanding’ that occurred between the end of August and the first two weeks of 
September, and ‘to raise the temperature’ of the Italian people.78 In the last month 
of 1939, the appointment of a new chief of Italian propaganda who was rumoured 
to be closer to Ciano than to Mussolini could signify that censorship and media 
control were to be adapted to the foreign minister’s priorities. Yet future events 
would show that, although most government ministers were not inclined to war, 
the Duce was the figure in the regime who made the final decisions.    
 
Conclusion 
With Europe on the brink of a new war in September 1939, most Italians were 
still under the influence of the jingoistic complacency that followed the Ethiopian 
and Spanish campaigns. The spectre of a future, total, war was still confined to 
fiction or to initiates in the military or academia. Yet beyond the propagandistic 
curtain, people feared Hitler and did not want alliance with Germany. Open 
dissent did not exist, but Mussolini was constantly informed in police and party 
reports that his country, which since coming to power he had been seeking to 
transform into a nation of ‘citizen soldiers’, was not ready for war, and neither 
was the military machine. ‘The Italian race’, he told Ciano in January 1940, ‘is a 
race of sheep. Eighteen years are not enough to change it’.79  
 Yet Mussolini was adamant in supporting Hitler and in giving both the 
Germans and the democratic powers the impression that Italy could join the fight 
at any moment. To achieve this aim, he needed a propaganda and media narrative 
that could compensate for what the country lacked in substance. Hence the 
frequent press and radio reports on successful exercises and displays of discipline 
among civilians. The MCP, under the Duce’s supervision, was in charge of the 
construction of that narrative, maintaining control over not only the press, but also 
cinema, theatre, the arts and all forms of popular culture. The promotion of 
Alessandro Pavolini in autumn 1939 to the head of the Ministry was instrumental 
in that project.
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Chapter 2. From Non-Belligerence to the First Air Raids 
 
The mission the Duce assigned Pavolini in autumn 1939 was not an easy one. 
Italians were to be prepared for the gamble that the regime was increasingly more 
determined to take – entering the war alongside Hitler to claim a share of the 
booty. Military chiefs had made clear that the country was unprepared and that 
civilians did not have sufficient protection from the hazards of total war, but the 
expectation of a swift victory and the intention of containing operations within a 
small theatre inclined Mussolini to take the risk. In the transition from non-
belligerence to war, Italian propaganda was mostly engaged in highlighting the 
German military effort; the mainstream media did not expound on details that 
might give the public an idea of how remote Italy’s abilities were from the might 
of Hitler’s machine. 
 When war was declared on Britain and France on 10 June 1940, Pavolini 
issued a few general instructions on war reporting, the most important being that 
underestimating enemy military power would be ‘politically foolish’. Aware of 
how zealous newsrooms could be in this respect, he wanted to give a pre-emptive 
warning. In addition, he ordered that Italian military operations be reported with 
‘sober headlines’ avoiding ‘lyricism’. Journalists were allowed to use news from 
British and French official sources only ‘if they confirmed or amplified’ German 
and Italian bulletins. They were told neither to hint at peace prospects nor to 
comment on the speeches of US President Roosevelt. Any mention of new 
‘offensive or defensive devices’ was prohibited.1 However, whereas skilful 
choreography in newspaper pages could invent battlefield successes – though the 
increasing number of listeners to the BBC’S Italian service soon allowed the public 
an alternative to Fascism’s lies – it was difficult to escape reality when the enemy 
attacked Italian cities. Experiencing their own vulnerability, people realised that 
the dictatorship’s pose as an effective and war-like regime was a pretence.  
 This chapter examines the policies the regime adopted (or failed to adopt) 
in the delicate passage from non-belligerence to war and how they were translated 
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in the propaganda material. The focus will be mostly on civil defence and 
evacuation, which had been a critical faultline in Italy since September 1939 
which the first air raids exposed. An analysis of the impact and representation of 
some key figures charged with responsibilities on the home front aims to show the 
frailty of Fascism’s ability to establish a working and credible hierarchical 
apparatus.                        
 
2.1 The Truth about Civil Defence 
Despite the optimistic and self-congratulatory tone of press reports during the first 
months of non-belligerence, at the end of 1939 Italy had a poor system of active 
and passive defence. The anti-aircraft apparatus was suffering from serious 
shortages and was absolutely unprepared for war. There were few fighters to 
intercept enemy aircraft and responsibility for civil defence was shared between 
the army, navy, air force and the Fascist militia.
2
 Only 225 outdated batteries were 
available in the country, and even fewer in the overseas territories (13 in Libya, 14 
in the Aegean and three in Albania). There were no uniforms for soldiers who 
served in the DICAT, the branch of the army charged with intercepting enemy 
planes. Military facilities, although better equipped than the structures devoted to 
civil defence, lacked effective means of protection: 40 new batteries were deemed 
necessary to protect ports and navy bases. Airfields and air force stations were 
exposed to enemy air raids. The military forecast that those requirements would 
not be met until summer 1942.
3
 On 18 November 1939 chief of staff Pietro 
Badoglio, chairing a meeting of the supreme command, raised the issue of anti-
aircraft protection with a scathing preamble: 
 
It is a painful subject. There has been a great deal of scepticism about this: it always happens in 
peacetime, but no longer in wartime. Other nations have prepared their anti-aircraft defence 
according to extensive criteria, giving it the importance that it deserves. For the time being we 
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have only decommissioned, unsuitable material, made good as best we can. When we have a 90 
mm gun, we can begin to say that we have an anti-aircraft gun. 
4
 
 
The conference minutes offer an extraordinary insight into the deficiencies of 
anti-aircraft defence on the eve of Italy’s intervention into the Second World War. 
Badoglio claimed he had in vain told the government since the early 1930s that 
factories should be forced to provide themselves with the means of air raid 
protection but was persuaded that an acceptable level of preparation could not be 
achieved until 1942; he therefore invited the chiefs of the three branches (army, 
air force and navy) to adopt a united front with the political authorities in order to 
channel funds towards the updating of material and equipment.
5
 
 At the beginning of 1940 the situation had not improved and the 
government failed to acknowledge that the problem was one of resources. In 
February the issue of anti-aircraft protection was put on the agenda at the 17th 
session of the supreme defence commission, a body where both civilian 
authorities and military chiefs met. The anti-aircraft services were badly trained 
and short by 50,000 men. They lacked 30,000 uniforms, 30,000 overcoats and 
10,000 pairs of shoes. Raw material was needed to provide the civilian population 
with seven million new gas-masks. The failure to address such problems is 
epitomised by Mussolini’s appalling comment on the issue of inadequate air raid 
alarms. When the meeting dealt with a request to install alarms inside blocks of 
flats because the sirens were barely audible in buildings when the windows were 
closed and people were asleep, Mussolini said that, ‘in wartime the sensitivity of 
human hearing sharpens and therefore it is foreseeable that, in any residential 
building, hypersensitive people will raise the alarm and sometimes false alarms as 
well. The ruckus they make will be enough to warn the building, the road and the 
whole neighbourhood’. According to the Duce, the problem could be solved ‘by 
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itself, through that permanent state of excitement which people are in when an air 
raid occurs’.6   
 In public, Mussolini made every effort to hide the widespread 
unpreparedness for war and to present his compatriots with his usual image of 
confident and pugnacious leader – an image which press, newsreels and radio 
reports were ready to circulate among the public. On official occasions, words and 
tones were carefully chosen to convey confidence, as during an inspection of the 
central artillery school for anti-aircraft troops in Nettuno, near Rome on 6 April 
1940, when the Duce gave a short speech aiming at boosting morale. Newspapers 
reported that Mussolini ‘had expressed his deepest satisfaction at the perfect 
training of the troops’.7 Obviously the media could not reflect the military’s 
widely held worries because their mission was to set a fictitious scene, for both 
internal and international audiences.    
 
2.2 Preparing Civilians for War 
Besides bragging and issuing reassuring reports, censorship authorities were 
interested in giving the public clear instructions, anxious not to repeat the lack of 
unequivocal direction lamented during the days preceding Mussolini’s decision to 
opt for non-belligerence. Editors and journalists were also briefed on the best way 
of presenting news from belligerent countries and were explicitly requested to 
describe, when reporting air raids, the exact nature of the objectives. For instance, 
it was stipulated that, ‘when it comes to reporting the bombing of ports, it is 
necessary to specify that military structures have been hit and not merely to name 
the place’. 8 The aim of such instructions at this stage was to present the war, and 
primarily the air war, as a fight that did not affect civilians. Besides, such a 
representation allowed German attacks on enemy territories to be framed through 
a narrative in which honourable combatants did not involve innocent civilians in 
their action. 
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 In the autumn of 1939 the Italian media had reported on the consequences 
of the initial phase of war in the European countries involved without any sense of 
hostility. Civilian life in those countries had been depicted without mockery or the 
air of superiority. The Istituto LUCE’s newsreels accurately reflected the efforts 
made to protect people from air attacks in France and Britain, sometimes in 
almost emotional tones. For example, a short film recounted the departure of 
children from Paris and the sadness of their mothers ‘bravely facing the painful 
parting, certain of the loving assistance their sons will receive’ far from the city, 
‘safe from the air dangers’.9 Three weeks later the anti-aircraft measures adopted 
in London had also been accurately and almost dispassionately described: the 
increasing number of signs showing the closest shelter, people carrying gas 
masks, small crowds commenting on the political and military situation in front of 
maps. ‘Curiosity was aroused’, the announcer said, ‘by female volunteers in fire-
fighting squads’, adding that, ‘it is not unusual these days to see King George 
inspecting anti-aircraft shelters in London boroughs’.10 
 In that autumn the MCP promoted Cronache della guerra, a new weekly 
publication with a wide circulation that specialised in reporting on war operations 
and in the analysis of military topics. Although biased in favour of Italy’s German 
allies, the magazine tried to maintain an informed and technical tone with 
commissioned articles by expert writers put together in a style that managed to 
combine specialisation with popularisation.
11
 From 1940, material for publication 
was also provided by the press office of the supreme command and in February a 
new column began to appear devoted to analysing the home front in the 
belligerent countries. In the first months of war, even before Italy’s entry, 
Cronache della guerra dedicated great attention to air war and its repercussions 
on civilian life. The newspaper popularised the idea that in modern wars a clear 
distinction between fronts and safe areas could no longer be drawn. Because of 
the newly available military technology, civilians were exposed to the same 
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dangers and subject to the same restrictions as soldiers. Remote villages that at 
other times had been the ideal hideouts for evacuees could be suddenly 
transformed into war zones: ‘The important thing is for civilians to be 
permanently mobilised. For them the state of readiness is in force. The whole 
country is a “war zone” and there are no longer people exposed to danger and 
privileged citizens’.12               
 The organisation and functioning of anti-aircraft protection was described 
at length and illustrated with drawings and detailed captions.
13
 Specialist articles 
focused on the most modern technology such as the listening devices invented to 
locate enemy aircraft or the newest kinds of bombs.
14
 This attention to technical 
and often esoteric aspects of war – from the media of a country that lacked the 
most important instruments in the field of air war – focused on the German, 
French and British forces. Mostly such articles appeared between September 1939 
and June 1940, since later the press could not even hint at delicate areas like the 
Italian (lack of) preparation for war in industrial output, availability of raw 
materials and fuel, and troop training. Indeed, Italian fighters and anti-aircraft 
batteries did not have until 1943 the capacity for detection and communication 
(based on radio and radar) that had been available to the Germans and the British 
since 1940. No modern instrument was available to provide early warning and 
continuous observation. In the 1950s, for example, on the Gran Guglia, a 
Piedmontese mountain not far from the French border, it was still possible to see 
the bell that in June 1940 still had to be rung to signal the presence of French 
aircraft to the barracks, 3,280 feet below, where there was a telephone to alert 
anti-aircraft batteries in Turin.
15
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 The last months of non-belligerence were therefore also devoted to 
preparing the Italian media for the task of reporting war at home. In March the 
MCP, without the Ministry of War’s permission, banned the publication of 
panoramic photographs of military and industrial areas which could be of interest 
for Italian defence. The same instruction urged the provision of ‘lots of space to 
photographs regarding civilian life’, not only to divert attention from the 
preparations for war but also to project the image of a country carrying on as 
normal.
16
 Yet, in spite of all the Fascist propaganda efforts, even on the eve of 
Mussolini’s decision to enter the war, during the chaotic and confused days of 
September 1939 before the Italian position of non-belligerence became clear, 
concern about the efficiency of anti-aircraft protection was widespread among 
Italians. ‘The paramount concern of the wealthy Genoese’, a party informant 
reported to Rome, ‘is finding good, quiet accommodation in case they are 
requested, as happened last September, to leave the city’.17 As a matter of fact, in 
Genoa ordinary people pointed at rich families leaving for their country houses 
and commented that, ‘those who want the war are the first to flee from the city’. 
In Naples the authorities were being blamed for the lack of measures to protect 
civilians, and police information referred to growing scepticism among ordinary 
people who were reportedly criticising the inefficiency of protection. At this stage 
the figure of the Duce seemed immune from criticism: for instance, civilians were 
reported as commenting that it was the military which was not equal to the 
challenge issued by Mussolini or that the bombs dropped on Italian cities were 
guided by spies who were betraying their country. On 24 June, the questore of 
Milan wrote to the chief of police saying that the air force was being harshly 
criticised, that citizens complained about the lack of shelters and that most people 
could not understand how it was possible that the defence of such important cities 
as Milan and Turin was entrusted to unprepared men struggling with obsolete 
material. In Milan tenants protested against landlords who used cellars as 
improvised shelters, while factory workers in Sesto San Giovanni lamented that 
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they had no shelter at all.
18
 Reports of improvised and unsafe shelters became 
more numerous as the weeks went by, whereas the local Fasci di combattimento 
weekly paper published accounts describing the incessant activity of the federale 
to persuade landlords to comply with anti-aircraft protection rules.
19
 In Turin, 
where the city council had drawn up plans to build 23,000 metres of shelters 
under public parks and squares with space for 76,000 people, works did not begin 
until 10 June 1940, the day of Italy’s war declaration, and were stopped soon 
thereafter.
20
 Mussolini himself, recalling the first days of war and the preparation 
of protection measures at his house in Rome, wrote in 1943 that, ‘in June 1940, 
after the outbreak of war, the first anti-aircraft shelter at Villa Torlonia was built 
in some caves’. The Duce remembered that, ‘it was deemed absolutely safe. But, 
after an inspection, the competent authority stated that it was a death-trap’.21 
 Aware of Italy’s unpreparedness, the British were puzzled by the contrast 
between reports indicating Mussolini’s ambitious offensive intentions in the 
Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Aegean, and the persistent absence of defence 
measures in urban areas. On 17 May the War Cabinet noticed the ‘present strength 
of the metropolitan army (over 1,400,000), the concentrations on the French and 
Yugoslav frontiers (23 and 14 divisions respectively), a concentration at Bari’, 
and ‘eastward movements of troops in Libya’. But alongside those indications, 
they remarked, ‘may be placed a number of independent reports of lack of 
military activity in centres such as Rome, Naples, Ancona, Bari and Brindisi, the 
number of untrained recruits now serving and the seeming lack of A.R.P. 
measures’.22  
 
2.3 Evacuation: a Policy Bound to Fail 
Transport requirements for the mobilisation of troops and armaments on a limited 
railway network was one of the main obstacles to civilian evacuation. Two weeks 
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before Italy entered the war, the media was instructed not to discuss the 
compulsory evacuation of cities and was ordered to confine itself to the 
communiqués issued by the MCP, ignoring any initiative adopted by prefects in the 
provinces. As a consequence, even provincial newspapers were instructed not to 
publish bulletins issued at a local level. Such news, censors explained, ‘often give 
rise to a mood of distrust and fear which leads to the same hurried decisions and 
unruly exodus we were witness to last September’.23 The directive reflected 
Mussolini’s growing scepticism about a policy that both authorities and the media 
still largely championed at the end of 1939, echoing the Fascist ‘struggle against 
urbanisation’, but which was deemed not to have produced valuable results. ‘Italy 
is small’, the Duce told government colleagues and military chiefs in February 
1940, ‘and evacuation of cities does nothing but cause overcrowding elsewhere’.24 
 However, despite Mussolini’s opinions on the subject and the subsequent 
directives from senior propaganda figures, the authorities’ stance on clearance of 
largely populated areas remained contradictory and ambivalent both at central and 
local levels, disguising the incapacity to prepare in advance a functional 
machinery for doing so under the new refrain of ‘voluntary evacuation’. On 3 
June 1940 secret instructions from the Ministry of War confirmed that the 
evacuation of civilians from large cities was ‘absolutely voluntary’ and drew up 
two lists of cities from where departure ‘will take place according to two levels of 
urgency’. On 8 June, only two days before Italy entered  the war, the same 
Ministry ordered compulsory evacuation in Aosta, Turin, Cuneo and Imperia 
provinces from villages on the frontier with France: paradoxically, 9,000 people 
living in Ventimiglia and 2,628 residents in the small village of Pigna were told to 
move to Genoa and Savona respectively, two of the few Italian localities targeted 
by the first French and British attacks.
25
  
 The media did not manage to adapt to the lack of a uniform and coherent 
policy. In May, for instance, Cronache della guerra had run a long and detailed 
                                                 
23
 ACS, MCP, GAB, b. 49, Rapporto giornalisti, Instructions of 25 May 1940. 
24
 Della Volpe, Difesa del territorio e protezione antiaerea, pp. 215-216. 
25
 ACS, MCP, GAB, b. 117, Diradamento delle popolazioni civili dai grandi centri ai fini della 
protezione antiaerea, Instructions of 3 June 1940; ACS, MCP, GAB, b. 117, Esodo popolazioni da 
determinate località, Instructions of 8 June 1940. 
52 
analysis of the reasons supporting the necessity of drafting timely evacuation 
plans. The argument was that people who moved to the countryside were more 
difficult to target and easier to feed; in addition, services for those who stayed in 
the cities could be streamlined as provisions could be supplied and distributed 
more smoothly. The article drew on the German experience in 1937, when 
105,000 people had moved from Berlin to the countryside, organising their lives 
according to the principle of autarchy: families that had ‘almost no need for 
others’. The author praised that experience because it benefited from early 
planning and preparation, unlike evacuation which, ‘as has happened elsewhere’, 
took place ‘out of fear or in a chaotic way’. The sudden inflow ‘of an enormous 
metropolitan crowd to some provincial places creates all kinds of serious 
troubles’. A hint, not so veiled, at the haphazard exodus from Italian cities in the 
late summer of 1939.
26
 
 When the Italian war began, the press did not publish the instructions of 
the prefects which, tailored as they were to meet local contingencies, might stir up 
public confusion and alarm. Nevertheless, they went on reporting news and 
practical advice and, most of all, attesting that everything was taking place in 
absolute calm and discipline. For example, Corriere della Sera wrote about what 
was going on in Milan: 
 
City dwellers accepted to a great extent the advice to leave and many citizens are now moving to 
the small villages which, for many, are the very places where they spend their summer holidays. 
Women, children, the elderly, in short all those who do not to have to stay in Milan, are leaving 
without haste in an intense but peaceful exodus.
27
 
 
Two weeks later the same newspaper had to disavow its hasty analogy between 
evacuation and holidays, noticing that the departures were unlike the usual 
summer moves, for they were governed ‘by a conscious and quiet prudence, not 
by the annual hedonistic care of enjoying the good weather on the beach or at the 
mountains’. Destinations were chosen for their proximity to large cities (where 
most men continued to work, often commuting daily or weekly to join their 
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families) and for other practical reasons – certainly not for leisure.28 The media 
directors were aware of police reports that since the first alert in September 1939 
had been emphasising the anger of ordinary people at those who had the means to 
leave dangerous places and find comfortable accommodation elsewhere. 
 On 20 June the Ministry of Interior told prefects in the north-western 
Italian provinces that voluntary evacuation had reached ‘unjustified proportions’ 
and must be limited. Those who could not be persuaded to stay at home had to 
leave by their own means.
29
 As a matter of fact, evacuees benefited only from 
subsidised railways ticket and exemption from the visitor’s tax (in spite of the 
aversion of some podestà to such allowances), but had to meet all other expenses. 
The authorities limited themselves to some measures to curb profiteering and 
abuses, for example imposing controlled prices on landlords and farmers in the 
countryside or organising at interchange train stations assemblies of party 
members cheering and refreshing passengers travelling to their new destinations. 
Some employers decided to help their staff by contributing towards moving 
expenses. The Corriere della Sera publishing company, for instance, proudly 
announced its decision to give their employees 250 lire for every child under 12 
years sent away from Milan.
30
 Newspapers began to praise employers that met the 
expenses of sending their employees’ children to places deemed safer than the 
densely populated industrial areas, but the authorities neither planned nor 
organised a systematic evacuation of children until November 1942, when the 
Ministry of Interior and the Gioventù Italiana del Littorio signed an agreement 
which defined the responsibilities of the Fascist Party’s youth organisation in 
organising the voluntary evacuation of children aged between 6 and 14 from poor 
families.
31
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2.4 The First Air Raids On Italy  
On 14 June 1940 the press reported on the air raids carried out on Italian cities 
during the night of the 11th. The previous night, Aldo Valori had read the casualty 
list to EIAR listeners: ‘They are all workers, family men, women’.32 For the first 
time in two years of war games, the danger was real and people could see the 
enemy over their heads. The MCP issued instructions not to report news of alarms, 
incursions or bombing attacks that had not been recorded in the general army 
headquarters bulletin.
33
 Turin was the most affected area: Fiat factories at 
Mirafiori and a railway junction had been damaged, a gasometer gone up in 
flames, and a market hit in the densely populated area of Porta Palazzo. Fifteen 
people died and 30 were wounded. Air raids were also attempted on Milan and 
Piacenza but, according to the official report of the supreme command, anti-
aircraft artillery managed to repel the attacks. The following morning British 
planes flew over Rome, Gaeta, Leghorn, La Spezia and Genoa without dropping 
bombs.
34
 The press did not mention the air and naval attacks by the French on 13 
and 14 June on Imperia, Savona and Genoa which killed ten people and injured 36 
more.
35
  
 Newspaper front pages were full of headlines about the exploits of Italian 
ships, planes and troops in the Mediterranean and on the North African and 
French fronts. Il Regime Fascista, Roberto Farinacci’s Germanophile daily, 
published excited articles that praised the raids on Toulon and other places near 
Italian borders while the Germans had already brought France to its knees.
36
 Yet, 
as far as enemy air attacks on home territory were concerned, editors were 
instructed to publish casualty lists ‘with a two-column headline and without 
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emphasis’.37 The press complied, briefly describing the facts and praising the 
Fascist leadership on its decision to hide nothing from the Italian people: the 
regime ‘can look the truth in the face and make it known in full, without feigning 
or distortion’. Comments on the front page of La Stampa, the Turin newspaper, 
were more wide-ranging than such concise reports, attacking ‘the false champion 
of civilisation that bombed an open city, playing havoc with the the elderly and 
defenceless workers’ and denouncing ‘an abominable aggression, carried out 
against the law of nations’.38 According to Corriere della Sera, ‘Turin was 
bombed by planes that flew high and therefore hit only at built-up areas, since at 
that altitude they could not aim at specific targets’.39 
 This kind of argument ignored the fact that British bombs hit populated 
areas only because precision bombing of industrial and military objectives was 
impossible on account of the short fuel distance, bad weather en route and air 
crews’ limited experience in nocturnal navigation.40 Italian press accusations 
against British pilots inaugurated a typical tool of Fascist war propaganda, along 
with the depiction of the enemy as a barbarous aggressor breaching international 
laws. Yet Turin was not an ‘open town’ according to the rules of warfare, since 
the city was not ‘undefended’, it contained military resource and had not been 
declared ‘open’ by the Italian government.41 Besides, the British government 
acted quickly to ascertain and acknowledge its air force’s mistakes. For instance, 
the authorities in London investigated reports from Switzerland that bombs 
dropped on Geneva on 11 June, causing the death of five civilians, were British; 
and on 28 June recognised that ‘the British machines operating in Northern Italy 
lost their way owing to unfavourable weather over the Alps and involuntarily flew 
over Swiss territory’. The British government accepted responsibility ‘for the 
bombs dropped in the region of Lake Geneva’, expressed ‘their regret at the error 
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and its tragic consequences’, and declared that they were ‘ready to assure 
reparation for the damage inflicted’.42            
 In his memoirs published after the war Alfredo Signoretti, editor of La 
Stampa from 1932 to 1943, wrote that the first attack on Turin inflicted 
‘insignificant damage’ in comparison with the ravages of 1942-1943, but it had a 
huge impact on civilians because it showed how unprepared the country was for 
war. ‘Most people’, he recalled, ‘thought they were in the middle of an exercise 
and looked with curiosity at the lights of rockets illuminating the bombers’ 
targets’.43 The air raids carried out on Turin were the first in which the Italian 
anti-aircraft batteries caused civilian casualties. A shell hit a building in via 
Tallone, wounding 11 people and killing a young clerk, Arnaldo Gandini.
44
 In 
Rome, newspapers only reported the episode in which Italian artillery hit a 
building in via Varese wounding an old woman, Carlotta Bardo, although damage 
was inflicted on several areas: shells dropped on via Vespasiano, via Andrea 
Doria and the popular market of via Alessandria, near Porta Pia.
45
 Such stories 
were relayed by the press mainly as a reminder of the dangers of contravening 
safety regulations by walking around the streets during alarms but the errors of 
anti-aircraft fire and the inadequate protection of houses and public places 
occasioned sarcastic remarks among citizens. A committed Fascist, Paolino 
Ferrari, noted in his diary that, ‘damage and casualties in Rome have been caused 
by our anti-aircraft artillery’ and ‘bitterness and indignation crush any other 
feeling among Rome’s population’.46 In private conversations the UNPA was 
ironically renamed Unico nostro pericolo aereo (The only air danger is ours) 
while the DICAT, the anti-aircraft artillery, became Distruzione integrale case 
Torino (Total destruction of houses in Turin), Distruzione integrale centro abitato 
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Torino (Total destruction of built-up areas in Turin) or Dormienti in cima ai tetti 
(Sleepers on the rooftops).
47
 
 Over the following days other attacks were carried out on northern Italian 
cities and the regions of Piedmont and Liguria were again the most affected areas. 
On 15 June bombs were dropped on Genoa, damaging a power plant, a police 
barracks and a Fiat factory. A local daily, Il Secolo XIX, while reporting that anti-
aircraft defence had worked at its best and that citizens ‘were proud of their 
artillerymen’, also had to publish a communiqué from the Ministry of War 
instructing civilians to stay indoors during anti-aircraft fire and not in attics if 
possible.
48
 People were startled to see how easily the French could hit the city 
from planes and ships.
49
 Genoa’s vulnerability was to become a constant feature 
of the bombing war against Italy. When air attacks were carried out again on 
Milan, the press gave readers a rather unexpected genuine warning:  
 
…. although anti-aircraft artillery has made remarkable progress in recent years and sighting and 
hearing systems can give timely alarms to populations, it is very difficult to prevent a mass 
bombing from achieving its purpose, it may only be possible to impede the threat.
50
     
 
British planes were targeting the Caproni, Macchi and Savoia Marchetti 
aeronautical factories, but bombs fell on the inhabited areas of Milan and on 
Monza. After the first ten days, when attacks had been focused on Northern Italy, 
British planes moved towards the South and the islands targeting ports, airfields, 
railways, refineries and factories. Sirens sounded in Naples and Cagliari. Heavy 
attacks hit Sicily on 22 and 23 June: in Trapani 20 people died and 40 were 
wounded while in Palermo the following day bombs killed 25 people and injured 
110.
51
 The OVRA inspector general Dino Fabris wrote from Cagliari to the chief of 
police that the alarm had not been given in time, most people did not know where 
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to shelter, and the enemy aircraft had flown over the city unnoticed by Italian 
artillery.
52
 
 In the Italian cities that were not yet in the sight of enemy bombers, people 
were described in the media as being quiet and confident, but police and PNF 
sources sent the regime alarming news. In Florence, for example, the local daily 
explained that after three days of partial blackout the city (which would not be 
bombed until September 1943) was demonstrating ‘calm, serenity and 
discipline’.53 But confidential police information reported that the air raids on 
Turin had made an impression upon the population, which feared the next attacks 
could target central Italy and Florence. According to the OVRA informant, news 
broadcasts, far from improving morale, had depressed the public. In addition, 
increasing opposition to war was being recorded.
54
 Alongside widespread fear and 
fatalism a new feeling began to gain ground in Northern Italy, as people were 
heard commenting loudly that Britain and France had ‘every reason’ to bomb, 
because ‘they were right’.55 Such observations were not simply expressions of 
discontent and fear, but also denoted that the regime’s ideological justifications of 
the war against the European democracies were already not working, whereas the 
simple message that the Allies conveyed through leaflets was more reasonable 
and persuasive. 
56
 
 As the Fascist officials were aware of this danger, after the second wave of 
raids a vocal propaganda campaign was started against rumour-mongers 
(vociferatori). Reports from the authorities, and relevant sources in general, show 
that vociferatori were not dissenters or political opponents, but mostly ordinary 
people hostile to the danger and restrictions of war and prone to comment on the 
internal situation in shops or public places where Fascist spies or police 
informants were ready to record their words. Authorities tended to lump any form 
of popular reaction to war under the generic label of defeatism, and the media 
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acted accordingly. On 17 June, for example, Il Secolo XIX carried a harsh 
commentary on people spreading rumours about the outcome of the British air 
raids on Northern Italy, observing that shops were ‘the focus of the infection’, the 
places where   
 
servants, masters, paunchy know-it-all gentlemen are transformed into so many well informed 
bulletins… It circulates in every stripe and colour. They talk of whole buildings sucked like fresh 
eggs, piles of dead, holes huge as Vesuvian craters everywhere, hundreds of enemy planes over the 
city and so on. Obviously there is always someone who believes the tall tales of these reckless 
people.
57
   
 
The new attacks in late June gave further occasion to the Italian press to extend 
the pattern of the comments printed after the first day of war, denouncing British 
unfairness at hitting non-military objectives and promising an inexorable, though 
undefined, retaliation. Corriere della Sera published a list of the dead and wrote: 
‘The enemy, in accordance with his barbarous custom, dropped bombs on 
Palermo slaughtering peaceful residents. These crimes raise the price that such a 
disloyal enemy will soon have to pay’.58 For their part, British authorities were 
determined to maintain bombing raids on Italy from their bases in North Africa, 
convinced it was more vulnerable than its German ally.
59
 Reports showed that, ten 
days after the first raid, ‘Italian morale was low’. Italy was, the Foreign Secretary 
argued in a cabinet meeting, ‘a weak point in the Axis, and it would be wise to 
concentrate on her’. Therefore it was ‘very desirable to strike at Italy herself, as 
public opinion would not be much affected by air action on Libya’.60 Italian 
people, meanwhile, read in the newspapers that the Mediterranean campaign was 
going well and knew almost nothing of the enemy’s air force capability until they 
had to confront it face to face.   
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2.5 The Anti-British Propaganda Offensive  
During the night of 14 June, French planes dropped leaflets on Rome in order to 
pit civilians against Mussolini and the Fascist authorities, explaining that Italian 
cities were targeted because of the irresponsible choice the Duce had made to 
consort with Hitler and entering the war against the European democracies. At 
dawn, teams of dustmen lead by UNPA officers feverishly swept away loads of 
sheets of paper.
61
 Nonetheless, the following day the Italian press reported the 
leaflets’ content word for word, according to the regime’s willingness to hide 
nothing from its citizens:   
 
Did the Duce want the war? Here it is! France has nothing against you. Stop it. France will stop. 
Italian women, nobody attacked Italy! Your sons, your husbands, your boyfriends did not leave in 
order to defend their country. They are suffering and dying to satisfy the pride of one man. Victors 
or vanquished, you will have hunger, poverty and slavery’.62      
 
Corriere della Sera wrote that although the leaflets had fallen over a very small 
area of the city and only a few people had been aware of them, the authorities had 
decided to make them known so that everyone could consider their ‘foolishness’. 
It was ‘childish’ to hope that ‘the nonsense written in those slips of papers could 
have a hold on the Italian people’s hearts’: Italians ‘are bound up with the Duce, 
and his will is the will of the united country’. The truth, Il Popolo d’Italia 
thundered, ‘is the most effective weapon to crush the alarmist propagation of such 
irresponsible rumour-mongering’, and the leaflets were ‘a document of grotesque 
idiocy that reveals once more how persistent among democracies is an 
incomprehension of Mussolini’s Italy’. 63 
 That night left a clear memory for Aldo Valori, who became host of the 
current affairs radio programme Commento ai fatti del giorno in June 1940. He 
described it in his autobiography: 
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An innocuous raid in every aspect, but it showed how easy it was to fly over the capital without 
being much bothered. In fact anti-aircraft defence in Rome was ridiculous. A few batteries behind 
Monte Mario, some machine guns scattered around on turrets and roofs, everything with very 
limited ammunition.
64
   
 
In the first phase of the conflict, enemy planes flew all across Italy and hit several 
cities, but the number of casualties, in comparison with later stages of war, was 
still limited (about 70 dead and 244 wounded in the period 11-30 June).
65
 
Nonetheless, the impact on civilian morale was significant and so was the reaction 
of Fascist propaganda in the media, aiming to depict a country that  endured 
without sentimentality or weakness (on 26 June editors were instructed not to 
report the visits of prefects and members of the royal family to those injured in the 
air raids).
66
   Magazines were employed as well as national and local newspapers, 
for example L’Illustrazione Italiana, a weekly that enhanced its popularity and 
communicative strength by paying particular attention to photographs and images: 
an entire page on the first attacks on Milan was illustrated with five pictures 
which showed two large holes in the grounds caused by the explosions, two 
wrecked houses and some nuns trying to retrieve objects and books in a courtyard. 
The caption made clear the message implicit in the photos:  
 
For the benefit of all the ingenuous (so to speak) advocates of the British soldier’s civility, we 
publish these pictures of the targets hit by English airmen during a raid on Milan. The building of 
the Catholic school run by the nuns of Santa Maria Ausiliatrice and some workers’ homes: the 
heroic fighting spirit of Her Majesty’s pilots has been ruthless against these “military works”. Both 
school and houses were far from any military objective. It cannot therefore be considered a  
mistake. British bombs were dropped deliberately on unarmed people. Evidently only in this way 
can the democracies’ soldiers get to the people.67  
 
In the days following the first raids against Northern Italy, the MCP organised a 
media offensive to disprove foreign news agencies and newspapers, primarily the 
British news agency Reuters, which had reported that enemy air attacks inflicted 
heavy damages on the Italian industrial and military infrastructure. The Times had 
published a British Air Ministry survey describing ‘the heavy damage done to 
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aircraft factories in Northern Italy during raids by the R.A.F’ and ‘the little 
opposition encountered from antiaircraft batteries’. The British planes ‘took the 
ground defences completely by surprise’ and successfully bombed ‘two of Italy’s 
largest aircraft and aero-engine factories, the Ansaldo works at Genoa and the Fiat 
factory at Turin’. The British also claimed a positive outcome for raids on the 
Breda airframe factory at Sesto San Giovanni, the Caproni works in Turin and 
naval shipbuilding yards at Sestri Ponente.
68
 
 The MCP invited a party of foreign correspondents (but not journalists from 
the enemy countries) on a short trip to Turin, Milan and Genoa so that they could 
personally ascertain the truth of the enemy’s version of events. Instructions to 
newspapers and the Istituto LUCE on how to document the visit went as far as to 
dictate the exact wording of captions to the official photographs.
69
 In Turin, the 
Piedmont journalists’ union hosted and accompanied them to the most damaged 
areas, such as the city market and the workhouse. They went also to see the Fiat, 
Lancia and Snia factories. In Milan, escorted by the prefect, after a tour among the 
Falck, Breda and Pirelli factories, they visited a bombed nursery school. A 
delegation of foreign journalists also went to Genoa, touring at length the bombed 
areas with their hosts and pausing only at midday for a short lunch with the 
prefect.
70
 The initiative was a success according to the Italian media, as the 
foreign journalists ‘unanimously say that they could ascertain the enemy aviators’ 
dexterity in not hitting military targets’. Reports published by the Swiss press 
(Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Basler Nachrichten) were quoted as saying that, ‘no 
industrial plant in Turin and Milan was damaged’ and that ‘the news that the 
countries at war against Italy destroyed all the industrial areas in Turin and Milan 
thanks to British air force bombing proved totally untrue’. The Italian propaganda 
machine heavily exploited this episode, circulating a number of photographs and 
newsreels, as it was true that in their first raids British planes had inflicted no 
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relevant damage to military and industrial infrastructure, instead causing 
casualties among the civilian population.
71
 Yet the bombing of Fiat caused the 
company chief, Vittorio Valletta, to report to general Carlo Favagrossa, Under-
Secretary for War Production, that the factories were experiencing cases of 
indiscipline among workers who wanted to get fired so as to find employment in 
less dangerous places.
72
      
 Worried by the impact of air raids on Italian morale and conscious of the 
inadequacy of anti-aircraft defences, the MCP ordered the press to inform the 
Italian public of the devastating raids the British air force was conducting against 
German cities, stressing that even Italy’s mighty ally could not prevent damage 
and civilian casualties. On 19 June, for instance, instructions were given to 
emphasise a Stefani dispatch about the previous night’s attack on Cologne, 
remarking that ‘even in Germany, which as everybody knows has a formidable 
anti-aircraft defence put to the test in several months of war, it is impossible to 
stop raids that, under cover of darkness, the enemy makes on open towns without 
targeting military objectives’. The next day newspapers diligently complied, 
reporting that British bombs had killed seven civilians and commenting on the 
news with the very words dictated in the official instructions.
73
 Before the end of 
June news began to appear in the Italian media about German children killed by 
RAF bombs. On 29 June it was reported that three children had died while playing 
outdoors in Herme, a town in Westphalia where, reports asserted, there were 
neither military objectives nor factories producing for war. 
74
 
 
2.6 Diversions and Discipline 
Besides the obsessive insistence on the enemy’s disloyalty and barbarity, in the 
first weeks of war the press mostly followed two lines: dwelling on the rules 
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enacted by the authorities to limit the damage to the civilian population and 
emphasising the role of key figures in the everyday life of bombed towns. Official 
regulations alternated in newspapers with a great many practical suggestions, so 
that the prescriptive layout - which culminated in reporting exemplary cases of 
sanctions inflicted upon transgressors - was lightened by a paternalistic concern 
for the safety of ordinary citizens. The media reiterated warnings and 
recommendations, stressing the efforts the authorities were making to alleviate the 
discomfort of workers and evacuees. The union agreement that regulated the 
recovery of working hours lost in case of air raid alarms was abundantly 
trumpeted, together with instructions from the Ministry of Finance which aimed at 
preventing local authorities from imposing the visitor’s tax on people seeking 
refuge from urban areas. More news followed on the sudden allocation of funds 
by the Ministry of Public Works for the repair of damaged buildings.
75
 
Encouraging messages were conveyed, highlighting exemplary cases of 
resourcefulness and efficiency, such as the preparation of a model shelter in 
Florence or the highly symbolic measures adopted to safeguard artworks and 
museums. The gold statue on Milan Cathedral was covered with a special grey-
green paint. In Rome, a columnist solemnly wrote, ‘Monuments, churches, sacred 
places for the cult of the Country have a new appearance. Only a poet could 
express what everyone feels when they see the illustrious arches of the Colosseo 
in their military uniform’.76           
 Attempts were also made at easing the atmosphere of tense mobilisation 
through diversions or jokes. News of children born in shelters during alarms 
became frequent, always enlivened with picturesque, sometimes surreal, details. 
La Stampa recounted that in Turin, on the night of 15 June, ‘A lovely little boy, 
who was named Sergio, had the rare privilege of seeing the light in the shelter, 
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and he is in very good health, as the mother is. That child will be able to boast of 
being the first, maybe the only, newborn baby in such a place’. But Sergio’s 
extraordinary experience was not unique, as six other children were born during 
the first nights of war in the Turin maternity ward shelter.
77
  Jokes about enemy 
pilots – not only in satirical papers but also in the mainstream press –became a 
variant of the anti-British arguments increasingly employed in Italian war 
propaganda. The censorship authorities, evidently convinced that laughing at the 
enemy did not contravene Pavolini’s order not to underestimate it, encouraged 
this, even deploring ‘the scarcity of anti-British cartoons in the Italian dailies’. 
But the outcome seldom lived up to expectations. On 18 June, for instance, 
answering a letter from a woman worried that wild animals could escape from 
Milan zoo during alarms, Corriere della Sera wrote: ‘We rely on the beasts 
themselves, which are not so ferocious after all; less ferocious, undoubtedly, than 
those British airmen who bomb open towns’.78  
 Yet the emphasis on the necessity for discipline remained the central 
theme – the resilience of the home front being a crucial test of the rules and rituals 
practiced over almost two decades of exercises, parades and rhetorical slogans:  
 
Fervour, warlike enthusiasm, certainty of the forthcoming battle must not make us lose sight of the 
common and simple everyday duties, the small things that have to be done so that the life of the 
fighting Nation maintains its rhythm. When we fight there are no small things: everything has to 
be done. Enthusiasm must not damage discipline. And the certainty of victory must not relax our 
vigilance. More than ever it is necessary to follow the rules of defence. The orders are: discipline, 
discipline, and more discipline.
79
 
 
Freight agents accused of exacting excessive prices from evacuees were 
denounced to the police. As in September 1939, country landlords who extorted 
exorbitant rents from people fleeing cities were also blamed and punished. Il 
Mattino praised the decision of the prefect of Naples Francesco Benigni to arrest 
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Arturo Russo Spena, guilty of renting out his rooms in Sant’Anastasia at a very 
high price, and warned that the regime would not tolerate actions which were 
deemed ‘pure crimes’ due to ‘an inconceivable mentality, which lies outside 
Fascist law and ethics’. Against ‘greedy landlords’, summed up the Naples daily, 
‘we must hit hard, so that everybody can come to his senses’. At the same time it 
pointed out the unselfishness of a farmer who had offered his house free of charge 
to the family that had fallen into the profiteer’s hands.80 The press initially printed 
lists of blackout transgressors who had been brought to justice and exhortations to 
get the things necessary to black out windows in homes, offices and factories, but 
only four days after the declaration of war, the MCP ordered newspapers not to 
print the number of fines inflicted for breaking blackout regulations in case of 
alarm.
81
 Censors must have been worried that the long lists in newspapers might 
reveal a high level of non-compliance and indiscipline rather than act as a 
deterrent for unlawful behaviour.  
  
2.7 Custodians of Order  
A handful of key figures came to embody the imperative of order on the home 
front. Heads of apartment blocks (capifabbricato) were portrayed in newspaper 
articles as the guardians of compliance with safety measures and upholders of 
discipline. They were as much commended at public events and in media reports 
as they were blamed, ridiculed and even hated by their contemporaries and in 
memoirs and works of fiction published after the war. They were primarily 
charged with making ready private shelters, assuring compliance with blackout 
regulations and directing people during alarms. An official booklet that came out 
in 1939 spelled out the capofabbricato’s duties, stating that ‘his mission must be 
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accomplished with tact, firmness, a sense of responsibility; he must not frighten 
but has to reassure residents’.82     
 In order to make them more credible and authoritative, tribunals started to 
punish people who infringed rules. For example, on 24 June in Piacenza a button-
maker was sentenced to seven months in prison because he refused to obey the 
capofabbricato and assaulted him.
83
  In some cases the authorities had to sanction 
irregularities and abuses by the capifabbricato, as in Milan, where the prefect 
ordered the arrest of some ‘who not only failed in their duties, but even refused to 
take in passers-by caught in alarms’. Commenting on that episode Mussolini’s 
paper, generally given to martial tones and violent invectives, curiously stressed 
that the act of leaving people exposed to danger was ‘a sign of a lack of the most 
basic human solidarity’.84 However, in general, Fascist hierarchies and local 
authorities could rely on the willingness of capifabbricato to exercise a sort of 
many-eyed and widespread social control, based on delation and spying on private 
lives. For those reasons, their role had been enhanced since the early days of war:  
 
The great responsibility that weighs on the capofabbricato must induce in everyone a sense of 
great respect, discipline and prompt obedience. The best intentions in the world do not justify 
infringements of those three fundamental canons and nor should it be forgotten that the 
capofabbricato is entitled to interpret and implement the authorities' orders; others must obey and 
- if asked - co-operate.
85
 
 
As the alarms became frequent and increasingly disquieting as the war went on, 
caretakers (portinai) were called on to help the capifabbricato in their duties, 
although in some ways their importance in acting as the regime’s antennae in the 
everyday life of Italians was well-established even in peacetime. An example of 
this was later provided by the fictional but mostly realistic character of a woman  
charged with the care of a huge building portrayed in an Italian film, Una 
giornata particolare (A Special Day), which recalled the atmosphere of thrilled 
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mobilisation during Hitler's visit to Rome in May 1938. She spent the whole day 
looking suspiciously at Gabriele and Antonietta, the only two residents in the 
apartment block who did not go to cheer the Führer at a parade organised by the 
Party. The former, a prime target of mistrust and suspicion - being an antifascist 
(and homosexual) intellectual - was visited that same evening by Fascist police 
and punished with internment.
86
 
 In wartime, caretakers were called upon to raise their efforts and, as a 
consequence, their function and status were enhanced. ‘The completely new 
character of this war’, a columnist observed in Il Secolo XIX, ‘brings a new kind 
of civil soldier, as worthy of regard as he is unassuming: the caretaker’. While the 
capofabbricato was engaged in only one field of activity, the portinaio must 
perform several tasks, such as preventing thieves and looters from breaking into 
flats left empty during alarms: ‘We have all seen him, in this week of air raids, 
always present day and night’, forced to sleep ‘with one eye open’.87 
Capifabbricato and portinai were helped by fire wardens (guardiani del fuoco), 
charged with the task of keeping watch, during alarms, on buildings and in 
particular on attics. Unlike the former, they were called out mostly in emergencies 
and usually did not meddle in other people’s lives. Generally chosen from among 
strong and trained people, they had to rush to wherever incendiary bombs 
dropped, cover them in mud and put them in a safe place with a shovel. 
Firefighters could be called only if guardiani del fuoco did not manage to keep 
the flames under control.
88
 Sometimes recruitment and promotion among civil 
defence personnel subverted  the entrenched social hierarchies, as happened to the 
main character of a short story set in a poor Naples neighbourhood during the war 
– a lame dustman whom everyone laughed at and held in contempt. In June 1940 
he was named UNPA squad leader and his life and status changed all of a sudden:  
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He was supplied with a helmet, a hoe, two bags of sand, a fire extinguisher, a gas mask, and a 
motorised tricycle. At last he had the chance to take revenge for the humiliation he had suffered 
when he collected garbage from people’s homes: now, at the slightest infringement, he fined those 
haughty caretakers who for many years had prevented him from taking the lift because of the 
stinking litter he carried. A stair window left open, a glass not well blackened were more than 
enough for them to be summoned by the police.
89
           
 
The members of UNPA and people who had responsibilities in apartment blocks 
were not remembered with affection in their contemporaries’ memories and were 
to become the object of harsh or humorous treatment in Italian post-war fiction. 
They enforced an array of prohibitions and obligations that reproduced on a small 
scale the dynamics of Fascist power over 20 years. With very few exceptions, 
instead of acting as unselfish leaders of small communities engaged in self-
defence efforts, they exercised their small prerogative to invade the privacy of 
people’s homes, strutting about in their uniforms, shouting orders in courtyards or 
stairwells, making sure everyone wore the party pin and nobody listened to ‘Radio 
Londra’.90  
 
Conclusion 
Italy’s entry into the war charged Pavolini and the MCP with the task of giving 
people the illusion of triumphal successes in the battlefield, but sources show that 
fear and insecurity spread among civilians from the first air raids on the Italian 
cities. The media did not manage to conquer those feelings. Even sensible general 
directives (for example those coming from Pavolini recommending to avoid 
‘lyricism’ and emphatic headlines or not to underestimate the enemy) often 
produced opposite outcomes in the daily routine of newsrooms accustomed to 
work on the basis of established procedures of overzealous self-censorship. The 
irregular and sometimes inconsistent directives from propaganda controllers 
reflected similar attitudes within the regime and of Mussolini himself, while the 
enemy became gradually more effective in conveying, by means of leaflets and 
‘Radio Londra’ broadcasting, a direct and simple message: that there was no 
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aggression against Italy and Italians were being forced to pay for a choice one 
man had made. The huge military setbacks of autumn 1940 would make that 
message even clearer. 
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Chapter 3. Adjusting to Reality: Home Front and Air War  
 
In the first year of war, the organs of Fascist propaganda and the media 
cooperated in the attempt to make credible the image of a country determined to 
stay resolute and impassive in the struggle against the enemy. Their efforts aimed 
at refuting evidence that war was a disruptive break with deeply rooted rhythms 
and habits that both civilians and soldiers had experienced since the summer of 
1940. For example, the emergency blackout measures were presented as an 
opportunity to lead a simpler life and to rediscover the lost beauty of cities and 
landscapes unspoiled by artificial lights. Moreover, faith and endurance on the 
home front were to be kept alive by stressing the valour of the Axis troops and the 
rightness of their cause. Papers, news films and radio bulletins reported the 
terrible consequences of the German air raids on English cities down to the 
smallest detail, delighting in describing Londoners under the Blitz as troglodytes.
1
 
Leading journalists were mobilised to exalt the Italian forces and vilify their 
enemies, often exploiting the commonest stereotypes of a declining military 
tradition, such as the myth of the Regia Aeronautica. Specifically, the almost 
symbolic participation of the latter in the German air raids on Britain in autumn 
1940 was unfortunate, both in its military outcome and from a propaganda point 
of view. As will be shown in detail in Chapter 5, the Fascists’ initial boastfulness 
of that participation was later in the war used by Britain as motivation to increase 
the pressure on Italy and even to threaten the bombardment of Rome.  
Moreover, attempts to minimize the negative impact on morale of Italy’s 
first great military setback turned out to be useless. In particular, failure in 
occupation of Greece loomed, and the British attack on the Italian fleet in Taranto 
made manifest the vulnerability of the Italian defence. In the Italian media there 
was no echo of the doubts and fears gradually spreading among the population – 
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diligently recorded instead with increasing apprehension by the Fascist authorities 
and well known to the MCP, which insisted on its remit to galvanise the public. 
The lack of confidence and increasing mistrust in the Fascist leadership that 
followed the first enemy raids risked contaminating the troops. The army staff had 
to censor many letters written to soldiers from relatives who described the first air 
raids as a ‘nightmare’ and reported ‘great agitation’ in Milan and other cities in 
Northern Italy. A note sent by a police informant from Genoa on 18 November 
1940 showed that a breach in Italian morale, and therefore in popular support for 
Fascism and Mussolini, was known to the the authorities in the first months of 
war:   
 
If what has been taking place in London for two months happened in Genoa, even for a dozen 
days; if we were forced, for a dozen consecutive nights, to go down to basements or hastily to take 
cover in shelters, it is unquestionable that the political situation would be deemed really 
dangerous.
2
        
 
3.1 Beyond the Blackout Experience: the Fascination of Darkness 
Blackout and air-raid warnings compelled civilians, especially the urban 
population, to adjust suddenly to nights in complete darkness. When the first air 
raids consigned to the past the artificial excitement of the drills that had marked 
the nine months of non-belligerence, the Italian people had to change their habits 
completely, resigning themselves to spending much more time at home or in 
shelters. The authorities wavered between two conflicting needs: making sure that 
everyday life went on as normally as possible and preventing unnecessary 
crowding in streets and public places. Gossip columnists were ordered not to 
report news of parties attended by politicians, aristocrats and celebrities to show 
that on the home front everybody did their bit; ordinary people had to think that 
the whole nation was engaged in sharing the sacrifices the Fascist war required, 
the authoritarian version of the ‘we’re all in it’ feeling of 1940 that George Orwell 
described about war-time Britain.
3
 The media was mobilised to convey a 
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harmless, romantic and sometimes awkwardly poetic image of the total darkness 
which closed in on war nights. Writers and journalists were enlisted to fight fear 
and worries among their countrymen with the weapon of a rhetoric which was to 
appear, as the war became more difficult to endure, ever more absurd and surreal. 
The story the Italian media began to tell about the consequences of the war on the 
civilian population attempted to disguise the constraints created by the anti-
aircraft measures and to hide the discrepancy between the propaganda’s 
presentation of the facts and real life.
4
 
That kind of propaganda had begun during the months of non-belligerence, 
describing in particular the everyday life of Germans under the first Allied air 
attacks and the disciplined reaction of Italians during the civil defence tests. In 
March 1939, Corriere della Sera had written that whoever witnessed Milan 
during the blackout experiments ‘did not think of a dead city, but of a strong-
willed one, which has heard and understood an order’.5 A year and half later 
Milan was still described as an orderly and well organised city, which ‘firmly 
submitted to the rules of war, without giving a dramatic turn to it’. 6 Mussolini had 
dragged Italian cities into the fight, but newspapers continued painting idyllic 
urban scenes: people going light-heartedly to theatres, placid policemen 
controlling the traffic, bicycles and trams contending for the road, civilians 
adequately protected by roomy shelters and powerful anti-aircraft guns.  
This idealisation of blacked-out Italian cities persisted in the first months 
of war. When darkness closed in on Rome a few weeks after Mussolini’s 
declaration of war, Il Messaggero wrote that the city had ‘a grave fascination’ that 
‘nothing can upset’.7 In Florence, ‘the darkness became the limpid sheath of 
wonderful vibrations, the city acquired a profile, its ancient true profile, the night 
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was filled with life and ardour’.8 At times the coexistence in the same story of 
martial tones and intimate atmospheres produced a disorientating effect. In 
summer 1940, for instance, the journalist and writer Emilio Radius insisted that, 
“blackout is a war, a true war operation, in which civilians must take part with 
military discipline’. At the same time he noticed that in the evening “life is being 
led indoors and homes, by contrast, have become more comfortable and 
brighter”.9 Blackout, the writer Corrado Alvaro observed, was bringing to the 
large cities inhabited by millions of Italians the sober life hitherto led only by the 
peasantry in the countryside or in the mountains – full of solidarity, community 
spirit and good feeling.
10
 Newspapers insisted on the socialising function of 
shelters and alarms: the sound of the sirens pushed people into cellars, where they 
got to know one another. ‘We are almost sorry’, Carlo Manzoni wrote, ‘when the 
all clear advises us to go back to bed’.11 The blackout experience, as depicted in 
the short stories disseminated in the press, hailed the example of generous and 
unselfish people, always willing to help the weak and unflappable in the face of 
danger.
12
 As during the months of non-belligerence, the media also attempted to 
cheer up readers by focusing on frivolous topics in line with war needs. The 
weekly Tempo, for example, commissioned stylist Else-Ley Haertter to sketch a 
new collection for Italian women in wartime:             
 
Men from all walks of life stay calm and vigilant, but women are proving themselves even calmer. 
So calm that they do not want to give up some charming mental occupations. On the contrary, the 
circumstances have stimulated their imagination and now we have an extraordinary surprise: 
fashion has been inspired by blackout, discovering for the incoming fall and winter seasons the 
purples, the pink-purples and the blues prompted by the dim lights, the amber and overcast colours 
of war nights. One of our most sensitive designers has added those colours to her palette and 
decided to launch them as the foundation of the next winter fashion, creating original patterns that 
bring out the harmony of blue, purple and pink in elegant dresses cut from the newly made Italian 
cloth. Once upon a time, in wars and revolutions, women used to dress in martial styles that gave 
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civilian dress an operetta’s atmosphere: nowadays, the taste and intelligence of our fashion offer a 
good idea of the new, rapidly changing situation.
13
                        
 
It is hard to ascertain how many Italians might have taken comfort in those 
articles. But such entertaining exercises seemed so inconsistent with the content 
and timbre of almost two decades of bellicose pedagogy that open dissent 
emerged within Fascism itself. An unsigned comment in Primato, the cultural 
journal founded by Giuseppe Bottai, condemned ‘the craving’ for looking at  
everything through ‘eyes veiled with lyricism and tears’ and observed that ‘poetry 
of logistics,  poetry of the blackout, poetry of the anti-aircraft barrage’ came 
alongside ‘poetry of the advance and the attack’. But the war, the author warned, 
‘is a tremendously serious thing, which requires method, calculation, gravity, 
even when it is not made but is merely relayed’.14 Yet Bottai’s criticism had no 
influence on the direction of Italian propaganda and the press continued to follow 
the path that Primato had exposed. As late as 1942, for example, L’Illustrazione 
Italiana carried an article written by Gio Ponti, an influential architect and 
designer, exalting the blackout because ‘it gave us back the sky light’.15                                    
 
3.2 ‘Them and Us’: Heroes against Villains 
Juxtaposing two antithetic styles of waging the air war was a permanent fixture in 
Fascist war propaganda: on the one hand, the cowardly and indiscriminate attacks 
of British pilots on innocent civilians; on the other the heroic and successful 
actions of Italian airmen against selected military targets. German forces too 
benefited from the exaltation of military virtues: the Italian newspapers had been 
praising the Luftwaffe raids on British cities since the beginning of the war and 
accusing the RAF of targeting homes, schools and hospitals.
16
 This rhetorical 
device was closely linked to the Fascist idealisation of Italian air power based on a 
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handful of highly symbolic precedents, such as the proclamations of the ‘flying 
poet’ Gabriele d’Annunzio, the aeronautical records achieved by Francesco De 
Pinedo, the saga of the dirigible airship Norge of Umberto Nobile, the futuristic 
theories of Giulio Douhet, the feats of the ace Francesco Baracca in the Great 
War, and the mythical figure of Italo Balbo, whose legend among contemporaries 
was preserved while concealing from the public the fact that his death in June 
1940 had been caused by Italian anti-aircraft gunfire on the North African front.
17
 
Together with these historical landmarks, popular culture, literature and the arts 
had also contributed to the construction of the myth, mixing with political 
propaganda and building solid foundations among different layers of the Italian 
society: the romantic novels of Liala - such as the most popular Brigata di ali, 
which came out in 1937 - provided women with fascinating  portraits of gallant 
pilots, while boys were attracted by comics featuring exemplary heroes in the 
most read youth magazines: ‘L’asso dell’aria’ in L’Avventuroso, ‘Il mistero 
dell’aeroporto Zeta’ in Topolino, ‘Aviazione e fascismo’ in L’Audace.18 
Aeropittura and aeropoesia were branches of Futurism which had been 
exalting the ‘aesthetics of the flying machines’ respectively in paintings and 
poems since the Great War.
19
 In the 1930s they were part of the propagandistic 
campaigns supporting Fascist wars, first in Spain, then in Ethiopia and finally in 
the Second World War. Notwithstanding the cultural pedigree, those elements of 
the Futurist movement never attracted a huge popular following, compared with 
the influence cinema had in popularising stories of successful airmen. For 
example, the story of the two main characters in the film Luciano Serra pilota - a 
father who had fought in the Great War and his son who piloted a plane in the 
Ethiopian campaign - was a powerful synthesis of those streams of the air-power 
myth. The film, written by Roberto Rossellini and supervised by Vittorio 
Mussolini, the Duce’s son who acted as the regime’s voice in the world of 
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cinema, was awarded the Coppa Mussolini at the Festival of Venice in 1938 and 
Fascist propaganda continued to exploit its success for years to come.
20
 In June 
1940, when Mussolini joined Hitler in the war, the MCP showed the film in Berlin, 
where spectators were reported to have applauded ‘especially the scenes dealing 
with the development of Italian air force’.21        
In war reporting, the ‘exceptionalism’ of the Italian air power was 
translated into stories whose style and language hinted at almost supernatural 
forces. The Ala Fascista was portrayed as ‘infallible’ and ‘inexorable’, and as 
being ‘everywhere’. The content of the Corriere della Sera on 24 June 1940 was 
an example of this kind of propaganda. Two days earlier a British air raid on the 
Sicilian city of Trapani had left 20 dead and 40 wounded, mostly civilians, 
besides ‘relevant damage’ to military targets, but the front page of the newspaper 
was monopolised by news of a ‘successful’ raid that Italian bombers had carried 
out on the British port in Alexandria in Egypt, ‘a magnificent action, which 
confirms the ubiquity of our air force, for which there are no such thing as 
unattainable enemy bases’. An anonymous commentator set the ‘magnificent 
deeds’ of the Italian pilots against the ‘criminal act of enemy aviation on the built-
up area in Trapani’.22 Comments and reports amplified the facts related in the 
Italian war bulletins and insisted in singling out episodes which were deemed 
particularly emblematic of the enemy’s dishonourable conduct. Praising the 
actions of Fascist aviators in the Mediterranean at the beginning of September 
1940, for instance, La Stampa remarked that an Italian rescue seaplane, ‘which 
bore the required red cross, had been attacked and machine-gunned while it was 
searching for planes lost at sea’. The Genoese newspaper Il Secolo XIX  labelled 
the act as ‘wicked and infamous’:  
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In war, from 1914 onwards, airmen from all over the world have always restricted their actions 
and have always operated within the limits established by international law on air war. The British 
airmen were the first to break this chivalrous custom and put themselves outside the law.
23
 
     
Renowned journalists and writers were enlisted to provide vivid accounts of 
bravery and cowardice. ‘Our press, in the name of the Italian airmen’, Gastone 
Martini wrote in L’Illustrazione Italiana, ‘more than once dared the British to 
appear in our skies in the daylight, as our pilots do in their missions on 
Alexandria, Malta, Aden and so on, night and day’.24 Corriere della Sera 
published Vittorio-Beonio Brocchieri, an historian at the University of Pavia and 
a committed aviator embedded with the Italian air force. From his earliest reports 
he played the card of comparison between Italian and British pilots. Writing about 
the battle over Malta, he set ‘our bold actions against the enemy bases’ against 
‘the criminal English air raids on open cities’. Describing the Italian attack as a 
retaliation for the British raid on Trapani, he praised the conduct of the action ‘in 
perfect military style’, noting that the Italian planes ‘veer over the built-up area of 
Gozo, which is scrupulously respected’ and ‘point at the military bases in Malta’. 
In that article, the Italian reader could not see the enemy, impersonally described 
as a cold and defective military machine, but was encouraged to admire the Italian 
pilots standing against a background of clear skies, brought together in a 
comradely spirit, with commanders personally taking part in the actions in order 
to convey confidence and assurance to their subordinates. In the same report, 
Beonio-Brocchieri described the effects of the British raid on Palermo on 23 June 
1940 in which 25 people were killed and 110 wounded. He emphasised the 
atmosphere of tragedy – without hinting at the fact, duly registered in the supreme 
command’s diary, that the attack was an effective one, having hit some important 
military targets including a vehicle depot, a shipyard near the train station, and an 
airplane factory:  
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We were in town when ambulances and stretchers carried away the dead and wounded. Poor 
unarmed people, civilians, defenceless, hit by the stupidity of a disloyal and clumsy enemy who 
allows the aerial offensive fall upon mistaken targets. We conceive war in a very different way. 
25
                
 
Readers of Cronache della guerra, who benefited from reports that looked deeply 
at the theoretical and technical aspects of war, were also provided with analysis of 
two opposing ways of conducting air operations. This task was entrusted to Ugo 
Rampelli, chief press officer at the Air Ministry and a regular attendee at the MCP 
press conferences.
26
 ‘In the succession of enemy initiatives’, he wrote, ‘a logical 
connection, a concatenation which would demonstrate a line of conduct and 
therefore a clear and precise purpose is missing’. The author observed with a 
certain relief that the enemy had not conducted its  night raids on Turin, Genoa, 
Trapani and Palermo with ‘a terroristic intent’, in pursuit of ‘Douhet’s theories of 
air war’. But he did not ascribe that behaviour so much to a deliberate decision by 
the British authorities, as to ‘a mean and cynical mentality of the people who 
order the air missions’ and to the ‘poor training and scanty professional values of 
the crews that must accomplish them’. Against such descriptions of the enemy, 
Rampelli sketched in a few lines a fanciful and idealised portrait of the Fascist air 
force: Italian air operations distinguished themselves in ‘their continuity of 
direction, organic complexity of actions, accuracy of fire, choice of targets, crews’ 
desire for combat, persistence of every unit in reaching targets in spite of enemy 
anti-aircraft fire, enemy fighters and adverse weather conditions’. The aim was to 
persuade readers to believe that there was an enormous gulf between the two sides 
in terms of fighting skills and military preparation: 
 
In short, in our crews there is a style which you do not see in the enemy. Timely interventions, 
scrupulous observance of routine in flight, formations flying elegantly even in enemy skies, indeed 
especially in enemy skies, because those who see us can admire what discipline binds the units and 
what harmony there is among crews. 
27
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The printed media ensured that it provided a visual representation of the contrast 
between the two different ways of conducting the air war, filling their pages with 
pictures showing civilian buildings wrecked by British bombs set against aerial 
photographs framing the military targets carefully selected by the German and 
Italian crews.
28
 Cartoonists were also entrusted to disseminate such 
representations as widely as possible. The magazine Tempo, for example, 
published a drawing representing a group of British civilians surrounding an RAF 
plane asking the pilot whether the four crosses painted on the left wing 
represented the number of enemy aircraft he shot down. ‘No’, he replied, ‘They 
stand for the hospitals I bombed’.29 
This elementary schema based on the reiterated assertion of moral 
superiority over the enemy, despite proving rather ineffective in gaining popular 
support for war, according to confidential reports, was to remain a constant in 
subsequent years and extending, as chapter 4 will show, to other forms of 
propaganda supervised by the MCP.     
 
3.3 Capitalising on Death: In the Footsteps of German Propaganda 
During the first months of non-belligerence, Italian propaganda against the Allies 
had inclined towards ideological, political and economic issues, rather than 
questioning their war practices in detail or framing two divergent ways of waging 
war. At that stage the war was fought mostly at sea and civilians were not fully 
involved. In the last months of 1939, with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact still in 
force, the war Russia waged against Finland to take over a territory deemed vital 
to protect Leningrad drew the attention of the Italian media. Readers and 
spectators were fed stories and images of Soviet aggression and encouraged to 
sympathise with the Finnish people. In December the bombing of Helsinki was 
widely reported, praising the courage of the ordinary Finns who stood firm against 
the invader: the first five air raids claimed hundreds of victims among civilians 
and several buildings and an hospital burned, yet ‘the population behaved with a 
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laudable calm, following with the utmost discipline the orders of the Defence 
Command, whose shelters worked perfectly well’.30                                         
On 10 May 1940 the western campaign began and German troops flooded 
into the Low Countries and France. Mussolini decided that his intervention could 
no longer be put off.
31
 It was at this point that war reports in the Italian media 
started to recount the fight between the Germans and the Allies adopting the 
framework of moral judgement regarding their military conduct. The bombing of 
Freiburg, in southern Germany, on 10 May 1940 offered German propaganda (and 
the Italian authorities, who uncritically echoed Berlin’s arguments) occasion to 
blame its enemies for the first deliberate air attack against civilians and to try and 
influence public opinion in neutral countries. That evening an official 
communiqué reported that three enemy planes had dropped bombs on the open 
city of Freiburg killing 24 people and announced strong retaliation against French 
and British cities. The next day a second German bulletin reported that 13 of the 
dead were children who had been playing in a municipal playground when the 
bombs fell. The Italian press immediately echoed the thesis of an Allied massacre, 
indulging in macabre particulars of blood and bone fragments at the scene of the 
explosion and lingering over moving details like the discovery of broken toys 
belonging to the dead children.
32
 
Over successive days the Italian newspapers reported the British Air 
Ministry’s strong denial, which stated on 11 May that the German communiqué 
was pure fabrication.
33
 However, the papers did not follow the event’s 
developments, which turned out to be a classic example of the skill of Goebbels’ 
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propagandists. The story was ineptly countered by their opposite numbers in 
London and Paris, as shown by the fact that as late as 16 May the French news 
agency Havas related Swiss information that Allied squadrons had attacked 
mechanised German troops travelling through Freiburg, during which action some 
civilians had been unintentionally hit.
34
 It took the British Foreign Office until 20 
May to issue an official communiqué asserting that, ‘statements to the effect that 
the RAF have deliberately bombed civilians or non-military objectives are 
completely untrue,’ and that, ‘His Majesty’s Government have made it clear that it 
is no part of their policy to bomb non-military objectives, no matter what the 
policy of the German government may be’.35 William Shirer, the CBS radio’s 
Berlin correspondent, guessed at the truth. He noted in his diary on 11 May:  
 
Goebbels’ propaganda machine, shifting into high gear, discovers today, twenty-four hours after 
the official announcement that twenty-four persons had been killed by the bombing of Freiburg, 
that thirteen of the twenty-four were children who were peacefully frolicking on the municipal 
playground. What were a lot of children doing on a playground in the midst of an air-raid? This 
particular Goebbels fake is probably produced to justify German killing of civilians on the other 
side’.36  
                                                 
Shirer’s intuition was well founded, but it took decades for the myth that the 
Allied bombing of Freiburg had started the terroristic air war against civilians to 
be refuted. The German town had been accidentally hit by three Luftwaffe 
bombers lost on their way to Dijon in France.
37
 
Two months later, when Mussolini had been at war for just four weeks, the 
Italian authorities had to face the first real test of war propaganda about civilian 
casualties. On 2 July 1940 the German U-Boat U-47 torpedoed the British liner 
The Arandora Star which was heading to Canada carrying German prisoners of 
                                                 
34
 ‘Une mise au point au sujet du pretendu bombardement de Fribourg-en-Brisgau’, La Croix, 16 
May 1940.  
35
 ‘No Bombs on Non-Military Objectives’, The Times, 20 May 1940. 
36
 William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent 1934-1941 (New 
York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1943), p. 270. 
37
 ‘Große Sache’, Der Spiegel, 26 April 1982, pp. 74-76; Horst Boog, ‘The Anglo-American 
Strategic Air-War over Europe and German Air Defence’, in Germany and the Second World War. 
Widening of the Conflict Into a World War and the Shift ot the Initiative 1941-1943, Vol. 6, The 
global war, ed. Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 
p. 528; Hermann Knell, To Destroy a City. Strategic Bombing and its Human Consequences in 
World War II (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2003), p. 180. 
83 
war, Jewish refugees, Italian civilian internees and British servicemen. The liner 
sank within 30 minutes and 700 people died, two thirds of whom were Italians. 
The Fascist press flew into a rage when British newspapers reported that Germans 
and Italians had panicked and started to fight on the Arandora’s decks over 
possession of the lifeboats, but it failed to exploit the disaster and capitalise on the 
sensation it caused among the British where members of Parliament raised 
questions in the House of Commons. Instead the Italian media focused on blaming 
the enemy for some crucial factors of the shipwreck that emerged from survivors’ 
accounts: the ship had visible guns but was not escorted, nor did it display evident 
signs that civilians were aboard; there were only ten lifeboats; barbed wire 
hampered escape in some places; no planned emergency procedure was put in 
place. In fact, most of the Italian internees on The Arandora Star were neither 
Fascist sympathisers nor involved in politics. They had lived in Britain for 
decades as restaurant owners, caterers, shopkeepers and miners. Many were old. 
Nearly all were well integrated into British society. But the Fascist authorities – 
probably concerned that revealing the implications of that episode could cause 
trouble on the home front – did not denounce the method of their deportation or 
amplify the tragedy of The Arandora Star.
38
                       
Censors were more resolute in exploiting episodes which did not involve 
Italians. As Antonio Gibelli noticed, an anti-Soviet campaign orchestrated in the 
Italian press at the beginning of 1940 had produced cartoons showing Stalin’s 
bombers targeting innocent children.
39
 On 10 September 1940 the MCP instructed 
newspapers to ‘comment on the statistics of German children killed by British 
                                                 
38
 ‘Internati italiani e tedeschi vittime della perfidia inglese’, La Stampa, 6 July 1940; Paolo 
Monelli, ‘Si racconta il naufragio dell’”Arandora star”’, La Nuova Stampa, 23 October 1949;  
Terri Colpi, ‘The Impact of the Second World War on the British Italian Community’, in The 
Internment of Aliens in Twentieth Century Britain, ed. David Cesarani and Tony Kushner , 
(London: Frank Cass, 1993),  pp. 177-183; Lucio Sponza, ‘The Internment of Italians 1940-1945’, 
in Totally Un-English? Britain’s Internment of ‘Enemy Aliens in Two World Wars, The Yearbook 
of the Research Centre for German and Austrian Exile Studios, ed. Richard Dove, Vol. 7 
(Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi B.V., 2005); Maria Serena Balestracci, Arandora Star: dall’oblio 
alla memoria (Parma: MUP, 2008).  
39
 Gibelli, Il popolo bambino. Infanzia e nazione dalla Grande Guerra a Salò (Turin: Einaudi, 
2005), p. 344-345. The author points out that in post-war Italy anti-communist propaganda 
exploited the same stereotype.   
84 
bombs on Berlin’.40 Accordingly, Mussolini’s men followed with greater 
conviction in the footsteps of Nazi propaganda when an RAF raid on 18 September 
1940 provided Goebbels with a golden opportunity to orchestrate another anti-
British campaign, again charging the enemy with brutality against the German 
civilian population. The Italian media carried news, comment and pictures of the 
attack launched by British planes in north-west Germany. The bombers hit a 
children’s hospital in Bethel, near Bielefeld, and killed 12 disabled children. The 
hospital had been in the sights of the Reich authorities charged with the eugenic 
T-4 programme which entailed the mass murder of mentally ill and physically 
handicapped people, but before the attack the perseverance of the hospital’s 
director, Protestant pastor Friedrich von Bodelschwingh, had saved the little 
patients, whom the Nazi authorities had deemed ‘unworthy of living’, from 
euthanasia. The official version of the Nazi propaganda was questioned by many 
Germans: spectators of a newsreel about the Bethel tragedy were recorded by the 
Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the counter-intelligence of the Nazi party that compiled 
morale reports, commenting on how moving it was to see the authorities so 
concerned for the ‘hereditary diseased’.41  The Italian media echoed the German 
propaganda machine, branding the British air raid as a ‘revolting crime’ against 
the very defenceless and sick children the Nazis had in fact planned to eliminate:                  
 
It is an exemplary event, without mitigating circumstances, not only because the surrounding area 
is a long way from any military objective which might attract the British bombers, but also on 
account of the huge extent of the hospital buildings, whose nature was instantly recognisable and 
clearly marked with the Red Cross symbol. Owing to all those factors, only one hypothesis is 
admissible: the attack was expressly and deliberately premeditated and implemented, which is 
therefore not only a measure of the vileness of those who carried it out and who marked 
themselves as unworthy of being called soldiers, but also seals the moral stature of the entire war’s 
direction and of a whole people, which too evidently shows solidarity with this way of fighting.
42
 
 
‘It is unquestionable’, Il Messaggero said, ‘that the dreadful deed has been 
perpetrated in total awareness’. Corriere della Sera tried to move its readers, who 
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obviously did not know about the T-4 programme, comparing Bethel with a 
similar institution in Turin, the very popular ‘Beata Casa del Cottolengo’. In a 
break from its custom of not publishing shocking pictures of war casualties, the 
Italian press published photographs released by German propaganda showing the 
young victims of the Bethel bombing lying in a morgue. The caption in 
L’Illustrazione Italiana described ‘the German children killed by British bombs 
during the attack on Bethel, the centre in Westphalia which is called “the city of 
the wretched” because it is inhabited by thousands of sick people who find 
assistance and rehabilitation there’. The same scenes were also screened in Italian 
cinemas by the Istituto LUCE.
43
   
 Although it was always solicitous about the fate of civilians when the 
bombers were  (or were reported to be) British, the Italian media failed to note 
that the Arma Azzurra’s airmen did not show any humanitarian restraint in the 
Middle East. Since 15 July 1940 planes taking off from Rhodes had targeted oil 
installations, refineries, storage facilities and power stations in Palestine. The first 
raid against Haifa, on 15 July, was carried out by five aircraft under the command 
of secretary of the Fascist Party Ettore Muti in his capacity as air force major. In 
their deadliest attack, on the afternoon of 9 September, Italian planes dropped 4.5 
tons of bombs on a residential area in the centre of Tel Aviv killing 117 Jews, 
seven Arabs and one Australian soldier. The city, unlike Haifa, did not host 
military or industrial targets and lacked anti-aircraft guns. Thousands of people 
attended the funerals of the victims, shocked by what they saw as a deliberate 
attack on civilians, and the mayor of Tel Aviv, Israel Rocach, wrote letters of 
protest about the Italian raid to Roosevelt.
44
 Since the news did not exist for the 
Italian public, Fascist propaganda did not care to answer the British authorities 
                                                 
43
 ‘Criminale impresa della RAF contro i sanatori tedeschi di Bethel’, Il Messaggero, 20 September 
1940; ‘I delitti della RAF. Tre ospedali per bambini bombardati in Germania’, Corriere della Sera, 
20 September 1940; ‘Gli obiettivi dei bombardieri inglesi’, L’Illustrazione Italiana, 29 September 
1940 n. 39; ‘Effetti dei bombardamenti inglesi e tedeschi’, Giornale LUCE C0076, 19 September 
1940.  
44
 Nir Arielli, ‘“Haifa is still Burning”: Italian, German and French Air Raids on Palestine during 
the Second World War’, Middle Eastern Studies 3 (2010), pp. 333-336; Daphna Sharfman, 
Palestine in the Second World War: Strategic Plans and Political Dilemmas (Eastbourne: Sussex 
University Press, 2014), pp. 15-16.   
86 
and the press which claimed the bombs had been dropped indiscriminately and far 
from any possible military objectives.
45
 On 11 September 1940 La Stampa 
confined itself to reporting from the official bulletin which stated that the Italian 
air force had bombed the port of Haifa and the Alexandria-Marsha Matruh railway 
line in Egypt.
46
  
 
3.4 Italians in the Battle of Britain 
The participation of an Italian air expeditionary force in German operations 
against the British Isles was a valuable opportunity for Fascist propaganda to 
write a new chapter in the epic of the Arma Azzurra. As a matter of fact it was an 
initiative with no relevant consequence on the course of the Battle of Britain (on 
the contrary, it ended up causing embarrassment between the Axis partners and 
huge resentment in Britain), but it was sold to the public as a bold enterprise and a 
military success. A poster designed by illustrator Gino Boccasile, showing a 
bombed-out London in flames below an overhanging hand with the Roman 
gesture of ‘thumbs down’, were to be found on Italy’s walls for the whole war.47  
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After France’s surrender on 22 June 1940, Mussolini’s belief strengthened that a 
successful German invasion of England would lead to a swift end to the war. On 
26 June he sent a message to Hitler offering land forces and aircraft to assist in the 
planned operations on British soil.
48
 Yet the propaganda authorities did not allow 
the media to speculate about this development (“Do not hint at Italian 
participation in the German attack against England”, was the terse directive issued 
on 26 June), since it required careful assessment by Air Ministry officials and a 
cautious approach to the ally.
49
  
On 13 July Hitler answered Mussolini, half-heartedly accepting the 
cooperation of the Italian air force.
50
 The following day the Italian ambassador in 
Berlin, Alfieri, conveyed to Ciano his information regarding the size of the 
German air force in view of the attack on England expected to start 18 days later: 
the Luftwaffe was lining up 1,400 fighters, 1,800 bombers and 1,300 transport 
planes.
51
 The huge divergence of commitment and preparation between the allies 
was therefore evident to Rome. But, notwithstanding the perplexity of the Regia 
Aeronautica’s chiefs, Mussolini insisted and the military authorities agreed that 
some bombers and fighter squadrons should be sent to German bases in occupied 
Belgium. On 10 September the Corpo Aereo Italiano (CAI) was formally 
established. The Italian aircraft (75 bombers and 98 fighters) took six weeks to be 
relocated to the Flemish airfields. In spite of lengthy preparation for crews and 
support personnel, the transfer flights from Italian bases turned out to be 
particularly difficult: 17 planes were forced to make emergency landings and four 
were destroyed. Aircrew had not been adequately trained in blind and 
instrumental navigation and they realised from passing over the Alps that flying 
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conditions in Northern Europe might be different from those of the Mediterranean 
and North Africa.
52
 When, on 22 October, the assembly of squadrons and 
headquarters was complete, no hint at those technical setbacks was reported by 
the Italian newspapers, which instead printed word for word the ceremonious 
telegrams exchanged between Herman Goering and General Rino Corso Fougier, 
commander of the CAI.
53
 Over the following days, the Fascist media described as 
incontrovertible successes a handful of actions that, in spite of the diligence and 
sometimes courage of the crews, did not inflict significant damage on enemy 
infrastructure and did not disguise the improvisation and inadequacy of Italian 
machinery. 
The authorities were well aware of the meagreness of the Italian share in 
the battle over the Channel. They were conscious that inflating the contribution in 
the media might cause friction with Italy’s allies and provoke forceful British 
reaction. On 29 October Pavolini told editors and journalists to report CAI 
operations only if they had been previously cited in German communiqués. 
Knowing the media’s penchant for emphasis, he ordered that articles by special 
correspondents should be published sparingly: ‘We cannot keep talking about that 
activity for obvious reasons of delicacy and proportion’.54 The Istituto LUCE duly 
complied with the order and Italian spectators did not see much about their 
compatriots’ actions against British cities; instead, they were shown scenes of 
military routine: a troop train ferrying airmen and materials, camouflaged planes, 
preparation of ammunition, the flight over the Channel and the targeting of enemy 
objectives.
55
 The specialised press tried to dodge the snare literary accounts of 
pilots’ deeds, instead stressing the technical, strategic and political aspects of 
Italian participation, which ‘proved the complete solidarity within the Axis’ and 
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signalled the addition of a new front to the Fascist war, ‘already tough and 
difficult because of its span of seven different sectors’.56   
Pavolini’s directive on CAI coverage went fundamentally unheeded among 
newspapers, and probably not for political reasons. They vied to publish 
sensational reports about those missions, in fierce competition with each other, 
mostly because articles about aviation and pilots’ exploits still attracted readers as 
a break from the boring routine of war reporting, which was constrained by 
military censorship and MCP supervision. Besides, Italian papers had always 
prominently featured stories of aeronautical adventures and their heroes. In the 
1930s La Stampa, following the example of the French newspaper Paris Soir, 
began to use a plane to move its reporters around quickly and to take spectacular 
photographs, especially on occasions of popular sporting events. The journalist-
pilot Maner Lualdi accomplished his first missions on such a plane, and a few 
years later he took part in the Ethiopian War and then the Battle of Britain, flying 
an Italian bomber as a reserve officer and sending a series of reports about the 
Regia Aeronautica’s expeditionary force to the Turin daily.57  In his time with the 
CAI crew, Lualdi, who remained a successful and popular journalist in post-war 
Italy, alternated between the usual martial rhetoric (‘It rains bombs, targets appear 
shocked by the very precise firing. The first daytime victory in English skies has 
been won’, he wrote on 14 November) and technical digressions aimed at 
elaborating the daring of Italian pilots. In his reportage, Britain’s powerful anti-
aircraft defence and its powerful fighters were not enough to stop the Italian 
attacks, while the skilful handling of the Italian planes counterbalanced the 
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undeniable speed of the Spitfires: ‘The pilot’s firm hand makes up for a 
contingent mechanical failure’.58 
By the time the press published the most sensational reports about the 
Italian raids on enemy targets (ports, military installations and factories in 
Harwich, Ipswich, Margate, Folkstone and Lowestoft), the commander-in-chief of 
the German Air Command, Wilhelm Keitel, had offered to release the CAI from 
the Channel Front, suggesting to Badoglio, in a meeting on 14 and 15 November, 
moving planes and crew to Egypt and Greece where the need was greater.
59
 When 
the Italian military authorities yielded to German insistence and withdrew the CAI 
(taking two more weeks to start the operation, which was completed in the first 
week of 1941), newspapers scrupulously conformed to official instructions to 
emphasise ‘the Axis’ common action’.60 Yet Italian readers did not receive the 
balance sheet of the expedition, which had cost the Regia Aeronautica 38 planes 
and 43 airmen, in comparison with nine RAF planes shot down.
61
 Nor did they 
hear about the civilian victims of the raids, such as the three British workers killed 
during an attack on the Co-operative Wholesale Society’s canning factory at 
Waveny Drive, Lowestoft, on 29 November.
62
 
Even in 1942, Fascist propaganda was perpetuating the legend of an 
honourable Italian participation in the Battle of Britain, for example in a pamphlet 
commissioned by the MCP to praise the performance of the Italian armed forces 
during the first two years of war.
63
 It took several decades for the voices of CAI 
veterans to be heard, and their accounts disproved the official version. One had 
jotted down his impressions in the aftermath of an action on 11 November: ‘We 
bombers are badly led. Units are too far away from each other and fighters cannot 
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shield all the planes. We don’t have armour-plating, but we do have on our heads 
beautiful steel helmets, the same the infantry’s’. Another witness dismantled the 
notion that the German and Italian air forces were on the same level, retelling the 
reactions of Luftwaffe men when his battered plane returned from a mission with 
some wounded crew: the Germans ‘press round us’ and ‘make me understand that 
we Italians are a little crazy in carrying out such dangerous missions, in broad 
daylight, with such a plane’. And a 20th Wing airman remembered that his 
inaugural flight on England ‘was the first dispiriting contact with a reality very 
different from what we had imagined’: both the ally and the enemy ‘were very 
well organised, with functioning radar, practical and exceptional infrastructure on 
the ground, very efficient liaisons, remarkably trained pilots’, while ‘our pilots 
showed a magnificent spirit of self-sacrifice and enthusiasm and too many of 
them lay down their lives’.64                
 
3.5 A Blow to the Italian Fleet   
On the night of 11 November 1940, twenty British planes - among them 11 
Swordfish torpedo-bombers - that had taken off from the aircraft carrier 
Illustrious, carried out a plan devised in 1935 by the Fleet Air Arm, bombing the 
Italian fleet at its main base in Taranto harbour. Anti-aircraft defence was able to 
shoot down just two planes. The British fighters quickly intercepted the Italian 
seaplanes dispatched on a reconnaissance. Three battleships and two cruisers – 
half of Italian naval power – were rendered unserviceable for months.  It was a 
severe blow, which boosted British morale and embarrassed Mussolini’s military 
chiefs to such an extent that even the official records were drafted with reticence 
and inaccuracy, minimising the damage inflicted by the enemy, keeping silent 
about the death of 40 seamen, and inflating the strength of the anti-aircraft 
response to the attack.
65
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On 12 November, at 7.30 in the evening, during the usual MCP press 
briefing, Pavolini made no reference to the disastrous raid and told journalists 
that, ‘on national territory the reaction  to enemy air attacks is more and more 
lively and effective. Any time there is an incursion, a great many enemy planes 
are almost always shot down’. He also pointed to ‘the unceasing Italian 
participation in German air missions on the English island’ that had culminated, 
the day before, in ‘a violent and victorious combat of Fascist Wings on the mouth 
of the Thames’.66 Newspapers followed the official version and reported the news 
about Taranto in a few lines quoting the official communiqué. Commentary 
ventured to invert reality, as in an article on 13 November by the editor of La 
Stampa Alfredo Signoretti, who shamelessly claimed (scrupulously observing 
Pavolini’s prescriptions) that ‘the metropolitan territory is preserved from any 
serious threat’ and the effectiveness of enemy raids ‘is absolutely limited’.67  
However, beyond propaganda tricks, the British raid on Taranto did cause 
considerable anxiety in Italy among politicians and journalists, as well as 
exacerbating concern among the military hierarchies, who had in vain warned the 
government about the inefficiency of the Italian war machine. The Italian fleet at 
Taranto had been so vulnerable to the Fleet Air Arm torpedo bombers partly 
because of the lack of timely air cover. An enemy aircraft carrier was able to 
approach the port without being intercepted.  During the first 11 months of war 
there was no direct contact between the air force and the navy in the field and 
their actions at sea were co-ordinated through their headquarters in Rome. There 
were no liaison officers at intermediate levels. It was only in May 1941 that Ugo 
Cavallero, Badoglio’s successor as chief of the army general staff, charged an 
aviation general and an admiral with drawing up shared rules on the engagement 
of Italian planes in defence of the Italian fleet.
68 
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The Minister of National Education, Giuseppe Bottai, noted in his diary 
entry for 14 November that there was ‘depression going around over the situation 
in Greece and even more because of the attack against the fleet in Taranto’. The 
mistakes that had led to the events in Taranto, he added the next day, were not 
‘unforeseen and unforeseeable’ but were ‘the logical consequence of a command 
and government system centralised to the extent that it abolishes any competence 
and responsibility’.69 Also in media circles the event was privately recorded in 
quite a different tone from the official line of dissimulation dictated by the 
censorship authorities. ‘And to think that the torpedo bomber was originally an 
Italian invention. Cold comfort!’, the journalist and broadcaster Aldo Valori wrote 
in his memoirs. Another writer, Enrico Rocca, noted in his diaries that the Navy, 
in order to remedy the damage inflicted to the fleet, was forced to recall Umberto 
Pugliese, the Jewish general of the ‘Genio navale’ who had built the battleship 
Littorio and who had been discharged following the racial laws.
70 
Scepticism and lack of confidence became widespread among ordinary 
people as well. On 15 November 1940, four days after the British attack against 
the Italian fleet, an informant of the OVRA secret police wrote from Genoa:  
 
The news about the Taranto bombing spread immediately, first in naval and industrial circles and 
then throughout the city, causing the greatest emotion. It is common knowledge that the 
battleships Littorio, Conte di Cavour, and Duilio, besides various cruisers, were hit by bombs and 
torpedoes fired by British planes. People say that the Conte di Cavour sank, the other two 
battleships were seriously damaged and several bombed cruisers suffered substantial damage. 
Such news caused a feeling of consternation and anxiety. Criticism is being voiced about the 
alleged insufficiency of our anti-aircraft defence and the diminution of our naval power is 
gloomily expected. A great many listened to Radio Londra’s broadcast and every remark fits with 
what the British said about the events in Taranto. The news on the Taranto bombing caused deep 
and painful emotion also in La Spezia, where yesterday some friends told me that there is a great 
deal of worry in navy circles and morale is very low.
71
           
 
The emphasis the British press gave to the Taranto events, echoing the satisfaction 
expressed in London military and political circles, forced Italian propaganda to 
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construct a reaction which contradicted the initial nonchalance of the press and 
exposed the embarrassment of the Fascist authorities. Listeners to the Italian 
service of the BBC knew the truth about the Taranto attack from the familiar voice 
of Colonel Stevens, who announced on 13 November that it was unlikely that the 
Italian Navy could recover from ‘the hard blow’, while the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Albert Victor Alexander,  broadcast the news to his compatriots, 
saying that within ‘their inglorious shelter the Italian battle fleet had suffered a 
defeat which could only have been redeemed in the public mind had that fleet 
shown itself willing to accept battle at sea’. With those words the British Admiral 
underlined an aspect which hurt Italian pride and exposed the vacuity of boastful 
propaganda: the decision to spare a significant part of the fleet the hazards of 
fighting on open sea had not been enough to shelter Italian ships from the 
boldness of enemy planes.
72 
‘I imagine the havoc created in Palazzo Venezia’, the speaker of Radio 
Londra remarked two days after the attack, emphasising that Taranto harbour had 
been left without air protection while the FIAT CR42 fighters and BR20 bombers 
were kept busy in England.
73
 However, at first Mussolini did not seem to grasp 
the importance of the Taranto events, either in terms of military consequences or 
regarding public opinion. Ciano recounted that when he went to see his father-in-
law on 12 November he believed he would find him ‘depressed’. Instead, ‘he took 
the blow quite well’ and did not seem ‘to have fully realised its gravity’.74 In spite 
of the Duce’s initial reaction, the Germans did not underestimate the 
consequences of the British attack against the Italian fleet, particularly its 
unavoidable effect on morale among the troops and on the home fronts of both 
countries. ‘What a humiliation, and a disgrace!’, Goebbels observed in his diaries 
on 16 November, noting that, ‘the Taranto affair continues to loom large in the 
English victory bulletins’. Even in the German press, usually monolithic in 
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backing the Italian version of war episodes, The Times was able to pick on a 
puzzled observation from Frankfurter Zeitung’s Rome correspondent who wrote: 
‘It is a fact that the true events at Taranto were sad enough’ and ‘the loss suffered 
will be felt for a long time’.75 
When Winston Churchill told the House of Commons that the Royal Navy 
had struck ‘a crippling blow at the Italian fleet’ and that the outcome of the attack 
had affected ‘decisively the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean’, the 
Italian media described the British Prime Minister’s announcement as a 
‘shameless fraud’ devised ‘to give the illusion to those in England and elsewhere 
who are still ready to listen to such clap-trap that the bombing of Taranto during 
the night of November 10-11 had paralysed the Italian fleet’. A few days later 
Mussolini himself was forced to answer in a live broadcast address to the Fascist 
leadership gathered at Palazzo Venezia, resorting to irony  (‘Cries of joy arose in 
the House of Commons when Churchill was at long last able to give good news’), 
claiming that Italian bulletins always told the truth, denying that the fleet had 
suffered any irreparable damage, but also rectifying the initial Italian version with 
some partial admissions about the blow inflicted to the Italian fleet.
76
 Radio 
Londra noted maliciously that, ‘there must have been good reason’ if the Duce 
‘had deemed it appropriate to take the floor, during the difficult digestion of the 
bitter pill he had to swallow in Greece and after Taranto’. The broadcast hinted at 
the alarm among the Italian people reported by the police chief to Mussolini.
77
 
Neverthless, the Duce’s speech did not completely convince his compatriots. A 
police informant from Genoa, for example, pointed out that Mussolini’s words 
caused a stir by referring to the possibility that ‘the hardship ensuing from the war 
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may become more severe’.78 In addition, the military censors intercepted a telling 
letter sent on 22 November to an army captain from a relative commenting on the 
Duce’s address after Taranto:  
 
It was a speech full of confidence in victory, prescinding from the time needed to achieve it – two 
months or a year, it doesn’t matter: ‘You have to trust me that we shall give Greece a good 
trashing, as we did the Negus”. It is good to have such certainty but, alas, we would prefer if all 
ended in just two months so we could say, ‘we shall meet soon’. Yet we trust in Divine 
Providence.
79
      
       
The battle of words between Churchill and Mussolini did not settle the matter. For 
a whole month the propaganda machines went on arguing about their respective 
symbolic utilisation of the Taranto affair. When The Times reported exultation in 
the United States over the British success, the Italian media polemicised also with 
the American press, accusing it of ‘having outdone Churchill and his propaganda’ 
in exaggerating the consequences of the British raid.
80
 The publication of 
unequivocal pictures in British newspapers showing the condition of the fleet in 
the aftermath of the enemy attack was not enough to quieten Italian propaganda 
on Taranto .
81
 Il Giornale d’Italia went so far as to manipulate the brief 
description of the Taranto pictures released by the British authorities circulated by 
Reuters, in a clumsy attempt to deny the evidence. 
82
 The newspaper’s editor, 
Virginio Gayda, invited the British Prime Minister ‘to moderate his inconsiderate 
fervour’ because, ‘as a whole the Italian navy maintains its tremendous efficiency’ 
and the balance of power in the Mediterranean ‘remains as it was at the beginning 
of the war, in fact has improved in favour of Italy’.83 Cronache della guerra 
published a long and pedantic analysis to unmask ‘boasting on Taranto’ by means 
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of the peculiar argument that the amount of damage to Italian ships claimed by 
Churchill and the British Admiralty could not  technically have been caused by 
the kind of torpedoes fired by the British planes. 
84
 Notwithstanding such 
rhetorical expedients, the Italians did not have the nerve to summon foreign 
journalists in Taranto and allow them to assess the official version in person, as 
they had on the occasion of the first British raids against northern cities in June 
and as they would do in December in the case of the ships that Radio Londra 
reported as hit during the sea battle at Capo Teulada on 27 November.
85
 In 1942 
Orio Vergani, one of Corriere della sera’s most well-known war correspondents, 
continued to deny the facts, writing in a propaganda pamphlet promoted by the 
MCP that the Italian fleet had recovered from the Taranto attack, regaining ‘so 
much strength that it completely changed the situation in the Mediterranean’.86   
 
Conclusion 
Few military setbacks were enough to show that, even before the end of 1940, 
Mussolini’s hope of joining in a rapid Axis victory was fading, alongside any 
expectation of standing equal with Hitler. In particular, the ruinous participation 
of the Regia Aeronautica in the Blitz and the lack of defence to prevent the attack 
on Taranto that decimated the fleet made it clear that not only was the much-
discussed Italian air power a myth ungrounded in fact but also that, as far as 
propaganda and war reporting were concerned, the regime’s aspirations had to 
make way for German priorities. The MCP (and consequently the media) limited 
themselves to the menial task of manipulating the evidence the British provided in 
order to prove their deeds, and  inconsistent, often surreal press campaigns, such 
as the one that recruited writers and artists charged with recasting wartime nights 
as occasions for enjoying aesthetic experiences, added to the dispiriting effect that 
lies and bombast had on people’s feelings.  
 
                                                 
84
 Nautilus, ‘Le vanterie di Taranto e la fuga da Capo Teulada’, Cronache delle guerra, 7 
December 1940, n. 49. 
85
 ‘Un vibrante messaggio al Duce’, Corriere della Sera, 3 December 1940; ‘Pietosi diversivi della 
stampa britannica per smascherare la verità’, Corriere della Sera, 4 December 1940.                  
86
 Vergani, ‘La guerra aerea’, p. 246. 
99 
Chapter 4. Cracking Italian Morale  
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to highlight the increasing difficulties the Fascist 
propaganda machine faced from 1941 in conveying a consistent, reassuring 
message to the Italian people about the regime’s chances against the enemy. There 
is consensus among historians that the first substantial breach in people’s morale 
was opened when the Allies changed their air war policy in 1942. However, 
documents show that discontent was widespread among civilians as early as 
Italy’s first military defeats. Such sentiments were not yet a form of conscious 
dissent or of committed anti-Fascism, yet the military setbacks – along with the 
increasing menace at home – played a crucial role in dismantling several tenets of 
Fascist orthodoxy, as the previous chapter has argued in relation to the myth of 
Italian air power. 
 Reticence, distortion and media lies increased mistrust among Italians and 
led to the spread of conjecture and rumour. In targeting specific layers of society, 
as it did for example with women, the press was unable to refrain from 
stereotyping and patronising. Even when dealing with aspects traditionally suited 
to authoritarianism such as the wartime tightening of law and order measures, 
Fascist propagandists were unable to pursue a coherent argument, mostly because 
government policies were dithering. The centralisation of censorship over other 
vehicles of propaganda like theatre and popular music was based on a paternalist, 
albeit efficient, management that prioritised practical outcomes over the 
imperative of ideological control.     
 
4.1 British Air Strategy: Unintended Consequences and the Attack on Morale 
The Italian press often misreported Churchill’s speeches in order to show that the 
British Prime Minister was the mastermind of an unfair war. For example, they 
summed up the 5 November 1940 House of Commons debate about the war 
situation and the Italian invasion of Greece by saying that London had announced 
that the bombardment of ‘Italian cities’ would continue on an ever increasing 
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scale.1 Those reports alarmed even the Vatican, and the British ambassador to the 
Holy See, Sir D’Arcy Osborne, had to inform the Pope that Churchill had actually 
spoken of ‘military objectives’ in Italian cities and ‘bases in the South of Italy’.2 
The Prime Minister had been in fact more moderate in his speech than the 
members of Parliament who asked for a harder stance against Mussolini. Hastings 
Lees-Smith, who led the Parliamentary Labour Party while Clement Attlee was in 
the coalition government, suggested that if Britain ‘wished to assist those whom 
Italy had attacked, the most effective way of doing so would be to bomb Italy 
continuously on every possible flying night without intermission’. Uninterrupted 
bombing for six weeks or two months, he added, ‘would have had such an effect 
on the Italian mind that it would have been very doubtful whether Mussolini 
would have undertaken an unpopular adventure like the attack on Greece’.3 
 During that phase, the British war leaders were aware that Italian civilians 
panicked when the alarms resounded in their cities, but they were more interested 
in maximising the damage that RAF raids on Italy could do to resources that were 
vital for Mussolini’s war effort than in speculating on the potential effects on 
public morale. Oil stores, for example, were top of their priorities. They estimated 
that oil supplies to Italy for December 1940 would drop considerably lower than 
30,000 tons, forcing Mussolini to import 80-90,000 tons from Rumania. Thus, 
they decided to target Leghorn, where crude oil was hydrogenated to make 
aviation fuel. Hitting that target, a Foreign Office report predicted, ‘will be very 
rewarding both directly and indirectly, as stimulating friction between Italy and 
Germany’. The same line of reasoning was applied to Porto Marghera, where an 
air raid on 15 January 1941 damaged a petroleum reservoir at a cost of two 
million lire.  Five days later the Foreign Office again requested reliable 
information about hydrogenation plants in Bari and Leghorn, and about Pirelli 
rubber production, ammunition plants and aircraft factories in Campania. At the 
end of January the British noted that ‘the civilian population realised the extent of 
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Italian defeats and their morale was low’ but they conceded that, ‘there was 
nothing to show that the country was on the verge of an internal collapse’.4 
A general statement of British bombing policy dated 31 May 1940 had declared 
the intentional bombardment of civilians illegal, establishing strict rules of 
engagement for attacks on military objectives.5 In the first year of the war against 
Mussolini, the Foreign Office received diplomatic and intelligence reports on 
increasing discontent in several quarters about the bombing policy towards Italy, 
which was deemed to be too indulgent. Such discontent was due more to the 
perceived need to retaliate for Italy’s aggression against Greece and its misdeeds 
in the ongoing African campaign than to the urgency of targeting civilians to 
weaken morale. On 1 October 1940, for example, a telegram from Cairo 
recommended the ‘renewal of air raids upon Italian towns on a large scale as a 
corrective to the facts of the Italians at Barrani’. A few days later, a British 
informer from Yugoslavia reported on continuous questioning, ‘in all quarters 
including high official ones why we do not continue air bombing of Italy’, and 
said that it was clear from all reports received from Italy that, ‘if we could only do 
a tenth part of the bombing there we do in Germany the effect would be very 
serious on Italian morale’.6 Similar reports came from Athens, where the British 
press attaché received ‘continual enquiries why we have stopped bombing 
Northern Italian objectives’. The Foreign Office replied to Athens that the reasons 
for the temporary cessation of bombing were partly political, due to Swiss 
complaints about British planes violating their neutrality, and partly strategic.7   
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The panic provoked by the RAF in Italian cities and the countryside since the first 
year of war may therefore be seen as an unintended consequence of the British 
bombing policy during that phase of the conflict. As a matter of fact, in August 
1941 the Butt Report following an inquiry into the effectiveness and precision of 
bombing found that only 30 percent of British bombers came within five miles of 
their targets. Bomber command claimed that bombing was accurate, but in 1940, 
as Richard Overy has observed, only one bomber in four carried a camera and in 
many cases the cameras failed to record the lateral bombs hits.8 The Italian press, 
however, continued to exploit the situation, presenting the imprecision and 
mistakes of the enemy bombers as intent to terrify Italian civilians. In addition, 
they took advantage of an ongoing campaign in some British newspapers to press 
the political and military leadership to get tougher on Italy. The MCP ordered the 
press to publish and comment ‘with some emphasis’ British media reports about 
those appeals.9 
 Journalists duly complied. For example, condemning the editor of the 
Sunday Express, John Gordon, for having observed that it was more useful to 
target civilians in Italian cities than to kill Italian soldiers in battle: ‘All Italians, as 
their brothers are falling, both in the homeland and in the remote lands where our 
men fight, are unafraid’.10 The same attacks were levied against the News 
Chronicle for insisting on the need for immediate air raids on Italy.11 La Stampa 
wrote that the British newspapers demanding ‘the bombing of our cities’ showed 
no concern ‘for the unavoidable casualties and the destruction of artistic and 
cultural treasures’.12 Corriere della Sera lamented that the British press carried 
letters from readers calling for more decisive bombing of Italy and that The 
Observer and the Sunday Times had gone so far as to specify places in Italy where 
British bombers ‘should urgently go’.13    
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 At the end of 1940, the British authorities’ hope for a possible army coup 
to oust Mussolini with the king’s approval, which would force Italy’s defection 
from the Axis, was fading. The chiefs of staff (Admiral Dudley Pound, Marshal 
Charles Portal and General Robert Haining) recommended to the War Cabinet 
that, in case the objective of a separate peace became unrealisable, London ought 
to aim at Italy’s complete military and political internal collapse before Germany 
could intervene. Accordingly, they suggested maximising military and economic 
pressure and trying, through propaganda and subversive activity, to detach the 
Italian public, the army and the colonies from Germany and bring about the 
overthrow of regime. Their advice was that British propaganda ought to be 
directed against the Germans and the Fascist administration and not against the 
Italian people or armed forces, explaining that Italian failures should be attributed 
‘to the inefficient corruption and duplicity of the Fascist government’.14 
In a meeting of the War Cabinet on 30 December 1940, the Foreign Secretary 
reported a telegram from Berne recommending the adoption of ‘a different 
technique’ when bombing Italy, ‘where, owing to the emotional temperament, 
pinprick raids on several towns simultaneously would have a greater moral effect, 
whereas raids of the Coventry type were needed in Germany’.15  A change of 
policy was also recommended by international observers. On 15 February 1941 
Myron C. Taylor, the US president’s personal envoy to the Pope, forwarded a 
letter to Roosevelt received from Count Wladimir d’Ormesson, former French 
Ambassador to the Vatican, stating that Britain should deliver ‘a mortal blow to 
Italy as soon as possible, to eliminate it from the struggle’. According to Taylor, as 
long as the Italian population itself did not suffer ‘severe air bombardments’, 
serious trouble ‘will not take place in Italy’. The Italians ‘will grumble, as they 
have already grumbled, but they will remain passive’. The diplomat explained that 
he gathered from news from Italy that the population ‘would not resist three 
weeks against the daily regime which the Germans have inflicted on the English 
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for the past six months’ and that there would be ‘panic in Italy that it would sweep 
aside the present regime and would ask peace of the English’.16 
 Throughout 1941, the Foreign Office sent the Air Ministry information 
reports that a more systematic approach to air raids over Italy was needed, mostly 
regarding the choice of targets. In October, for example, it was reported that, 
‘occasional raid in Italy does produce the scenes of panic one expects from an 
Italian crowd, but it does not seriously affect the morale or war output’. If morale 
was the main objective, stations in Milan and Turin were ‘ideal targets’, and if an 
industrial plant was to be selected it was better to hit Caproni, crucial for aircraft 
production, than Isotta or Alfa Romeo. Naples harbour and station were 
highlighted as other important targets. Additionally, the report showed some 
insight into the enemy’s internal situation, observing that, ‘the significance of 
bombing persistently targets in areas where there are Germans in numbers would 
be quickly grasped by Italians generally’.17 
 In Autumn 1941 the discussion about the bombing policy against Italy was 
intertwined with the controversial subject of targeting Rome as an exceptional 
measure against the enemy. In principle the British, although they did not expect 
to embark on any indiscriminate bombing of Italian towns, made clear that they 
would not hesitate to attack any city, Rome included, if such actions were 
considered to be in the best interest of Britain’s war effort. Churchill made this 
clear in a statement to the House of Commons on the war situation on 30 
September 1941, saying that, 
 
we have as much right to bomb Rome as the Italians had to bomb London last year, when they 
thought we were going to collapse, and we should not hesitate to bomb Rome to the best of our 
ability and as heavily as possible if the course of the war should render such action convenient and 
helpful.18   
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The Foreign Office resented external pressure on the matter, especially the 
comments of United States diplomats in Italy regarding the possible bombing of 
Italian towns including Rome by the RAF. The US, concerned about the reaction of 
Catholics at home, insisted that morale in Italy was low and that a British attack 
on non-military objectives might raise it and reverse the favourable trend of 
opinion for Britain, while the change of policy would be exploited by the Fascist 
media for propaganda purposes. The British Foreign Office instructed its embassy 
in Washington to reply along the same lines as the Prime Minister’s speech to the 
Commons: London kept its options open against Italy.19     
 During that phase of the war the military pointed out that, since the 
availability of aircraft was limited, targets should be selected for their strategic 
importance. For that reason, Charles Portal was against the idea of employing 
nuisance raids against Rome and favoured the course of striking Naples and 
Tripoli in order to cause disruption to the flow of enemy reinforcements to North 
Africa. The counter-rationale was that all the experience of the RAF in Britain and 
in Germany showed that fear of bombing was engendered by ‘heavy and 
concentrated attacks’. Whereas Portal claimed that nuisance raids on Rome would 
give the city the opportunity to prepare itself for heavier raids and raise civilian 
morale, the British ambassador to the Vatican, Osborne, asserted that they would 
depress it. Although the debate had no practical military consequences until July 
1943, the bombing of Rome was to become, as chapter 5 will show, a major theme 
in the propaganda fight between Italy and the Allies.20 
 
 
4.2. Air Raids, Media Attitudes and Civilian Reaction  
 
Autumn 1940 was a turning point for civilians in most Italian cities. The 
frankness with which the press reported the enemy’s intention to widen the air 
offensive did not contribute to loosen the psychological pressure on the home 
front. Realisation that the attack on Greece was not the swift triumph Mussolini 
boasted of, compounded by the disastrous setback for the fleet at Taranto, led to 
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civilians across the country feeling vulnerable and unprotected. In the parts of 
Italy where military and industrial targets were concentrated, the war became 
more real than elsewhere. Alarm sirens sounded every night. Urban areas close to 
transport networks, infrastructure, ports, airfields and barracks were being hit 
more frequently than in previous months. Suburban and rural territories around 
the large cities paid the price for mistakes by British crews or for their need to 
unload bombs from their planes to get back to their bases safely. 
 Mussolini’s gamble in joining Germany first revealed itself as a tragedy on 
the home front from autumn 1940, as Milan, Turin, Genoa and Porto Marghera in 
the north, Leghorn in the centre, Naples and some parts of Apulia in the south and 
the islands of Sicily and Sardinia suffered rising casualties and devastating effects 
on everyday life which added to the rigours of rationing and other war restrictions. 
Civil defence organisation continued to be inadequate: space in public shelters 
was insufficient so that people had to take refuge in cellars, basements and 
tunnels. Anti-aircraft batteries were ineffective – and sometimes dangerous, as 
when their fire missed RAF planes and caused both damage to buildings and 
civilian casualties. In addition, no effort was made to make schools and hospitals 
safer, despite their frequent proximity to enemy objectives. For example, 30 out of 
Italy’s 69 mental hospitals were close to military objectives and 15 were in the 
vicinity of Fascist and Nazi headquarters, railways, airports, arms factories and 
anti-aircraft batteries.21 During the war, 30 asylums were hit, 18 of which suffered 
irreparable damage, with heavy casualties among patients and staff. Moreover, 
general hospitals were not moved from pre-war locations that were now 
dangerous. The hospital in Collegno, near Turin, for instance, had 2,272 patients 
in June 1940 and was situated between a power station, the railway and an 
airbase. When the local fire services ascertained that its fire prevention defences 
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were inadequate and recommended installation of a system of hydrants, the 
hospital’s management board decided to buy a cheaper motor pump.22 
 The Italian media only hinted at this lack of preparation in order to 
criticise those who had not complied with regulations requiring that owners of 
apartment blocks provide buildings with shelters, while overlooking faults in local 
and central government. The problem, according to this interpretation, was the 
non-compliance of individuals rather than a governmental failure to adopt timely 
and effective policies. A recurrent journalistic ploy was to blend that argument 
with the usual anti-British rhetoric, as Aldo Valori did in a particularly virulent 
radio broadcast during the summer of 1940, stating that: 
 
Preparation, like discipline, is never enough; especially as we are facing an enemy so stupid, so 
ferocious, maddened by the feeling of imminent danger and impending punishment; and we know 
that we can expect anything from a raving madman. The concept of chivalrous war must lie 
outside our thoughts; we must conceive of the British as cruel enemies, equipped with all the 
means that civilisation has invented to harm; therefore we must be careful; without in the least 
being upset, but not forgetting that it is not a metaphor when we say that all the Country is 
mobilised.23         
 
 
Pavolini instructed newspaper editors in December 1940 that they must adapt to 
the transition from a phase characterised by a ‘generically optimistic appraisal of 
war’ to a ‘realistic evaluation’ of it. In fact, he had admonished journalists since 
the beginning of the war for depreciating the strength of British forces in their 
reports and comments, since belittlement of the enemy would rebound on the 
image of Italian soldiers.24 Execution of the ministry’s orders had  thus far 
followed the usual course of blaming British wickedness and threatening 
apocalyptic reprisals against the enemy, but at the beginning of 1941 a more 
incisive approach was needed regarding events on the home front. An article by 
Alfredo Signoretti, editor of La Stampa, illustrated the beginning of a more 
systematic and vocal media campaign against British attempts to drive a wedge 
between Italians and the regime: 
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There is a front that the enemy looks on with a special curiosity, the domestic front. This is a sign 
that the British, with their fondness for traditionalist arbitrary schemes, do not know us. They like 
to refer to the legend of the slight, impressionable and nervy Italians. They do not know us: at the 
right time, we are the people with the coldest and implacable will, matched by the fastest and most 
daring reactions. And now is the right time.25     
 
The press was still mandated to minimise damage inflicted by raids in its reports 
or – when specifically requested – its comment on military bulletins, so the 
mistakes or inaccurate fire of RAF bombers were framed as the deliberate acts of a 
barbarous strategy. When the British again attacked Turin in November 1940, 
targeting major industrial plants converted for military production, the MCP 
instructed newspapers to emphasise, on the front pages, that ‘the victims are, 
without exception, workers, elderly, women and children,’ and that ‘Italian air 
reprisals against British positions and their allies is going to be most severe’.26 
The same line was adopted with regard to the attacks on Milan. Journalists were 
told to refute Radio Londra claims that British airmen had hit the Magneti Marelli 
plant, a company specialising in electronics. ‘It is odd that in Sesto San Giovanni 
and the area surrounding Milan nobody heard explosions. It is obvious that they 
are radio bombs’, Corriere della Sera observed. The Milan daily supported a 
similar interpretation when the British claimed to have hit Officine Pirelli, a 
factory making tyres for military vehicles. As a rule, the press was keen on 
denying damage to production or military installations, preferring to single out 
and amplify civilian casualties whenever war bulletins reported them.27 
 The official line of minimising damage and the anti-British stance had a 
partial influence on Italian audiences, limited to areas not yet targeted by the 
enemy where official bulletins and rumours were the only sources of knowledge. 
Police reports from Mantua, for instance, showed that at the end of 1940 the 
alarms did not upset people, who stayed almost ‘apathetic’ and ‘in a state of great 
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tranquillity’ – even in areas not far from bombed cities.28 A resident of Florence, 
writing to relatives in New York in December, sent a reassuring message: ‘In 
Florence we have never had air-raids, and in other cities there has been no 
important damage. God spares our Patria, which is fighting for good and justice 
with an indisputable civility’.29 In targeted areas, the reaction was very different. 
People sought news from foreign media and were terrified by enemy raids, 
realising that there was no real defence against a power that appeared irresistible. 
Magda Ceccarelli De Grada, a writer living in Milan, noted in her war diaries on 7 
November 1940 that an unpleasant sense of foreboding accompanied the sirens 
and bombs: 
 
Last night a long alarm kept us awake from 11 to one. We cannot go down to the basement 
because it is uninhabitable; there is no proper shelter. Landlords, mean as they are, and not 
controlled by anyone, prepared ridiculous support. If there was really an intensification of the air 
campaign, we would all die like rats.30 
 
During the winter of 1940-41, civilians in targeted areas in the North foresaw that 
the situation could only worsen, well before the catastrophic raids of subsequent 
years. Recalling her experience as a child in Turin during the war, writer Virginia 
Galante Garrone remembered the deep impression made by an air raid early in 
December 1940 when a bomb destroyed a hospital pharmacy and caused a wave 
of terror in the surrounding area. The small house where she lived with her family, 
 
shook to its foundations, as in an earthquake. When the dim lamp went out, we found ourselves 
close together, hugging each other, trembling in the dark, bent under the roar of ever closer bursts, 
feeling the throes of the end, voiceless, out of breath. The noise of torn up roof tiles and broken 
glass, unexpected pauses like eddies, the howl of sirens, wails, crashes, and finally stillness and 
silence. Was that the end? It was just the beginning.31 
 
While civilians lived through such difficulties, newspapers continued to threaten 
vengeance against ‘Churchill’s savage bombers’ and to quarrel with British media 
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reports on air raids, trying to demonstrate that the enemy had not targeted crucial 
areas of military and industrial infrastructure.32 Although the ministry’s orders 
were often obscure, extravagant and ill-timed, control over printed materials was 
meticulous, as the prefects’ attention towards even the smallest publications in the 
provinces showed. As a matter of fact, glimpses of the truth were sometimes to be 
found in local papers or religious bulletins, but the reaction of the authorities was 
usually prompt.  In January 1941, for example, Abbondio Montani, a parish priest 
in a small village in Lombardy, was sent to Calabria after the carabinieri reported 
that he had said during a sermon that, ‘war news from the press and wireless 
reports are not truthful, because the casualties are much greater than they tell the 
public’. At the beginning of 1941 in Cremona, censors forbade the diffusion 
among church-goers of the newspaper L’Angelo della Parrocchia; and the paper 
was confiscated in September for mentioning the story of a child wounded and 
orphaned in a bombardment.33 By autumn 1941 Catholic newspapers were 
routinely seized, as Fascist informants tended in their reports to consider parochial 
churches’ attention to the most inhumane aspects of war as a sign of a widespread 
irresponsible – or even defeatist and pacifist – stance among civilians.34 
 Yet facts were difficult to hide and people knew what was happening. In 
January 1941, for example, a deep sense of insecurity drove a woman in Turin, 
who had been asked for hospitality by some relatives, to reply that her city was 
dangerous day and night. People, she said, escaped to caves and basements not in 
order to be safe from the British raids, but to avoid anti-aircraft fire, which ‘flies 
around and very often finds its way in through windows, smashing everything to 
pieces’. Not even the countryside was safe, she added, ‘because when the enemy 
is being chased, it lets the bombs fall on open countryside. Several such episodes 
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have happened’.35 While British reports stated that the air raids on Turin, ‘though 
spectacular had done little damage’, the Italian authorities could not hide their 
impact on morale. In February, a police informant wrote that, ‘depression in 
people’s morale has started to be noticeable’. He reported rumours about an 
imminent evacuation of 300,000 people in March, warning his superiors in Rome 
that,‘the conviction that our Power is decreasing a bit and we will not reach the 
end victorious’ was spreading.36 
 In the poorer Southern regions, the increasing feeling of insecurity added 
to trouble provoked by food scarcity. Bombing had been intensifying since the 
beginning of the Greek campaign, with enemy planes able to fly from Greek bases 
and from airports in Marmarica and Cyrenaica that had fallen into British hands. 
Police informers reported that in Naples people linked the RAF raids with 
Mussolini’s aggression against Greece.37 In the three years from October 1940, 
Naples was hit by over 100 bombardments, with heavy human casualties and huge 
damage to homes, factories and port facilities. The same happened in Sicily, 
which suffered isolation and the cutting off of food supplies, with several cases of 
starvation.38 In this first period, RAF bombers struck the towns and cities of the 
bay of Naples. The most affected area were the industrial districts and the old 
historic centre of Naples overlooking the sea and the port, which remained a key 
objective until the liberation of the city.39 The local press exalted the role of the 
anti-aircraft guns, stating that their fire was ‘an insurmountable barrier for the 
RAF’.40 But since the very beginning of the war civilians had been aware of the 
inefficient defences, and the authorities ordered the media to minimise news about 
the raids. On 11 November 1940, for example, the prefect of Naples informed the 
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local press that the MCP had telephoned to order it to avoid headlines like ‘the 
bombardment of Naples’, instructing the press instead to lead the page on the 
most important news from the day’s bulletin.41  Mussolini, too, in a letter sent to 
Hitler on 22 November 1940 about the developments of the Greek campaign, 
sought to reassure him that there was ‘no reason to worry about the 
bombardments on Southern cities, as they do little damage’.42 
 Nevertheless, the authorities found it necessary to rehearse the rules about 
shelters in private buildings and to remind newspapers to attack big landlords and 
companies that owned blocks of flats and did not want to meet the expense of 
building shelters in their properties.43 Il Mattino warned residents in targeted 
towns about the new face of war: 
 
The distinction between combatants and non-combatants, which was logical in other wars, is no 
longer valid these days. All citizens are combatants. They share with the combatant the discipline, 
the tenacity, the boldness and the faith.44      
 
Late in 1940, people in Naples realised that the obsolescence of that traditional 
distinction was one of the rare truths the press told them. In the night of 14-15 
December, 50 bombs were dropped on the Granili area and the port. At the naval 
base, the RAF knocked out the cruiser Pola, the tanker Laura Corrado and the 
motorsailer Immacolata III, killing 22 seamen. A building was hit in Via Nuova 
Bagnoli and ten people died.45 Il Mattino praised civilians for their attitude, 
stressing that they were ‘used to alarms, enemy bombs and anti-aircraft fire’ and 
that the fact that they stayed ‘serious, confident and quiet as never before’ was 
‘one more disappointment for the British’.46 All the local authorities, including the 
cardinal archbishop Alessio Ascalesi, attended the solemn funeral of the civilian 
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victims paid for by the city council. At the end of the ceremony, the federale 
performed the Fascist rite of the roll call of the dead.47 
 On 24 December 1940 at noon a four-engine British aircraft dropped 
leaflets on Naples.48 The press reported the war bulletin without detailing the text 
of the leaflets, although it argued that the enemy attempt at differentiating 
between the Duce and the people, the nation and the regime was ‘silly’.49 Yet 
police reports did not reflect the confidence that characterised the media narrative. 
The Naples chief of police, for example, wrote to Rome that the fact that, ‘this 
morning the alarm was given when an enemy plane was already flying very low 
dropping the well known leaflets has caused lively comment in all circles’.50 
Already at the beginning of 1941 the British were aware that their attack on the 
largest Southern city had shaken civilians’ morale: on 11 February the Foreign 
Office received a report from Naples stating that the damage caused to business 
and residential areas ‘could no longer be hidden’ and that the anti-aircraft 
defences were principally manned by German troops.51 The British leaflets made 
an impression in Sicily. A resident in Acitrezza, for example, in a letter written on 
18 January 1941 in the wake of a raid on Catania airport, explained that the attack 
was due to the ‘betrayal’ of spies and that the enemy bombed Sicily because 
Italians did not take seriously the British warning not to let German troops stay on 
the island.52 Such documents show that the presence of German soldiers in Italy 
was perceived as a liability from the first weeks of war.   
 In July 1941, according to British intelligence sources, the attacks on 
Palermo were particularly successful, with several transport ships due to sail for 
Libya badly damaged and some of the quarters used by Italian reinforcements for 
Africa were hit. Other sources confirmed that raids on Messina, Palermo and 
Syracuse that summer forced the German air centres in Sicily to withdraw to the 
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middle of the island.53 Palermo was hit again on the night of 9 September, 
resulting in 27 dead and 58 wounded and causing the press to repeat that, 
‘people’s demeanour was exemplary in its calm and discipline’ and that, ‘so much 
innocent blood shall not remain unavenged’. 54 Reports from police informants to 
the Italian authorities that summer again showed growing discontent in Naples 
about the inefficiency of defences. An informant described in detail the 
psychological effects on civilians of the air raids on the city in July 1941: 
 
for an entire night the enemy had full control of the skies of Naples with the chance of striking and 
hitting the most inaccessible sites. The public is not informed about our defences. Nevertheless, 
they realise that the defences are almost non-existent and are anxious that this is happening in a 
city which has already been the target of enemy raids and is therefore deserving of greater and 
much more serious guarantees. Twenty-four hours after the first bombing it should have been 
possible to avoid the disaster at the refineries and the ammunition dumps.55      
 
Apulia was another Southern region heavily targeted by the enemy. In November 
1940 the RAF hit the ANIC oil refinery plant and the piers operated by the military 
in Bari. 56 The following March the British Foreign Office learnt from the 
Yugoslav Consul at Bari that RAF bombs had damaged the water supply, which 
was cut off for nine days.57 Autumn 1941 was a particularly difficult time in Bari 
and several other southern cities. In Naples on 21 October RAF planes attacked in 
seven waves lasting almost six hours: according to the British sources no warning 
was given, large fires destroyed entire streets of buildings, the electrical 
distribution was damaged and the train service paralysed. The population was 
angered by ‘Germans pre-emptying all air-raid shelters’ and coal was nearly 
exhausted.58 The following month London was told by informers in Berne that the 
Italian military attaché to Switzerland had said that the RAF had carried out heavy 
attacks on Naples on the night of 27 November 1941, the ‘casualties and damage 
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to property being so far the heaviest experienced in that town’.59 Also, the attack 
on Brindisi on the night of 7 November lasted for five hours and bombs fell on the 
historic centre causing 107 deaths, the highest casualty toll in an Italian city since 
the beginning of the war. In the face of such tragedies, the Italian media did 
nothing but pursue the same line: damning the enemy, playing down the damage 
and quarrelling with the British press about the accuracy of their reports.60 
In Sardinia the raids in summer 1941 led to increasing mistrust of official war 
reports among civilians. For example, when Cagliari was hit on 31 July and 
people read in the bulletin that anti-aircraft artillery and Italian fighters had 
quickly neutralised the British bombers, an OVRA informer wrote in his weekly 
report that, 
 
everybody knows, having personally ascertained it, that six large British airplanes arrived 
undisturbed flying low over our docks, almost flew over the civilian airport without harming it and 
went, still at the same height and in Indian file, over the Elmas airfield, where they machine-
gunned hangars and aircraft on the ground. Thereupon they left.61 
 
Unconcerned with such reactions to developments, the MCP continued its routine. 
In October and November 1941 the radio programme Commento ai fatti del 
giorno often dealt with British air raids on Italy, but announcers did not go beyond 
the same old story. Enemy leaflets, according to Rino Alessi, were ‘a pitiful 
document of a decadent spirituality’, while Mario Appelius, a journalist who 
became both popular and controversial for the magniloquent invectives he 
directed against the enemy in a radio programme personally supervised by 
Pavolini, thundered against the British insistence on the ‘most stupid stereotype’ 
of the ‘indolent’ and ‘impressionable’ Italian.  People in Southern Italy, Gherardo 
Casini assured his listeners, ‘did not panic’, but reacted ‘with supreme steadiness 
to the enemy’s stupid calculation’.62 
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4.3. The Naval Bombardment of Genoa 
On 8 February 1941 the military authorities in Rome received warning about 
British moves on Italy from Gibraltar. Air force reconnaissance aircraft were sent 
to the west of Sardinia, where an incoming enemy action was thought to be more 
likely. Meanwhile, a British fleet was moving towards the Liguria coast. On 9 
February, at 7.30am, the enemy shelled the port of Genoa from a distance of 22 
kilometres for 30 minutes. The Italian communiqué stated that an enemy fleet had 
attacked Genoa, taking advantage of the fog, missing its military objectives and 
killing 72 civilians. A week later newspapers reported that the numbers of dead 
had increased to 141. The Italian press stressed that only ‘homes, schools, 
churches and hospitals’ had been shelled and that ‘the elderly, women and 
children have been slaughtered with conscious calculation and cold cynicism’. 
The Genoese church supported the regime’s line. Cardinal Pietro Boetto wrote an 
open letter to his fellow citizens, widely reported in the newspapers, which 
denounced ‘the inhuman act committed by the enemies of our Italy’ and 
predicting that ‘the Lord, in view of the innocent victims, lifting his merciful hand 
on us, will grant full triumph to our beloved Homeland ’.63   
 The line of command that presided over the propaganda organisation 
collapsed, as some papers printed news the censor deemed unfit to publish. 
Indeed, the MCP had to instruct newspapers not to reproduce what Il Popolo di 
Roma and La Tribuna, apparently escaping preventive control, had reported about 
the targets of the enemy battleships, the composition of the British fleet and the 
reaction of the Italian Navy. The Ministry also ordered the press not to publish 
casualty lists (which newspapers had previously been proud of doing as a sign of 
their trustworthiness) and not to report news about donations for the victims from 
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Mussolini or other Fascist authorities.64 Ugo Ojetti noticed in his diaries that on 
the night of 9 February 1941 the ‘people at Corriere’ were ‘overwhelmed by 
ambiguous bulletins’ and ‘tired of shamming every night and lying and repeating 
that we are the masters of the sea and the air, of the East and the West’. 65 
When newspapers recovered from their bewilderment, commentators played their 
usual tune, stressing that the bombardment of Genoa was ‘in the tradition of 
English piracy’.66  Reporting from the funeral of the victims, Marco Ramperti 
wrote a piece that stands out as an extraordinary combination of empty rhetoric 
and pseudo-intellectual anti-British arguments: 
 
History repeats itself. The monsters who drank horses’ blood and decorated their shipping flags 
with skulls are still the same. They are all the same: the Morgans, the Churchills, the Rhodes and 
the Coopers, the Hastings and the Edens, the drunkard kings and the queens grown cruel, the drug 
dealers, the heroes of “the cat-o'-nine-tails”, the cowards who deserted their wounded at Dunkirk 
and the terrible cowards who did not rescue the wrecked of the Thétis.67 
 
Mussolini also contributed to the propaganda effort. In a speech at the Adriano 
theatre in Rome on 23 February 1941, he addressed an enthusiastic audience and 
asserted that bombing Genoa ‘to weaken its morale is a childish illusion’.68 
However, the following day, the carabinieri in Sestri Levante sent a report to the 
prefect of Genoa saying that people there looked ‘at the facts more than the 
speeches, passionate and convincing as the Duce’s was’.69 The naval 
bombardment of Genoa was the most shocking war episode to have taken place 
up to that point in the war within Italian borders, and the British were right in 
believing the effect on Italian morale was relevant, in spite of what the Italian 
press said about the ‘heroism’ and ‘self-denial’ of rescuers and about general 
morale, ‘always proud and very high’.70 The enemy realised that it had landed a 
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blow on Mussolini and propaganda from London inflated the action’s military 
achievements. The Times reported that during ‘the highly successful operation’ 
docks, harbour works, oil installations, supply ships, the Ansaldo electric works 
and the port’s main power station had been hit. ‘It is right’, Churchill said in a 
broadcast on the evening of the raid, ‘that the Italian people should be made to 
feel the sorry plight into which they have been dragged by the dictator Mussolini’. 
A special correspondent travelling with the fleet wrote enthusiastically that he had 
been witness ‘to one of the most concentrated punishments of the war’.71 
The British were also pleased that the United States ambassador to Rome had 
given ‘a very favourable account of the damage done’ in Genoa, but they soon 
realised that the real harm inflicted to physical infrastructure was not as heavy as 
first accounts had suggested. They received grotesquely exaggerated reports as 
well, such as the one stating that the Venezuelan Minister in Rome had said the 
bombardment of Genoa had killed 2,000 people. The British knew from sources 
based in the Italian capital that the greatest damage had been done to the Ansaldo 
works, while less harm was inflicted on the port and the electricity power station, 
which was repaired in two days. A witness remarked that the raid ‘has not 
produced very lasting results’ since the gasometer could be repaired soon, the 
bombs on the Ansaldo plants had destroyed the offices but not the factory halls, 
and none of the numerous warships and transport ships in the harbour had been 
destroyed.72   
 Nevertheless, a report sent from Rome to the British Foreign Office a few 
days after the attack conveyed an eye witness account to the effect that, however 
limited the real outcome of the bombardment, ‘the psychological and moral 
effects in Italy are enormous’: Italians were shocked by the fact that their navy 
and airforce did not attempt to defend Genoa, and ‘unanimously’ accused 
Mussolini of sole responsibility for the war. It was an impressive echo of 
Churchill’s radio pronouncement of 23 December 1940, when he had told Italians 
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that ‘one man, one man alone’ was to blame for their troubles.73 People were 
reported as saying that something similar could happen anywhere and that the 
British by this time were able to approach any part of the coast and fire far into 
the country. There were also accounts of ‘rioting’ in Genoa and the ‘catastrophic’ 
effect of the news elsewhere in Italy. London summed up the received information 
by conceding that some descriptions were ‘somewhat sensational and, from our 
point of view, rather optimistic’, whereas ‘others and more balanced reports state 
that the damage to purely military objectives was not extremely extensive and by 
no means irreparable’.74      
 Notwithstanding propaganda efforts, Italian reports from the bombed city 
were also alarming for the Fascist authorities, and not only because they revealed 
how ineffectual propaganda was in motivating the home front when enemy 
actions unsettled people’s lives. There was also serious concern about political 
discipline among civilians. On 18 February 1941 the questore of Genoa signalled 
to the chief of police in Rome that citizens there were ‘deeply indignant’ and 
depressed about the lack of adequate anti-aircraft batteries, reconnaissance ships, 
shelters and rescue efforts. He wrote that Radio Londra reports ‘were given huge 
credit’: according to that version of the attack, the British fleet arrived undisturbed 
and unnoticed at Genoa in the early hours of the morning, purposely not starting 
its action so as not to catch people sleeping. In the daylight it manoeuvred in order 
to be seen, and made sure by radio that the alarm had been given. Then, having let 
40 minutes to pass to allow civilians to shelter, the fleet directed its shells against 
military objectives. Collateral damage had been an inevitable drawback of a brave 
and successful mission.  
 In the same account, the questore warned that, ‘individual episodes of anti-
Fascism are surfacing more frequently’.75 Witnesses were reported as having seen 
people in Genoa pouring out into the streets shouting ‘cowards, defend us!’ – not 
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‘death to the British!’, as one would have expected in such a predicament.76 News 
from Tuscany told that ‘anti-Fascist, anti-war and subversive slogans’ had been 
written in various places. In Leghorn, where the ANIC oil refinery was bombed on 
the same day as the attack against Genoa, the gigantic map of military operations 
displayed in the city piazza was defaced. The postal circulation of anti-Fascist 
texts and leaflets from Florence and other centres had increased too, according to 
police reports.77 From Genoa fear spread all over the country and most people felt 
vulnerable in the face of enemy action. In Rome residents were convinced that the 
war ‘was entering a stage of greater violence which might be the final stage’.78 
From Taranto a police informant recorded ‘citizens voluntarily evacuating’ as a 
result of their fear that a bombardment from the sea might target the city, as had 
happened the previous November when the British fleet shelled Italian warships at 
navy bases.79 The Palermo chief of police wrote to Rome on 17 February 1941 
that, 
 
Sicilians are disheartened, as they fear what their situation will be as the British are strengthening 
their presence in Sicily. They say that we are unable to watch over the sea in order to ward off a 
naval attack and neither can we intervene afterwards, barring the way to enemy ships and 
punishing them harshly.80 
 
Another informant from Sicily conceded that the enemy had respected built-up 
areas, but people in Messina people were worried nonetheless because ‘the civil 
engineers were slow in making ready shelters in public buildings’.81 In Sardinia 
civilians dreaded a British landing.82 In Venice sarcastic remarks were recorded 
about the ‘proclaimed’ Italian ‘mastery of the Mediterranean’.83 Uncertainty and 
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fear lent fuel to conjecture and rumours. In Leghorn the oil plant had been hit 
while it contained 20,000 tons of fuel so people said there must have been an 
American spy, as Americans had started the building of the factory and ‘American 
engineers are still allowed to access it’.84 People coming from Genoa in the wake 
of the British attack were overheard saying that, ‘the enemy ships were able to fire 
for almost two hours’. People looked for an explanation for the navy’s immobility 
beyond that provided by the reticent official version: when the implausible 
explanation began to circulate that aircraft based in Lombardy were unable to 
leave for Genoa because runways were covered in snow, Magda Ceccarelli noted 
in her diaries that, ‘football stadiums are being regularly swept’.85       
 Scepticism also spread to those social classes traditionally sympathetic 
with Fascism. On February 1941, for example, an informant from Sardinia 
reported that while in a café in Iglesias a group ‘of gentlemen, all with their 
leather cases in hand’ commented on the war’s developments and one of them 
said, ‘the arrival of German anti-aircraft units means it is true that in Italy we are 
badly defended’.86 The subject of inadequate preparation was particularly 
embarrassing for the Italian and Genoese authorities because in November 1940 
the city had hosted the much-trumpeted exhibition on anti-aircraft protection 
organised by UNPA in Sampierdarena, which had shown model villages well 
provided with shelters and defences in which people, cars, public transport and 
factories were all unaffected by the danger of incoming raids. These were 
futuristic and unrealisable projects the implausibility of which was magnified by 
the fact that several Italian cities were already at the mercy of the enemy. 87 
An additional factor began to appear in civilians’ reaction. From Bologna, for 
instance, the bureaucratic language of official reports tried to hide the fact that 
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suspicions about the honesty of Fascist officials was spreading among the 
population: ‘The inaction of the defence system is being imputed to the leaders’ 
inadequacy and to the lack of war preparation caused by the illicit diversion of 
public money appropriated for that purpose’ and moreover, ‘any unsuccessful 
military operation is being deemed a consequence of the dishonesty of the not-so-
few gerarchi suddenly enriched by funds allocated to armament’ 88 
 
 
4.4 Media Credibility and the Fight Against Rumour and News-Mongers 
 
The question of what (and how much) information should be given to the public 
about enemy attacks, casualties and damage was a controversial one in all 
belligerent countries. In Britain, where the matter was always at the centre of 
public discussion, targeted towns, streets and buildings were not usually precisely 
identified in the press for weeks for security reasons. A consequence of the lack of 
reliable information was that, besides the spreading of other rumours, the numbers 
of dead and injured were reported, and very often inflated, by word of mouth.89 In 
Summer 1940, as the government became increasingly concerned about the level 
of rumour and gossip among the population, the Minister of Information initiated 
an extensive campaign on ‘careless talk’, aimed at advising discretion and silence 
to avoid foreign spies becoming aware of sensitive information.90 Later in the war, 
‘emergency information officers’ were appointed in every town with over 5,000 
inhabitants, tasked with countering rumours and disseminating information after 
heavy raids.91 In Germany the desire to prevent panic among the population meant 
that the press was allowed to provide information only about selected raids, and 
the city authorities were instructed not to publish damage reports or lists of the 
dead and to abstain from appeals to citizens for clearance work, since this could 
supply the enemy with useful information. This strategy was supposed to work 
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against demoralisation, while at the same time stirring up hatred against the 
enemy, highlighting British attacks against churches, monuments and museums. 
Yet the SD security service confirmed that concern in the press over damaged or 
destroyed cultural buildings was ‘mostly not shared’ by those who read the papers 
with sympathy directed more towards human casualties and people’s homes.92    
 The Italian authorities persisted in proudly asserting that they were keen to 
tell the truth about war, but what ordinary Italians actually read in newspapers or 
listened to on the wireless was always the unforthcoming version of official 
bulletins along with thunderous comments that were often scripted to the word by 
the MCP’s strict directions. Since the beginning of the war the press had been 
losing trust among people, as Italians’ condition as ‘victim-witnesses’ of wartime 
life and enemy attacks led them to ascertain the facts based on what they saw and 
no longer by scrutinising the doped prose of press and radio.93 Critics of the way 
the Italian press dealt with the reality of war were also to be found in the Fascist 
upper echelons. On 1 November 1940, an issue of Primato, the journal founded 
by Giuseppe Bottai, published an unsigned editorial that praised the press of the 
Fascist youth because GUF papers were carrying ‘the first sensible protest against 
certain types of anti-British propaganda’; they had dropped ‘the facile invectives 
against the internal and external enemies’ and were looking for ‘a serious, honest, 
time-resistant judgment’ .94 Post-war memoirs also reported on how the ‘colossal 
pieces of foolery’ from the MCP produced sometimes tragicomic results. Silvio 
Maurano, then editor of Corriere Emiliano, recalled the atmosphere in the 
newsroom when, after a series of dramatic events including the invasion of 
Greece, Graziani’s defeat at Sidi Barrani and the catastrophic naval bombardment 
of Genoa, an order from Rome enjoined them ‘to give special emphasis on the 
front page and under a four-column headline, to news of the river Maritza 
breaking its bank ’.95 
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 When the authorities prohibited the import of Swiss newspapers to Italy at 
the end of 1940, a Fascist Party informer warned that the middle and upper classes 
in Genoa criticised the decision because they were convinced that ‘substantial 
truths could be learnt’ from those newspapers. As a matter of fact, before the 
prohibition, 6,000 copies of French or Swiss newspapers were being sold in 
Genoa alone and the circulation of L’Osservatore Romano in the working-class 
quarter of Voltri went from two to 250.96 An informant from Milan wrote that,  
 
people avidly read newspapers in order to find the reasons or explanations of our defeats, but they 
feel bitterly disappointed: they do not find anything but big words, groundless or obsolete 
predictions, superlatives to describe German power, childish arguments, inconsistency between 
commentators and war reporters, often in the same newspaper issue and even on the same page. 
And so they end up not trusting our press.97 
 
In Sardinia, according to reports sent to Rome, by the end of 1940 people were 
already critical of the propaganda conveyed through leaflets and newspapers 
because ‘it exaggerated in undervaluing the British war power’.98 Those feelings 
were widespread in the wake of dramatic events. Two days after the naval attack 
on Genoa, for instance, the Rome questura recorded annoyance towards 
propaganda about depreciation of the enemy.99 
 In order to form a realistic view of what was going on, Italians had to 
supplement the official version with a confused mixture of reality and imagination 
coming from heterogeneous sources, such as foreign radio broadcasts, smuggled 
foreign newspapers, letters gone unnoticed by postal censorship, and rumours in 
public places. Listening to Radio Londra, in particular, began to have political 
implications when it turned from an individual act to a social choice about 
counter-information. Throughout the war anti-Fascists in Bari, for example, gave 
one of their number, Michele Cifarelli – who was to become the voice of Radio 
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Bari after the regime’s fall – the task of reporting to the group  every day at 5pm 
the news he had heard on the BBC.100    
 Rather than being recognised as a consequence of censorship and strict 
media control, rumours were feared by the Italian authorities, which developed a 
real obsession with vociferatori (rumour-mongers). The latter were sanctioned or 
interned and even beaten by Fascists – a practice that appealed to hard-liners, but 
was soon criticised by the general public and even by some Fascist authorities. As 
a police note of 21 January 1941 summarised, the enforcement 
 
of action squads’ methods against alleged rumour-mongers, who are forced to confess to wrongs 
they have not committed and take the consequences, causes a great deal of apprehension in some 
cities, such as Genoa and Florence. In Milan, even among the old Fascists, news about the order to 
make ample use of cudgels and castor oil was given a cool reception.101 
 
Police were not alone in detecting rumours. Informants were always on full alert, 
even when alarms and bombs caused frightened or indignant people in shelters to 
let loose streams of abuse against Mussolini and his decision to enter the war. On 
those occasions, not everyone was the champion of generosity and altruism 
praised by Fascist propaganda; instead, there were episodes of meanness and 
opportunism. For example in Asti, a small city near Turin, a whole family (father, 
mother and a 12-year-old daughter) told the Fascist authorities that on 8 
November 1940 in the basement of a council house during an alarm they had an 
argument with Paolo Barberis, a train engine-driver, who according to them sided 
with the enemy and predicted defeat for the Axis saying that, ‘the British have 
always ruled and always will’. When the police questioned him, Barberis denied 
the accusation, but the fact the he was not a Fascist Party member made the words 
of the ‘spies’ more valuable than his, and he was punished with one year of 
internment.102 
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 ‘The regime’s line of always divulging the truth also has the benefit of 
nipping in the bud any defeatist or exaggerated rumour’, Corriere della Sera had 
written on 16 June 1940. That course was not fated to last: it was easy to tell the 
truth when Italy entered the war harassing French troops that the Germans had 
already brought to their knees. Only a few months later, even from within the 
regime the official version was put in doubt. On 24 December 1940, for example, 
an OVRA informant from Bologna wrote to the chief of police that, ‘people 
continue to listen extensively to foreign radio because of an acute, widespread 
need of knowing facts and episodes our press is silent upon’. That, he added, 
caused ‘the spreading of often tendentious rumours and conjectures’.103   
 Police and party informants frequently reported rumours. One of these, 
from Genoa, suggested the inclusion in propaganda material of some basic 
geographical facts explaining the difficulties Italian aircraft faced, because he 
frequently heard people ‘who appreciate and even admire the deeds of RAF 
bombers who must make the trip from England in order to hit Italy, while the 
actions of the Italian airforce are being ignored or undervalued’. His addition in 
the same report showed that the MCP’s insistence on highlighting the ruthlessness 
of enemy attacks on Italian civilians had proved to be ineffective: 
 
I have heard the most ignorant peasants, unworthy of being Italians, justifying the fact that the 
British bombs never fall on military targets, but always hit women and children in their homes and 
in the open countryside, with the reason that our anti-aircraft guns force the planes to fly at 
considerable altitude, and that causes their shots to be quite inaccurate! So they parrot the stupid 
and wicked justifications Churchill set out in the House of Commons.104    
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 Pavolini admonished editors on 12 November 1940 against the danger that 
newsrooms and journalists could themselves become the sources of rumour.105 
Having learned the lesson, newspapers wrote that the enemy had ‘the absurd, 
stupid, insulting hope that our people will not endure a prolonged war’ and was 
spreading rumours for that reason. But Italians allegedly knew not to take them 
seriously and not to pay attention ‘to any optimistic or pessimistic gossip’ because 
‘the truth is written in the military bulletin’.106 These warnings were partly the 
practical outcome of the programmatic aversion to defeatism typical of any 
country at war, democracies included, but were mainly a facet of Mussolini’s 
obsession with the character that new Italians had to embody: the unshakeable, 
daring, martial, industriously silent man. That fictional image was to be preserved 
in every aspect of civilian life and, most of all, in the ways it was represented, 
from news reporting and journalism to literature and even popular culture. 
 
4.5 Discipline on the Home Front: Reporting the Regime’s Security Policies 
By the first weeks of June 1940 the Italian authorities had to face unprecedented 
challenges from civilians to rules and regulations, mostly connected with 
extraordinary conditions such as the blackout, food rationing and evacuation. The 
turn for the worse Italy’s military situation took in autumn 1940 was reflected in 
the media’s hypersensitivity towards breaches of the prescriptions aimed at 
preserving order and discipline on the home front. A high degree of press attention 
on criminal deeds and famous trials since unification in 1861 had led to 
commercial progress in terms of circulation, but despite this, crime news was 
usually concealed in Fascist Italy, due to Mussolini’s resolve to convey the image 
of a disciplined and ordered national community. At the beginning of the 1930s, 
instructions to newspapers on this issue became frequent and detailed. Killings, 
robberies, thefts and rapes had to be played down, and the construction of stories 
was meticulously prescribed to reporters and editors: articles had to be no more 
than 30 lines long, with headlines that were ‘not flashy’. ‘Alarming, pessimistic, 
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catastrophic and depressing’ news was banned, while newspapers were requested 
to show ‘optimism, confidence and certainty about the future’.107 
 Yet after the outbreak of the European war in 1939, and even more so after 
June 1940, news of transgressions and subsequent exemplary punishments began 
to spread in the press, as a constant deterrent to potential criminals who were 
admonished to maintain attitudes consonant with the hard times, also as 
reassurance for the majority of law-abiding civilians. A law passed on 16 June 
1940 attached aggravating circumstance to criminal offences committed in 
wartime, which were heard by the Special Tribunal for the Defence of the State, 
an extraordinary court established in 1926 and composed of a president chosen 
from army generals, a prosecutor picked from the military judiciary and five 
judges from among the officers of the Fascist Militia.108 A few members of the 
Camera dei fasci e delle corporazioni criticised the bill in the parliamentary 
debate. Alfredo De Marsico, a well-known lawyer who was a member of the 
Fascist Grand Council, claimed that the authority to decide on these kinds of 
crimes should be left to ordinary courts which were more qualified and impartial 
than the Special Tribunal, against the verdicts of which no appeal was allowed. 
Giovanni Battista Madia, also a prominent barrister, said that the list of crimes 
punishable by the death penalty under the new law was too long and included 
offences that were usually punished with 8-12 years imprisonment. Yet the 
president of the Committee dismissed those objections, saying that there was no 
reason for being concerned because the work of the Special Tribunal was 
‘supervised by the Duce, a big-hearted and generous man’.109   
 The Special Tribunal usually dealt with political crimes and was renowned 
for its harsh sentences on anti-Fascists. Even in wartime its attention to ordinary 
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crimes was limited to a very few cases. The most stubborn anti-Fascists were 
sentenced to prison or confinement at the end of farcical trials which were 
intended to legitimize the unending retribution against Mussolini’s opponents.110 
Extending the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal transformed infringement of 
emergency rules into an offence against the State and therefore into a political 
crime. This was an institutional change  specifically designed to stabilise the 
home front, sending a reassuring message to people angered by looters and 
profiteers.111   
 During summer 1940 there were few trials, with sentences of several years 
of imprisonment for minor offences.112 But in the autumn the Special Tribunal 
was called on to deal with the first important case in which the strict new rules 
could be applied. It was a story of petty crime on the face of it, but it turned out to 
have significant social, if not political, repercussions. A series of armed robberies 
and thefts were committed in Genoa between 8 and 17 October, taking advantage 
of the blackout, and caused a great sensation in the press. The major perpetrators 
were Alberto Pavese, a baker, and Clemente Grisanti, a driver, who together with 
four accomplices had stolen a dress, two hats and three bags containing 
respectively 523, 30 and 78 lire. At the end of the month, after only two weeks of 
an exceptionally swift investigation led by the questore himself and widely 
praised in the press, six people were arrested. They all confessed and paid full 
compensation for the damage inflicted on the victims. In two weeks a spectacular 
trial was set up. The Special Tribunal, which was based in Rome and presided 
over by Antonino Tringali Casanuova, a general of the Fascist Militia, moved to 
Genoa.113 
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 The city, which had been a target of enemy air raids and naval attacks 
since the beginning of the war, was a focal point of the home front. It was also one 
of the Italian areas least sensible to the Fascist mobilisation: a large number of 
workers in the docks and in the shipping industry, traditionally the lynchpin of the 
local economy, had left-wing sympathies. A few months after Mussolini’s decision 
to enter the war, police informants from Genoa reported that the high level of 
unemployment and the hardships imposed by emergency regulations were stoking 
disaffection for the regime among workers. They also noticed that a dangerous 
stream of anti-Fascist feeling was gaining momentum. Even reports sent to the 
party headquarters in Rome by Fascist local leaders and inspectors contained 
veiled admissions about the fragility of consent and political discipline in the city. 
In September 1940 it was confidentially made known to the authorities in Rome 
that anti-Fascist writings and hammer and sickle symbols were appearing on 
walls. Fascist workers reported that in the factories in Sampierdarena, a densely 
populated industrial area, most of their colleagues were ‘Reds’ and it was possible 
to hear ‘significant expressions’ such as: ‘When will the English decide to bomb 
Rome very hard?’ People’s ‘murmuring’ focused on the danger of enemy air raids. 
Other reports told that there was in Genoa ‘an absolute lack of enthusiasm about 
the war and its aims’. Informants also noted some loosening of discipline among 
party members. Interestingly, they stressed that they inferred such feelings from 
the observations people made when commenting on and criticising what the 
official sources – war bulletins, radio reports and press articles – said about the 
military situation.114        
 The trials held by the Special Tribunal at the end of 1940 and during 1941 
in some Italian cities against transgressors of the exceptional law need to be 
framed in that context. Indeed, the trial in Genoa against Pavese and Grisanti was 
not the only one dealing with ordinary offences. Giovanni Guerriero, who had 
wounded  Vincenzo De Meglio, a shopkeeper, attempting to rob him on the night 
of 31 August in Naples was sentenced to 26 years and 8 months in prison; 
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Giovanni Monte and Ludovico Casagrande, who on 22 August in Genoa had 
beaten Davide Perasso, a farmer and robbed him of 500 lire. The two culprits 
were sentenced to 26 years in prison. Both trials dealt with offences committed 
during the blackout and were bound to have an exemplary meaning for the Italian 
people.  
 The judges were more indulgent with people taking advantage of the 
blackout who were accused of rape. For instance, they acquitted Gaetano Lauria, a 
Sicilian tax collector accused of having assaulted a young woman at her home in 
the town of Piazza Armerina on the night of 8 July, sentencing him to one year in 
prison for the minor offence of housebreaking. Police reported to the judges that 
the victim was of ‘dubious morality’, while the defendant had no criminal record, 
was ‘inexperienced and an easy prey to other people’s cunning’.115 
 Yet no trial received the same attention as the hearings in Genoa in autumn 
1940. Almost all Italian newspapers published the Stefani agency’s dispatches. 
The articles were not particularly prominent, but the decision to report almost 
verbatim the prosecutor’s closing speech and the desperate attempts of the 
defence counsel to obtain a reasonable punishment for the defendants was a huge 
contrast with the understated and cautious approach to crime reporting in pre-war 
Fascist Italy. This created the perception that the press was pushing a degree of 
admonishment around the trial that had symbolic value for the regime. 
 The Turin daily La Stampa, widely read in the Genoa area, sent its legal 
affairs correspondent Francesco Argenta, an indication that the trial deserved to be 
followed with particular attention. Despite the mandatory tone of complacency, it 
was possible from Argenta’s articles to see the disproportionate nature of the 
authorities’ reaction given the actual importance of the crimes.116 On the first day 
of the trial the local daily Il Secolo XIX called for an exemplary sentence, 
commenting that Genoese people ‘today feel highly protected’ and ‘are certain 
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that they can look at the future with full confidence and absolute tranquility’.117 
Indeed, the prosecutor requested the death penalty for Pavese and Grisanti. 
Umberto Ferraris, Pavese’s counsel, questioned in his final address whether the 
facts that led to the trial ‘really provoked among Genoa’s population such waves 
of fear as to justify the harshness of the punishment being requested’. The lawyer 
explained, trying to put into perspective the impact of the crime on people’s 
everyday lives, that Genoa ‘is at work everywhere’  and it was one of the few 
Italian cities which still ‘offers a nightlife’. People there had not been touched by 
‘the cold shiver of fear’.118 
 Ferraris’ arguments did not persuade the judges. The Tribunal passed the 
death sentence on Pavese and Grisanti in a room crowded with local and national 
authorities, lawyers and the Genoese bar. The prefect and the podestà sat in the 
first row.119 The mob thronging around the courtroom welcomed the verdict, 
‘plainly nodding assent’. After the ruling, newspapers claimed that, ‘the Genoese 
people feel a calm assurance that nobody will dare to violate the sanctity of the 
law’.120 The written sentence explained that, as a consequence 
 
of a turbid and sudden germination sprouting from the slums, Genoa – a  peaceful and industrious 
city which has seldom been reported in the national news for notable crimes – has been in the early 
days of October 1940 the scene of criminal deeds the recurrence of which in so short a time caused 
extensive legitimate alarm. It seemed as though the streets at night were barred to the free transit 
of those citizens who, mostly for work, must move about the city. The blackout, which is due to 
the utmost needs of anti-aircraft defence, had given criminals the chance to carry out their deeds. 
They spread the terror of assault, often with the threat of a revolver, into the hearts of defenceless 
women and men.121 
 
The verdict was printed on 16,000 posters that were put up in the Genoa area.122 
No Italian law scholar had the courage to comment that the punishment was 
disproportionate to the crimes. In peacetime, the Special Tribunal had passed only 
15 death sentences, all carried out, five of which were passed against Slavic 
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nationalists convicted of acts of terrorism in the Northern border region of 
Venezia Giulia. The enforcement of the June 1940 law added to the iniquity of 
that system and led to ‘aberrant decisions, at odds with any principle of justice 
and lacking the most basic humanitarian feeling’.123  
 According to the biographies kept in the court records, Pavese had been 
previously sentenced for desertion in the First War. Returning to civilian life, he 
was soon made bankrupt. In the 1930s he volunteered with the Blackshirts and 
joined troops in East Africa, where he worked for four years as a baker and 
whence he was expelled in 1939, to arrive in Genoa. The local Fascist union in the 
city helped him find a job. Grisanti, who had been convicted of running an 
unlicensed lodging house, was a member of the Fascist Party. His estranged wife 
worked as a prostitute in Milan and he had to pay expensive fees for the Catholic 
boarding school their eight-year old daughter attended.124 On the one hand, the 
details of the complex lives of these men sentenced to death were not included in 
press reports, probably because both biographies were scattered with wrongdoing 
and misfortune. On the other hand, the men had complied with the fundamental 
requirements of survival in Fascist Italy such as party membership and military 
engagement. It was convenient for the media to present them as petty criminals, 
indifferent to the nation’s values and needs and capable of taking advantage of 
others in adversity.  
 Italian newspapers were avid for morbid details when the impact on 
morale of particularly hateful crimes on the enemy home front was concerned. 
Articles and comments contrasted the ways in which Britain and Italy dealt with 
deviant attitudes among civilians. According to the Italian press version, in Fascist 
Italy, the very few who dared to break the discipline observed by the 
overwhelming majority of law-abiding citizens were exemplarily and 
unmercifully chastised, whereas democratic Britain struggled to punish heinous 
crimes, giving defendants a fair trial and applying only mild sanctions. When the 
first trials for looting from people killed by German bombs started to be reported 
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in the British press, the Italian papers were keen to single out the stories. One of 
them was particularly emphasised: in January 1941, George Alfred Hobbs, a 
mortuary assistant in Kensington, was sentenced at the Old Bailey to three years 
of ‘penal servitude’ for stealing rings from the bodies of four persons killed in air 
raids.125 The Italian newspapers published all the particulars of the trial, even the 
evidence given to the court by the victims’ relatives concerning mutilation of the 
corpses, which was not attributable to the raid but to the desecrating thefts. The 
articles insinuated that British judges were concerned that this kind of story might 
have a negative effect on the public and therefore quickly closed the trial, passing 
a light sentence for crimes which ‘would have been sanctioned with capital 
punishment in any other country in the world’.126                
 This was the usual rhetoric of Fascist propaganda. However, after the 
Genoa trial the regime’s determination to show force and full rigour seemed to 
weaken. Crimes like those which earned Pavese and Grisanti the firing squad 
began to be punished less harshly. When serious crimes were committed and the 
Special Tribunal imposed capital punishment, the press reported the news 
concisely without adding details or comments: in Sicily on 26 January 1941 
Filippo Messina was executed for the ordered killing of a rich elderly woman 
during the blackout; one month later in Belluno a labourer, Antonio Mesotine, was 
executed for having beaten and robbed a railway worker walking along the track 
in the dark on his way home; in Avellino on 11 June 1941 two peasants, Angiolino 
Roberto and Antonio Porcelli, were put to death for the murder of two carabinieri, 
Luigi Formisano and Luigi Posillipo, during a robbery attempt.127 In none of these 
cases was the style, tone and layout of press articles comparable to the vast 
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publicity given to the Genoa case. Even the crimes and the investigations leading 
to the arrest of the culprits were largely neglected.128 
 One explanation could be the authorities’ intention to show that an initial, 
steady and resolute display of strength had been sufficient to make violations of 
blackout regulations increasingly rare. Since the first death sentence for ordinary 
crimes that profited from emergency war regulations, the Ministry of Interior had 
ordered that every town hall in the country must post a notice reproducing the 
Special Tribunal verdicts.129 On 12 April 1941, following instructions from the 
MCP urging newspapers to stress the government communiqué regarding ‘the 
scarcity of crimes dependent on the state of war’, La Stampa commented that in 
the first ten months of war there had been few offences and trials: transgressions 
were not alarming, and ‘even in the course of such a hard war the moral standard 
of the Italian people proved to be so high that it did not endure shocks or 
deviations despite circumstances propitious to anti-social leanings’.130 
 Even when the government passed a decree at the end of 1942 increasing 
the number of offences punishable with the death penalty, the press kept a low 
profile.131 And in the last critical months of the Fascist war, with the regime more 
anxious than ever to build a contained and disciplined home front, the press was 
told not to indulge in the kind of stories that had been extensively reported at the 
outset of war. In March 1943, when the Special Tribunal judges moved to Turin to 
try some men charged with looting after air raids, official instruction stated that 
their presence was not to be made known to the public. Authorities were 
concerned that a court that usually dealt with political crimes would ascribe the 
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strikes that had been under way in Turin factories since the beginning of the 
month to anti-Fascist feeling. Thus, on 18 March, readers knew from the front 
pages that five ‘vultures’ had been sentenced to death, without having heard from 
the media about the culprits’ deeds or the trial.132    
 
4.6 Soul of the Home and Steadfast Warrior: Women on the Domestic Front 
Reproof of villains coexisted with the a pedagogical reiteration and praise of 
virtuous models in press efforts to sway and motivate civilians. Women were the 
natural recipients of the actions of persuasion, as they were regarded as playing a 
crucial role in holding together Italian families deprived of male presence for 
years. As Elsa Goss, a writer and lecturer, told the audience of a war talk in Genoa 
in August 1940: ‘Every fireplace is a trench’.133 The press, tuning in to the Fascist 
authorities’ campaign among civilians against rumour-mongering about the 
military situation, urged women not to indulge in gossip with friends, shopkeepers 
and caretakers. Camilla Bisi, a writer and editor at Il Lavoro, wrote that some 
women were becoming ‘sowers of bad germs which infect the family, whence 
they spread to even larger circles’. At such a critical moment, women should not 
spread pessimism but a true, healthy optimism – as Italian women had done in the 
Great War when they ‘committed themselves and others to silence about things 
that could undermine the strength of their men’, creating ‘a single front of serenity 
against the threat’.134 During the First World War Italian women had an 
opportunity to change their lives for few years. For instance, they could 
experience new work roles in offices and factories or leave their families and 
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serve as Red Cross nurses on the battlefront. Yet these were to be temporary 
changes that did not emancipate women in post-war Italy, since the end of the war 
marked a return to traditional gender roles.135  
 In 1940, the need to guide women and once again ensure their support on 
the home front was supposed to benefit from 18 years of mobilisation in female 
party organisations. The regime’s propagandists were convinced that dictatorship 
had made it possible to frame women’s contribution both in ‘traditional’ terms (in 
their unalterable role in a male-dominated society) and in a ‘modern’ sense (in 
their acquired abilities as substitutes for men).136 Yet, in fact, that ambiguity led to 
an incoherent message simultaneously on the persistence of the usual reassuring 
stereotypes of family life and the inflated language of war propaganda. Getting 
this message across proved to be a juggling exercise that, especially in the first 
year of the war, sometimes had surreal implications, as when editors and writers, 
melding frivolous and serious topics, gave advice to women about the dress code 
for shelters. The newspaper Il Lavoro, for instance, went so far as to print a 
photograph showing the right way for women to carry torches during blackouts 
and giving detailed instructions in the caption:   
 
Not like a flower in your buttonhole, dear women walking at night-time in the blackout: not in line 
with your waist, like a shining belt-buckle, but almost at the border of the skirt (especially as 
nowadays they are so short) in order to light up your journey without blinding those who come 
towards you. If the legs are nice and the shoes are original, all the better.137 
 
Camilla Bisi was an assertor and practitioner of a form of journalism aimed at 
involving women in the patriotic atmosphere of the first year of war. She had been 
a feminist and had opposed a beauty contest for secretaries organised by the Milan 
weekly La Piccola in 1929, the first such event in Italy, and suggested that prizes 
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ought to be given to hard-working and courageous girls.138 Her support for the 
regime’s propaganda in wartime led to an eclectic vision in which every aspect of 
women’s lives – aesthetic, practical and ethical – must be put at the service of the 
country. In the first summer of the Italian war, when Genoa was within reach of 
French bombers and authorities adopted the first evacuation plans, Bisi started a 
column entitled ‘Journal of an Evacuee’, aimed at framing in a reassuring 
atmosphere the narration of an experience which had been unsettling the lives and 
habits of Italian families since the outset of war. Her writings set out to convey a 
model of a woman who continued to lead a simple and well-organised life despite 
adverse circumstances. Often she insisted on the socially levelling effect of alarms 
and blackout, sketching exemplary characters and situations: a young maid 
sheltering in a small hotel who had followed her mistress did not fear the air raids 
and was always smiling, but cried her heart out when seeing a spider; a small 
village where everyone resolutely did their duty – from the people who manned 
the anti-aircraft guns to the priest who offered his room to evacuees; the scorn 
heaped on some elegant ladies who fled to the fashionable places of the Riviera 
and therefore lost the small pleasures of provincial life like improvised film 
showings with friends in a welcoming house.139 
 The images of British women under the Blitz were mockingly compared 
with Italian women, helping convey the message that even under bombing Italian 
women would not cast off their femininity, while old habits and the destructive 
power of enemy attacks forced their counterparts in the opposing camp to look 
increasingly like men: 
 
English women adopt garments for air raid alarms, overalls fitted with zips, at least four huge 
pockets to carry a torch, a first-aid kit, cookies and chocolate. Lots of women wear men’s trousers 
and a hood to hide ruffled hair. The indispensable gas-mask pouch is in matching colours and 
hangs from the belt.140 
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Illustrated with a picture of a contented girl, the magazine Grazia commended the 
manufacturer of a ‘new model’ of gas mask for ‘being very conscious of the 
aesthetic’, as the object had lost ‘its monstrous shape’ and was reminiscent ‘more 
of an odd beauty care device than of its tragic function’.141 For mobilised women, 
who in the summer of 1940 were not yet fully involved in emergency duties, 
Camilla Bisi prescribed detailed rules regarding keeping up the appearances of an 
unscathed femininity. Italians’ acquaintance with the first lethal air raids in 
autumn did not change the substance or style of the material directed at women by 
the media, but hints at the military situation and the urgent needs of the home 
front became more frequent. The usual tenets of fashion, household management 
and family life were increasingly war-oriented. Calls for sobriety in 
entertainments and pastimes – though not the halting of them, because such 
‘complete sacrifice would mean the stagnation of countless branches of the 
national economy and consequently the paralysis of jobs’ – compensated for 
frivolous stories.142 
 Mothers were urged to acclimatise their children to the blackout by telling 
them ‘deeds of heroic children’. Children would then ‘fall asleep dreaming 
exciting adventures’. They had to be quieted by the strength of the familiar 
example: ‘Tell them that, as their dad or their older brother are at war fighting real 
dangers, the little Italians must not tremble’.143 In this respect as in others, the 
papers compared the virtues of the Italian people to the failings of enemy 
civilians. Quoting a report by the London correspondent of a Swedish newspaper, 
for instance, they criticised the wicked behaviour of British women, saying that 
‘mothers who abandon their children during air raids will be severely punished’, 
since such a crime ‘seems to be a recurrent one in Britain’. In Manchester, the 
paper explained, two women who had left their sons unattended during an air raid 
had stood trial and were sentenced to several months in prison.144 La Stampa 
reported a Daily Mirror article that claimed the rising crime rate among women 
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worried the British public: ‘A moral devastation has gone with the material 
devastation that bombing brought about in England’. Italian mothers, who had ‘a 
sublime cult of motherhood’ looked ‘with a shiver of horror’ at the increasing 
number of British women punished ‘for neglecting their children’.145 
 In contrast, the authorities instructed the press to emphasise the exemplary 
and heroic acts of Italian women, as in the case of Giovanna Deiana. A 14-year-
old member of the Verona branch of the youth organisation Gioventù Italiana del 
Littorio, Giovanna got a special mention, a silver medal, and a promotion to the 
rank of capomanipolo because during the British air raid of 21 October 1940 on 
her city, despite being hit in the face and completely blinded by shrapnel, she had 
carried her two little brothers to safety. That portrait went beyond the exaltation of 
a private virtue, since it was mostly the patriotic value of the girl that was 
commended. She was quoted as saying bravely that she was happy with the fate 
that had been chosen for her, sparing a soldier or a military objective. According 
to the press, even after that terrible experience, Giovanna only had thoughts for 
Mussolini: ‘I want it made known to the Duce that I will not cry and I will bear 
my pain for his own and the Country’s sake’. The cover of the weekly La 
Domenica del Corriere, drawn by Achille Beltrame, one the most popular 
illustrators of the time, brought the episode into Italian homes, showing a girl 
covering her face in her hands while shielding two children with her body. A few 
months later, Giovanna met Mussolini and her story was once again richly mined 
by the newspapers.146 
 The attention devoted to women in wartime even by the heavyweights of 
Fascist propaganda signalled how vital their cooperation was deemed to be for the 
cohesion of the home front with civilians increasingly becoming involved in the 
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war. Also, women had to be addressed because they were specifically targeted by 
enemy propaganda: for instance, leaflets urged mothers and wives to save their 
men’s lives by opposing the Fascist war.147 Mario Appelius applied a tested 
polemical scheme to the purpose of attracting women’s attention. Exalting his 
country’s past, he claimed that, ‘Italian women through the ages have solved the 
problem of fusing all the regal attributes of the most complete femininity with 
firm moral, spiritual and civic qualities’. Moreover, making reference to patriotic 
and bellicose imperatives, Appelius asserted that, ‘in this total war’ Italian women 
‘are valiant fighters’, and ‘are enlisted to serve their fatherland under arms’.148 
Women’s work also began to be emphasised, as long as it was clear that the 
extraordinary situation the country was in required their involvement in a field 
traditionally reserved for men. A huge propaganda effort had been directed at 
women during the two-year autarky campaign following the sanctions imposed on 
Italy by the League of Nations after the aggression on Ethiopia in October 1935, 
but at that time only their contribution to war as good mothers and shrewd 
consumers was encouraged and praised.149 The mobilisation of women in the 
Second World War provided them with new roles and opportunities.  In September 
1940 newspapers underlined enthusiastically that UNPA was allowed to recruit 
women as capifabbricato. ‘This significant recognition’, La Stampa commented, 
testified ‘not only to the trust the Fascist Regime puts in the female element, but 
also to the social maturity women proved they have attained, by means of 
exacting trials,  showing their peculiar virtues of abnegation, unselfishness, 
industry in a full light’.150 
 Yet despite the effort of the Fascist propaganda machine, the real lives of 
Italian women since the start of the war was – as diaries, memoirs, and official 
reports testify – poles apart from the media’s fictional account. Rationing, air 
raids, evacuation all transformed the role that tradition, authority and Fascism had 
imposed on women. In their efforts to find food, places where to escape from 
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bombed cities, and words to reassure relatives at the front, there was perhaps not a 
conscious evolution towards ‘modernity’, but it is undeniable that total war forced 
women to venture into territories that had been precluded to their sex until then. It 
is not by chance that in the summer of 1941 the first episodes of open reaction to 
the dictatorship, mainly in the poorest areas of Southern Italy, had as their 
protagonists women demonstrating against food shortages.151 Yet only in the last 
year of the Duce’s war did Italian anti-Fascist groups focus their counter-
propaganda on messages challenging the role that the regime’s ideology imposed 
on women.152  
 
4.7 Representations of the Home Front in Popular Culture 
On the eve of Italy’s entry into war, Adriano Nisco, an engineer from Naples, 
presented a plan for a monumental underground theatre to be built below Piazza 
Plebiscito, an area in the old city centre close to the harbour. The structure, which 
according to Nisco was instrumental in adapting Mussolini’s ‘theatre of the 
masses’ to the necessities of war, was meant to accommodate an audience of 
7,000 and, if need be, around 30,000 people sheltering from bombs. The project 
was a dead letter, although it would have been a godsend for a metropolis heavily 
hit by the Anglo-American air raids.153 The rallies that had been a linchpin of the 
Fascist ideology of never-ending mobilisation were no longer feasible after June 
1940 for obvious security reasons. They had been, as Emilio Gentile put it, not 
only instruments to manipulate public opinion, enforce obedience and obtain 
consent, but also ‘spectacles of power’ to project an image of unity, solidarity and 
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force.154 War became a litmus test of Mussolini’s ambition to mould the ‘new 
man’, and the home front was the ideal environment to realise that aspiration, to 
show that civilians were as ready and resilient as soldiers supposedly were. Even 
pastimes had to be consistent and equal to the challenge. 
 Notwithstanding the increasing success of popular music in Italy since the 
Belle Epoque, the outburst of patriotic tunes during the Great War and, above all, 
the role of anthems in Fascist mobilisation, there was no great surge of war songs 
in 1940 and thereafter.155 Even a press usually not prone to openly expressing 
contentious opinion, unless required to do so by their political masters, directed 
criticism at what seemed a fatal flaw in the national pride. Federico Petriccione, a 
journalist and playwright, noticed that songwriters dealt with war in a slovenly 
and superficial way. He said that their texts were ‘awkward improvisations’ with 
terrible taste and no poetic content.156 
 Indeed, the great majority of Italians did not return a martial response to 
the Duce’s call to arms. Since 1935 the 40-hour working week (sabato fascista) 
had been designed to allow people to engage in Party organisations and in 
edifying activities like visiting exhibitions, acting in amateur theatrical clubs 
(filodrammatiche) promoted by the Opera nazionale dopolavoro, or watching 
drama and plays. Yet, as Doug Thompson observed, ‘it still tended to be the 
lighter, intellectually less-demanding forms of music-hall entertainments which 
appealed to the masses’.157 So, when the war came, people wanted escape from 
reality. Spectators at popular theatre trebled between 1939 to 1942, mostly in 
northern cities, while the serious genres stagnated. That was a problem for 
censorship, because in shows like revue (rivista) and music-hall (varietà), 
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performers sometimes spoke lines that were not in the approved script, referring 
with jokes or witticisms to war news and to the domestic situation.158 Besides, 
mimicry, gesticulation and intonation had the power to radically change the 
meaning of the most innocent sentence approved on paper.159 
 However the press continued to praise highbrow theatre, which unlike 
rivista and varietà, was subsidised by the government and openly promoted by the 
regime, which claimed that the fact that people still filled the stalls in most Italian 
cities was manifest proof that the country was carrying on as usual. Four months 
of war, L’Illustrazione Italiana wrote, 
 
have not changed the face and spirit of Italy. The war, which Italians deeply and calmly felt and 
desired, neither stopped nor substantially altered the rhythm of national life and has in no sector 
caused worries, disorder, disorientation. Not even in the theatre, where companies have continued 
to play and audiences continue to hasten quietly as before, or almost as before. In Turin even 
during and after air raids; in Milan even after the bombs (real and metaphorical) of the British; in 
Genoa, Naples and Palermo, also visited by enemy incursions; and in Rome, in spite of the 
alarms.160 
 
Unlike control over the press, which was maintained by means of general and 
detailed instructions followed by subsequent sanctions against non-compliant 
newspapers, a centralised preventive censorship – headed since 1932 by Leopoldo 
Zurlo, a Ministry of Interior official who had direct access to both Pavolini and 
Mussolini – forced writers and managers to submit songs and theatrical and 
cinematographic scripts for approval. Works could not flout norms of decency and 
morality and, especially, had to conform to Fascist political orthodoxy.161 
In the first months of the war, authorities allowed shows to deal with topics that 
would become much more sensitive later on such as alarms, blackouts and 
rationing. Works showing people bearing sacrifices with composure were 
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favoured, but the green light was also given to scripts that provided entertainment 
and played down crucial aspects of wartime life. For instance, L’oscuramento 
(The blackout) e L’allarme aereo (The air-raid warning), two works by Aldo 
Fabrizi – a playwright and performer who was one of the most censored authors 
during Fascism and who was to become a star of post-war Italian cinema – were 
accepted, staged, recorded and broadcast, reaching millions of Italian households. 
They were two monologues describing surreal and comic situations, like the story 
of a married couple reacting to an air-raid siren with the husband eager to run into 
the shelter (‘I want to hurry, or else someone will take the best places beside the 
main wall’) and the wife accusing him of longing ‘to see the lady from the third 
floor wearing a vented dressing-gown’. Or the farcical tale of a man who, after 
getting lost in the blacked-out streets of Rome, ends up after exhilarating 
vicissitudes at Milan station.162 
 Those monologues were a big success and many fans wrote to Fabrizi. 
One of them, in a letter sent years later when the war was over, told him that a 
whole block of flats had whiled away the fearful hours spent in an air-raid shelter 
reading the small book containing the script of L’allarme aereo.163 That kind of 
representation did conceal apprehension and insecurity beneath a layer of humour, 
but it did not refrain from ridiculing rules and figures of authority who were 
deemed essential in home front organisation. While newspapers were hammering 
away illustrating prescriptions and civilians’ duties in great detail, comedians 
mocked figures like capifabbricato and UNPA wardens who shouted abstruse and 
vexing orders in the streets. 
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 A revue written by Armando Curcio with Eduardo De Filippo, another 
playwright and actor whom Zurlo and the Fascist leaders kept an eye on, 
surprisingly gained the censor’s approval despite some cuts which did not change 
the substance of the text. As its title suggests, Basta il succo di limone! alluded to 
the trick of writing words or sentences to be concealed from the postal censorship 
in lemon juice, De Filippo’s work implied the need to read between the lines of 
newspapers and official bulletins, in particular considering war emergency 
measures like blackout and curfew as the régime’s chance to limit what was left of 
people’s freedom. As was often the case in Mussolini’s Italy, officialdom was 
subverted on the ground. For example, on 25 November 1940 at the revue’s first 
night at the Quattro Fontane theatre in Rome, the show had to be stopped after the 
first act when a group of fascists in the audience started to boo actors off the 
stage.164   
 In May 1942 Eduardo De Filippo and his brother Peppino, himself also an 
actor and playwright, again troubled the Fascist authorities. During the 
performance at the Quirino theatre in Rome of their comedy La fortuna con la effe 
maiuscola (Luck With a Capital L), which had duly obtained the censor’s 
permission, they improvised a dialogue that poked fun at the UNPA and 
capifabbricato. Two members of the UNPA who were eavesdropping wondered 
whether to denounce the play to the questore or to settle the matter in person by 
going to the theatre to beat up the actors on stage. The phone tap was taken to 
Mussolini, who decided to drop the matter. In his memoirs Zurlo recalled that he 
advised the Duce against taking the incident seriously and conceded that the UNPA 
people, ‘because of their age and the way they dressed hold themselves up to 
ridicule’.165 
 Zurlo’s work with authors who were sympathetic to the regime’s needs 
was less demanding. In the first year of the war the majority of scripts submitted 
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for approval conveyed an idyllic image of the home front. Ordinary people were 
represented as coping easily and almost exhilarated by war regulations. Light 
comedies took their cues from restrictions on food choice and precautionary 
measures. In a 1940 revue by Concettina Vecchio, Il suon delle sirene (The 
Sounds of Sirens), for instance, blackout provided the occasion for two lovers, 
Rosita and Piero, to meet. Other shows were similarly set in an atmosphere of 
calm and optimism.166  
 Zurlo also had to examine hundreds of scripts submitted by amateurs 
dealing with war-related topics. As Pietro Cavallo observed, most of them 
produced a ‘celebratory’ theatre that sketched ‘exemplary figures’ who acted as 
‘role models’ presenting ‘the correct form of behaviour to Italians’. But when it 
became clear that the war was getting worse for Italy, the scripts started to show 
the ‘wretched condition’ of soldiers and civilians. They were increasingly based 
more on real-life experiences like bombing, lack of food and restrictions rather 
than on echoing propaganda’s old stories and therefore the censors deemed these 
plays to be ‘counter-productive’ from the Fascist point of view. When Sergio 
Motroni submitted for authorisation a play (Vento del Nord) that, in his words, 
was meant to show the ‘Italians are they really are’, devoid of any ‘vain rhetoric’, 
Zurlo accompanied his letter of rejection with a question mark: 
 
Should I, in my role of censor, pretend not to recognise the depressing effect your script produces 
on the audience? Your play is undoubtedly full of noble and impartial sentiments, but it also 
presents all the dark nuances of the war.167 
 
An anti-British stance was present in all forms of theatre. Besides the typical 
xenophobic invective so prevalent in the press and in radio programmes, a coarse 
comic register was also heard. Radiopanzane (Radio Yarns), a revue written by 
Michele Galdieri, submitted to the censors in 1940 and played by Paola Borboni 
and Riccardo Billi, parodied the BBC Italian Service and British war bulletins: in a 
letter to his nanny, a British war correspondent reports that, on landing in Sicily, 
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Her Majesty’s troops have been greeted by locals – a sketch intended to be 
amusing, but which in fact turned out to foreshadow what took place three years 
later.168 
 Blaming barbaric acts on the enemy was another common propagandistic 
tool. In two works submitted to the censor in 1941 – Un eccezionale 
paracadutista (An Exceptional Paratrooper) by Giovanni Cassese and Il 
fuoruscito (The Expatriate) by Mariano Marraffa – British soldiers were 
represented as waging a cowardly war that was based on bombing defenceless 
civilians, hospitals and churches. In a play by Antonio Zecchini, Piccola guardia 
(Little Guards), submitted to Zurlo in 1943, a schoolmaster tell his pupils that the 
British ‘invented a new form of war: men fighting against women, children, old 
people’. He enters into a spirited dialogue with them: 
 
SCHOOLMASTER: You all certainly know of the latest crimes that the British perpetrated upon 
our cities. 
THE PUPILS: Yes, sir! The bombing of Genoa … and Milan! 
PAOLO: It isn’t true! Not Milan! 
MARIO: The surrounding area! It’s the same, isn’t it? What matters is that they always attack 
civilians: is that true, sir? 
SOME PUPILS:  Churches, hospital and monuments as well. These are the only RAF exploits.169 
 
After the first year of war, it was no longer possible to propose a light-hearted, 
cheerful and optimistic representation of the internal situation based on the 
illusion of a short war.170 While the propaganda machine insisted on the 
imperative of a national, collective and disciplined attitude towards war, authors 
privileged individual experiences in the real life of an increasingly anxious 
country.171 Thus, since autumn 1941, when air raids against Italian cities became 
more frequent and effective, censors decided that no hint of the domestic situation 
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must appear in works of fiction. At the end of 1942, Zurlo wrote to Pavolini that 
he was in favour of ‘the exaltation of war’s values’ but he deemed ‘a realistic 
representation of war’ to be inappropriate. The minister replied that Zurlo’s 
observation was correct, ‘especially for bombing’.172     
 Indeed, the show Non c’è niente di male (There Is Nothing Wrong), 
written by Marcello Marchesi and Angelo Frattini, was approved for the 1941-
1942 season and staged at the Mediolanum Theatre in Milan, but on 30 October 
1941 its mentions of the home front were cut and passages about the blackout 
were obliterated. In January 1942, Zurlo rejected Senza tetto (Homeless), a work 
about shelters that, although praising government and charity efforts for evacuees, 
ended as ‘a painful and useless exhibition of misery’.173 Famiglie eroiche (Heroic 
Families), a script submitted to Zurlo in 1943 by Gabriele Mario Giuliani – which 
opened with a portrayal of popular enthusiasm in June 1940 and ended by 
depicting the suffering of civilians confronting food rationing and bombing – 
came to summarise the course of Fascist propaganda theatre in the three years of 
war.174     
 
Conclusion 
The spread of rumours, hardly curbed by police repression, was the direct 
consequence of reticence and lies in the media. Shaped by two decades of 
gendered social framing, Fascist war propaganda targeted women as ‘traditional 
recipients’ of gossip, and employed female journalists for the task of prescribing 
orthodox codes of conducts. The attempt at working out for the public an optical 
illusion of order, discipline and social cohesion relied also on entertainment: 
among the scripts dealing with war-related topics submitted to the MCP in 1940-
1943, works of clumsy propaganda coexisted with stories that gave glimpses of 
the real lives of Italians, of their fears and hopes. Censors were particularly 
diligent at removing passages that they feared might cause public demoralisation 
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or that contained veiled criticism of the authorities, but improvised or off-script 
performances sometimes gave small audiences some narrow spaces of freedom – 
albeit promptly repressed and sanctioned.  
Before the first catastrophic air raids on Italy, the regime focused on creating a 
smokescreen for its failures through a combination of domesticated information 
(the exaggeration of which began to cause open dissent even amongst Fascists) 
and the specific targeting of issues or social groups. Yet the policy of 
minimisation proved ineffective, as widespread popular reaction to the British 
naval bombardment of Genoa showed. In addition, the emphasis on the regime’s 
determination to punish mercilessy criminal behaviour in wartime and the press 
campaign aimed at women were two exemplary aspects of a propagandistic 
pattern that became increasingly unappealing in the following months, as living 
conditions deteriorated everywhere, and the sense of insecurity expanded across 
the whole country.  
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Chapter 5. Area Bombing and the Definitive Breakup of the Home Front 
 
With the worsening situation on the home front in 1942, mostly at the hands of 
the enemy air raids, the weakness of Italian propaganda appeared ever more to be 
part of the broader failure of Fascism. Even in 1943, when the Allies were aware 
that by killing thousands of civilians they exposed themselves to condemnation, 
the MCP persevered in fabricating stories and hiding facts instead of creating a 
plausible and coherent narrative. It was unable to orchestrate effective campaigns 
and it did not manage to stir up waves of hatred against the enemy, instead 
producing propaganda that was often instrumental in arousing disillusion and 
anger against the Duce. The purpose of this chapter is to detail MCP activities in 
the final phase of the Fascist war, analysing the work of the Ministry’s apparatus, 
the output of the different media branches, the reaction of the public, and the 
political and institutional factors that hindered its work.          
 
5.1 The Home Front and the Failure of Totalitarian Mobilisation 
An Italian trying to stay informed about the internal situation in the third year of 
war solely through the media of his own country, would have been under the 
impression that the PNF was in the front line of the battle against defeatism and 
demoralisation on the home front. The press and radio were called on to convey 
this perception, screening out shortcomings and feuds. As a journalist by training 
and trade, Pavolini was familiar with Italian newsrooms. Knowing that his 
colleagues, who were often the recipients of rumours, liked to speculate on the 
highs and lows of leading Fascists or to muse on divergences between career 
officials and the party’s hierarchy, he wanted to ensure that none of that gossip 
leaked out. Mussolini and the regime could not afford to bring to public attention 
how ineffective 20 years of mobilisation had been in forging the ‘new Italian’ and 
as early as the last months of 1941 Pavolini had thus instructed the press not to 
hint at disputes or rivalries inside the state and party machines, fearing that enemy 
propaganda would exploit a situation in which prefects and federali struggled, in 
their respective spheres of influence, to obscure their failures in preventing and 
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alleviating people’s suffering. Editors had to allocate space carefully between 
competing powers, always referring to them in flattering terms. As a consequence, 
increasingly more rhetorical material appeared in papers and newsreels.
1
 
 When he met representatives of the press in November 1941, the Minister 
turned his attention to the unavoidable hardships of the home front, asking 
journalists for stories capable of selling the public the idea that endurance and 
discipline were still powerful weapons in winning the war. Pavolini called to his 
audience’s attention the fact that in many parts of Italy the civilian death toll was 
‘even greater than that of some fronts in our Great War’, explaining that 
Mussolini’s war was different from that of 1915-1918 in that Fascist rule had 
filled ‘the gap between the trench and the home front’, imposing discipline and 
austerity on non-combatants as well as soldiers. Knowing the wide extent of the 
hatred of the wartime fortunes and lifestyles of many prominent Fascists, the 
Minister conceded that ‘individual cases had to be targeted on a case-by-case 
basis’. Yet the press seldom managed to convey Pavolini’s professed realism to its 
readers, since often inconsistent instructions from above enjoined the adoption of 
more reassuring and optimistic tones. Besides, the media never dealt with massive 
cases of incompetence or dishonesty in the PNF and in government, only reporting 
the occasional punishment of peripheral bureaucrats.
2
 
 Propagandistic efforts did not convince the great number of Italians who 
blamed their predicament more on their rulers than on the enemy offensive, 
though still falling short of any form of open or organised dissent. In November 
1941, for instance, an anonymous letter sent from Modena to London, evidently 
intending its interception by the Italian postal censors, begged the British military 
command to throw bombs ‘on the head of Mussolini and all his satellites’ instead 
of hitting ‘poor people who are not at fault if their government are all a bunch of 
scoundrels and crooks’.3 That perceived weakness in faith and discipline among 
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civilians – despite the government’s effort to show an image of power and 
organisation – was exploited not only by the enemy, but also by anti-Fascist 
groups seeking to spread their propaganda at home. Between 1940-1941 the 
authorities had indexed very few anti-Fascist leaflets but in the following years 
appeals against the war, Fascism and the Axis multiplied. At the beginning of 
1942 the police came into possession of leaflets blaming ‘hunger, cold and blood’ 
on the Fascist regime. That material also personally targeted the Duce: ‘Leave 
power, Mussolini, the man responsible for the bombing of our cities’.4 In the same 
period, Radio Londra rhetorically asked why 
 
in Fascist Italy, so virile, so confident in victory, so united around the Duce, morale on the home 
front needs such a propaganda to nourish it. Newspapers and the radio are working night and day 
to exhort people to keep their morale high, whereas in fact it falls lower and lower. People 
grumble and are not animated by a strong and unshakeable will to carry on with the war.
5
 
 
In June 1942 Pavolini singled out for criticism the press of the Fascist youth 
organisations, which sometimes hinted at cases of dishonesty and greed in the 
regime, implying that a moral crisis was at the root of the bad turn the war had 
taken. Such insinuations were a pernicious breach in the standing of Fascism, as 
Mussolini himself was very diligent in projecting a personal image of rigourous 
honesty as an integral part of his reputation. Accordingly, the minister laid the 
blame in particular on Vent’anni and Acciaio, respectively the papers of the Turin 
and Terni GUF, and briefed journalists that such topics played into the hands of 
enemy propaganda and had a depressing effect on people’s morale.6 Because he 
wanted the party praised for its assumed merits (but also because his camerati 
courted him in order to secure better press), he invited the media to magnify the 
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regime’s achievements in all fields. ‘We should show off what we are doing for 
once, instead of letting those anti-Fascists disgrace us’, he said – as though up 
until then the Italian press had been an example of understatement and self-
restraint that needed rebuking for not taking a partisan stance.
7
  
 In Autumn 1942 the shortcomings of the whole Fascist apparatus in 
motivating the home front was evident to Mussolini, however he was not willing 
to acknowledge the causes of that failure, preferring to seek comfort in pseudo-
anthropological explanations. Bottai recorded in his diary that when he told the 
Duce on 4 November of his recent trip to Milan and Genoa in the wake of the 
heavy air raids, uttering some appreciation of the moral resistance of those cities, 
Mussolini seemed dubious and replied: ‘One day I will say things as they stand. I 
will say, for instance, that Naples, lucky to be a miserable city, conducted itself 
better than the wealthy northern cities’.8  
 Non-Fascist observers were prone to point to the party’s faults. Crown 
prince Umberto, for instance, lamented with Bottai the foolishness of some orders 
coming from the PNF which dispatched ‘youngsters to write long live Mussolini 
on the same walls enemy bombs had just wrecked’ or commanded a football 
match be played as usual while there were people ‘still groaning under the ruins’.9 
Carlo Chevallard, a manager at a Turin metal firm converted to war production, 
noted that in the days following the two most recent raids ‘the most impressive 
thing’ he had witnessed was ‘the lack of authority’. As there were no directives, 
everybody made their own decisions or tried to follow inconsistent orders. The 
explosion of hatred against the regime and Mussolini in particular struck 
Chevallard, who wrote that ‘almost nobody’ inveighed against the British, 
whereas everybody railed against those ‘who drove us into this predicament’.10 
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5.2 An Uncertain Conversion to Realism 
In 1942 air raids intensified as part of the Allied strategy to impair Italy’s military 
and industrial infrastructure while simultaneously increasing pressure on public 
morale. A LUCE newsreel about the fire brigades’ war effort during the second 
year of war, showed the hitherto unknown level of violence endured by many 
Italian cities since the spring. In previous years the media had refrained from 
showing explicit scenes of death and destruction, yet this time the film’s 
anonymous authors were intent on displaying images to make manifest to the 
public that the enemy deliberately targeted civilian objectives: a cemetery in 
Palermo, the Duomo in Messina, churches in the Naples area, schools in Genoa, 
hospitals in Turin.
11
 However, not only was this kind of propaganda ineffective in 
arousing execration against the enemy but it also depressed morale. The mood 
was gloomy even among soldiers and Fascists. In May 1942 Livio Faloppa – a 
captain of the alpini on leave at Chiavari, near Genoa – wrote to a friend serving 
at Italian command in Tripoli that ‘everybody was in a blue funk’ and Genoa did 
not deserve ‘to have combatants as valiant as our soldiers’. In his opinion, Fascists 
were inferior to other Italians and the squadristi were ‘the worst’ of all.12 Signs of 
disheartenment among civilians were so widespread that in June the Italian troop 
command in Slovenia asked the general staff in Rome to urge the Fascist party to 
counter the ‘demoralising campaign’ they were sure was under way in Italy. 
Officers who read the mail sent to soldiers abroad found letters that ‘in their 
absolute majority were depressing and pessimistic’, describing (with ‘evident 
exaggeration’, the readers suggested), a country plagued by hunger, illness and 
deaths.
13
  
 In the first months of 1942, Italian propaganda seemed to abandon the 
bombast of previous years, when air force missions and the German raids on 
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British soil were described in triumphal tones. Even articles about civilian 
conditions in the areas targeted by German bombers, previously imbued with a 
sense of complacency, contempt and derision, almost disappeared from 
newspapers and screens. Pavolini himself recommended to journalists in January 
that the internal economic conditions in Britain had merely to be ‘recorded’ to 
show that ‘even if our predicament is difficult, so is our enemy’s condition’.14 
Despite that timid appeal to realism, Pavolini often showed an appalling 
incapacity to grasp people’s real feelings. In March, for instance, he said that 
Italians listened to the enemy wireless because the EIAR’s programmes ‘were 
lacking in light music’. He explained that the narrow choice was temporary and 
was due to the technical necessity of reserving three radio channels for the 
communication needs of anti-aircraft defence, promising that one channel would 
return to normal in a month’s time.15 Yet, when Italians regained the ability to 
choose between two channels, they continued to prefer foreign transmissions to 
Italian radio. The musical tastes of Italian listeners had a – presumably 
involuntary – echo in the House of Commons, where Russell Thomas, a Liberal 
National MP for Southampton, asked the government to make the BBC refrain from 
putting on ‘the usual jazz records’ in its broadcasts to Italy, because programmes 
‘for the Italian peasants should invariably include grand opera’. The response 
from Minister of Information Brendan Bracken (‘I personally would give them 
more bombs’) was a brutal synthesis of British priorities at the time.16  
 Despite some concessions to realism, the Italian censors sought to ensure 
that the media continue to ignore feelings, impressions and the human aspects of 
war in general, because they thought that any hint at such elements would 
inevitably give a bad impression. In March, for example, the prefect of Cremona 
enjoined the editors of parochial bulletins not to publish articles ‘inspired with 
false piety or likely to have deleterious effects on the public spirit’. Local 
authorities had been disturbed by some articles about the hardship of those made 
homeless by air raids or left bereaved after relatives were killed. Since the 
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religious press had a wide local circulation and was also sent to soldiers, censors 
feared their influence. Similar instructions were issued by the questura in Milan, 
which in June observed in the press ‘an accentuated pious tendency to include 
even the enemy in mourning trouble and sorrow’.17  
 The MCP was especially shaken whenever a major propagandistic event 
took place on the British side, on which occasions it lost any residual sense of 
proportion. For example, following a radio speech Churchill gave on 11 May 
1942 on the second anniversary of his appointment as prime minister, the Italian 
media was ordered to comment extensively, and to single out his ‘forewarning of 
poison gas attacks’ as ‘the last flick of a monster who is struggling, unable to 
avert its end’.18 Newspapers, as usual, obliged. La Stampa reproduced almost 
verbatim the formula the MCP dictated, stating that the British prime minister had 
threatened to use poison gas against civilians, as if he had targeted Italy directly.
19
 
Yet Churchill’s address was actually to announce that the Allied bombing 
offensive against Germany would be one of the principal features of war in 1942. 
He only mentioned Italy to say that Mussolini, ‘the Italian miscalculator’, had 
‘struck at the back of a dying France’ and that Britain had conquered the Italian 
empire, destroying or capturing almost all of Mussolini’s African Army. The main 
British target was Hitler, against whom the threat was explicitly addressed. As for 
the unconventional weapons (the Soviet government had expressed to Churchill 
the view that the Germans, ‘in the desperation of their assault’, might use poison 
gas against Russian soldiers and civilians), the British Prime Minister said, ‘We 
are ourselves firmly resolved not to use this odious weapon unless it is used first 
by the Germans’. The passage was intended to reassure the Russians while 
sending a clear warning to Hitler. ‘Knowing our Hun’, Churchill said, 
 
We have not neglected to make preparations, on a formidable scale. I wish now to make it plain 
that we shall treat the unprovoked use of poison gas against our Russian ally exactly as if it were 
used against ourselves, and if we are satisfied that this new outrage has been committed by Hitler, 
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we will use our great and growing air superiority in the west to carry gas warfare on the largest 
possible scale far and wide against military objectives in Germany.
20
     
 
Within a few weeks the MCP must have realised that bringing the threat of poison 
gas to people’s attention might be counterproductive and it issued orders aimed at 
preventing newspapers from dealing ‘with chemical warfare and whatever threat’ 
Churchill was employing in order to impress his own home front.
21
 In June, 
Pavolini returned mingling realism with an appeal to patriotism, ordering the 
press to emphasise the casualty lists from the air raids on Italy. He explained that, 
‘their sacrifice looks like that of those fallen in war and their names deserve to be 
reported in a respectfully’. When many papers did not comply, he insisted that 
those who fell under enemy bombs were akin to soldiers and ‘deserved to be 
remembered and respected’.22 The regime could still expect the most diligent 
compliance with such instructions in the first half of 1942, when the casualty 
figures on the home front remained relatively low.      
 
5.3 The Enemy Offensive in Autumn 1942 
Civilians in Italy may have been living in an atmosphere of depression with a 
sense of imminent danger since the first months of 1942, but many in Britain were 
asking why Italy had not yet been heavily targeted by the RAF. During a debate in 
the Commons in August 1942, for example, Commander Archibald Southby, a 
Conservative MP from Epsom, questioned whether the government was aware,  
 
that the public in this country, and certainly the public in Malta, are unable to understand why Italy 
is treated with such tenderness, particular in view of the fact that Italy is the base from which 
Rommel gets supplies of men and material for his forces in north Africa.  
In answering, Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee sought to be reassuring 
without providing details and replied that there was no policy of ‘treating Italy 
with tenderness’.23 The British were monitoring Italian morale, looking for factors 
that could precipitate a crisis in the Fascist regime. Intelligence sources had been 
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noting a ‘very low level’ of morale since the winter of 1940-1941 and now 
reported on strikes and riots mainly connected with low wages and food 
shortages. They observed that ‘latent factors’ such as ‘the corruption and 
favouritism of the system’ could undermine the ‘apathy’ of the Italian, who ‘can 
adapt himself to a very low standard of living’ and ‘accepts cold and even hunger 
with resignation’. Foreign Office analysts predicted that the unpopularity of the 
Fascist regime, coupled with an almost universal dislike of the Germans, might be 
capable of provoking ‘an explosion’, but only if living conditions deteriorated. 
The conclusion was that, ‘widespread and continuous bombing of Italian towns 
would probably produce such conditions of increased discontent and tendencies to 
revolt as to force the Germans considerably to reinforce their grip on Italy, with a 
consequent increased drain on German resources’.24 
 Italian morale was dealt a powerful blow from the unintended 
consequences of a British raid on Genoa on 23 October 1942 which caused heavy 
damage to the city and indirectly resulted in huge casualties. As the enemy aircraft 
approached and sirens sounded, hundreds of people were killed in a stampede that 
broke out as they were trying to escape into a tunnel, known as Galleria delle 
Grazie, which could be accessed only down a long, narrow and steep stairway. 
The local authorities said that they had advised against this, as the tunnel was 
believed to be unsafe, but people were accustomed to using it as a shelter. 
Genoese residents soon became aware of what had happened. In a letter to his 
soldier son, one father wrote that, ‘many people died even while standing, pressed 
against each other and suffocating’.25 Newspaper readers outside the Genoa area 
only managed to grasp fragments of that tragic episode from the usual sequence of 
reticent articles. In the wake of the tragedy they read that Mussolini had donated 
three million lire to the ‘victims of the raid’ (‘Three million lire and not one 
spoken word’, Colonel Stevens quipped from Radio Londra) and that the king and 
the queen made an unplanned visit to the bombed-out city. Subsequently, the 
military bulletin made readers aware that the enemy raid on Genoa had not 
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claimed any victims but numerous casualties had resulted from ‘the excessive 
crowding at a shelter’s gate’. The death toll was not reported until 27 October, 
without details of the exact cause of the massacre, while a great deal of space was 
given to condemnations of ‘the satisfaction’ expressed in the British press about 
the new wave of attacks on Italy and the carnage in Genoa.
26
  
 The Fascist authorities commended the Italian artillery for repelling enemy 
aircraft and the press were instructed to sing their praises. A cockpit and wheel 
allegedly belonging to a British plane were displayed as war trophies in the 
entrance hall of the Universale, a popular cinema in Genoa, alongside a 
reproduction of a military bulletin alleging that six RAF planes had been shot 
down during the raids on the city. However, it was rumoured that only one enemy 
aircraft had fallen, and not as a result of Italian air defence but because it had 
crashed into another British plane. Such attempts at showing power and 
effectiveness in protecting civilians from the threat of bombing sounded hardly 
credible when set against the reality of life for Italian civilians. On 27 October, for 
instance, the local branch of UNPA had to issue a communiqué warning the public 
that in case alarm sirens were inaudible, approaching enemy aircraft would be 
signalled by military bugle call. Many Genoese wondered about how this would 
be achieved in one of Italy’s largest cities, and about the implications of military 
vehicles driving at full speed in the narrow alleys where most people lived.
27
 
 Pavolini’s press conference on 26 October gives a clear example of how 
far Fascist leaders were from reality. The Minister said that the press should avoid 
thundering against the barbarity of the enemy because Italian planes had also gone 
to bomb Britain in 1940 – apparently reversing MCP’s previous pattern. He 
suggested describing the air raids as an expression of Anglo-American hatred 
towards Italy, explaining (rather optimistically) that such a representation would 
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reinforce ‘the spontaneous reaction’ of the Italian people, and recommending that 
the number of enemy casualties due to effective anti-aircraft defence always be 
reported. Then he embarked on a long and detailed set of instructions and 
‘technical advice’, even requesting that newspapers print detailed maps of 
shelters.
28
 The press tried to translate that kind of directive as best they could. The 
majority of the Italian newspapers reported, for instance, that the royal visit to 
Genoa was greeted with spontaneous and moving feelings of affection, and the 
MCP criticised four newspapers for relegating the visit to ‘the last page without 
adequate prominence, among the lesser news’. Yet three journalists present 
remembered the visit as almost four hours of awkward silence, the king and the 
queen passing along rows of suffering people and waving hands in a vain attempt 
to attract some warmth.
29
 British intelligence went so far as to report that 
‘demonstrations for peace’ were said to have taken place in Genoa.30 In a fit of 
sincerity, Giovanni Ansaldo, normally a cynical propagandist, noted in his diary 
that the illusion that ‘the Anglo-Saxons would discriminate, in carrying out their 
air raids, between the Italians and the Germans, was fading away’.31 As a matter 
of fact, the British were seeking to exploit people’s feelings in Genoa, making 
clear their stance on bombing Italy. The police found a number of British leaflets 
explaining that the air raids against Italian cities were caused by Mussolini’s 
decision to support Hitler: ‘Everyone is serving the German enemy and for that 
reason they will be attacked with all means available to us’.32 
 Despite the press downplaying the role of inefficient air defence in Genoa, 
at the end of October Aldo Vidussoni, the secretary of the PNF, removed the city’s 
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federale, Luigi San Germano. This action provoked a harsh reaction from Roberto 
Farinacci, who wrote to Mussolini protesting that the ousting of the federal 
secretary effectively blamed the party for ineffective defensive organisation.
33
 San 
Germano’s sacking notwithstanding, local authorities continued to face the enemy 
offensive by underplaying the danger. On 4 November, for instance, the prefect of 
Genoa ordered the press not to report incidents in tunnels and thefts in bombed-
out buildings so as not ‘to cause a state of excitement and concern among the 
public’.34 Such an approach ignored the fact that a lack of reliable information led 
to word of mouth conjecture, which in turn depressed morale.  
 The start of the new British offensive against Italian cities coincided with 
the celebration of the Ventennale in October 1942, the twentieth anniversary of 
the Fascist seizure of power, which Mussolini had imagined as an occasion to 
galvanise both party and public opinion. The commemoration was used as a 
smokescreen to divert attention from what was happening in Italian cities at the 
hands of the RAF. At the 26 October press conference, Pavolini instructed editors 
to devote the bulk of their papers’ space to the anniversary for three days, 
enthusiastically stressing that the date was being celebrated for two consecutive 
days on front pages by the German press. He emphasised that comments should 
underline ‘the work done in 20 years of the regime’, the same work, he added 
apparently without irony that ‘revealed itself at its best over the last two years of 
war’. He also argued that articles must insist on the significance of the ceremonies 
held in the cities, especially ‘those put to test by enemy raids’ – as if people in the 
most damaged Italian areas could be distracted, or have their morale boosted, by 
local dignitaries parading in pompous uniforms.  
 The effect of these recommendations was surreal. While people in Genoa, 
Turin and Milan were facing the unprecedented violence of the RAF bombers, 
news readers found a few lines about the raids lost among emphatic headlines and 
long articles on Mussolini’s achievements and his generosity towards Italians, as 
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the Duce had decided to celebrate his 20 years in power with the adoption of 
social provisions to compensate those impoverished by war.
35
 Bottai’s speech, 
broadcast on the evening of 28 October, that should have solemnly sealed a full 
day of celebration, contrasted with the atmosphere of grief and fear in Italian 
homes.
36
 British intelligence overrated the psychological effects of the Ventennale 
campaign, reporting that, ‘the announcement in the press of social measures to 
celebrate the anniversary coincided opportunely with, and effectively swamped, 
the news of the first British raids on Genoa and Turin’.37 But the Germans did not 
make the same mistake and Goebbels prohibited the German press from drawing 
attention in their material on the anniversary to the fact ‘that the 20,000 lire made 
available in Italy by the Fascist regime for social purpose over the past twenty 
years could not even equal the result of one single German Winter Relief 
Campaign’.38 Goebbels’ smug realism did not contaminate the Italian press. 
Genoa, a city stunned by the tragedy at the Galleria delle Grazie, was described 
in the papers as busying itself with writing grateful congratulatory messages to 
Mussolini, a reminder to the British of their  
 
stupid illusion that by bombing our cities they will bend the heart of a people that in the course of 
a millenary history has showed intrepid virility and tenacious steadfastness in the most awkward 
situations, in the hardest trials.
39
  
 
In Milan, local authorities confirmed the March on Rome celebrations despite the 
enormous damage British bombs were inflicting on working-class 
neighbourhoods lacking in defence and public shelters. Informants heard people 
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commenting that the Fascist militia members the party had sent to parade in 
Piazza della Scala should have been working on the outskirts of Milan where fires 
were burning, people still lay buried under the ruins of bombed buildings, young 
and unexperienced avanguardisti guarded unexploded devices, and victims’ 
relatives ‘cursed the enemy less than those responsible for that chaos’.40 Andrea 
Damiano, a journalist working on Corriere della Sera, considered in his diary that 
Milan had been hit in the daylight for the first time since June 1940. ‘The remote 
war’, he wrote, ‘the African war, or Russian, or Balkan, is here now, and it is 
blowing its red-hot breath’.41 Manlio Cancogni, a writer who fought in Greece 
and Albania, recalled that during five days of continual bombing,  
 
News from newspapers and on the wireless was partial, inconsistent and more alarming precisely 
for this reason. It was clear to everybody that we had no defence against the air raids. Entire 
populations were at the mercy of the enemy. It was rumoured that hundreds of people were killed 
and thousands were wounded and made homeless.
42
 
 
Again, the lack of timely and reliable news led to the spread of rumours, 
increasing bewilderment and anxiety among the public.
43
 The confusion in the 
press and the ineffectiveness of their political masters was perceived in Fascist 
circles. Bottai wrote in his diary on 8 November 1942 that the ‘newspapers, 
compelled to regurgitate the usual themes, do not realise that any argument is 
usually reversed in people’s memory’.44  
 In the last months of 1942 the British government continued to receive 
urgent demands from both press and politicians to increase military pressure on 
Mussolini. During a parliamentary debate in the wake of the definitive success of 
the Egyptian campaign, the Labour MP for Seaham tackled the issue with harsh 
words:  
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Some day we shall have to attack Italy. I hope it comes soon. I have welcomed the bombing 
attacks. It has been said that we ought to be careful in our propaganda in relation to Italy, that the 
Italians are a very nice people and, if only we treat them kindly in our propaganda, they will throw 
Mussolini overboard. I am not sure about that. It is much better to treat them as they try to treat us 
– ruthlessly. Nothing could be better than attacking Genoa and destroying it utterly. That it is the 
best form of propaganda, and to the extent that our bombing operations can teach the Italians a 
lesson, all the soon the war will be ended’. 45 
 
Despite the Italian authorities’ attempts to screen civilians from the truth about 
enemy attacks, the fear of imminent air raids spread to areas which had been 
hitherto relatively spared by the RAF. A police informant working in Cagliari, for 
instance, wrote on 17 November that people were convinced that Sardinia would 
soon be bombed and that the government, after two and a half years of war, had 
done nothing to protect them. Mistrust in the Fascist authorities, depression and 
weariness had political consequences, according to the informant: the conviction 
was spreading that the war would never be won and approval of ‘any attempt at 
political change’ was emerging.46  
 The first large-scale air raid on Turin, which the British had been targeting 
since the first days of the war, hit on 18 November 1942 and changed people’s 
experience of bombing: ruins and destruction were no longer restricted to 
industrial areas but apparent throughout the city. The MCP gave the order not to 
print details that ‘might give the enemy any hint of the results of their raids’, but 
this was a pointless instruction as the destruction was so widespread. People were 
fleeing Turin en masse, cycling or even walking. Emanuele Artom, a young 
Jewish intellectual, remembered in his diary that immediately after the enemy 
planes had gone, he saw looters taking advantage of the smashed windows and 
soldiers running to guard the shops. He observed that during alarms the crowd 
seemed torn between contradictory feelings: they were scared, but they also hoped 
for a ‘huge blow’. The questore of Turin wrote in his weekly report to Rome on 2 
December that some of the city’s most important factories had been hit and that, 
‘the few workers who turned up did not produce even half of the usual output’. He 
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summarised the damage, noting that the enemy had almost completely achieved 
its aim of paralysing war production. 
47
  
 Mussolini was aware of the blows that the enemy was inflicting on 
economic infrastructure and morale by increasing its bombing attacks on major 
Italian cities. He reacted as usual by blaming the Italians, who were guilty of not 
being the fiery race he had dreamt of for 20 years. Bottai recalled that on 21 
November the Duce entered the council of ministers with an ashen face and 
lambasted ‘those who confronted with any difficulty blathered that there was 
nothing to be done’. Mussolini drew a despairing comparison between his 
compatriots and the enemy: ‘If the Russians had shared this opinion, instead of 
defending their city street by street, house by house, latrine by latrine, Stalingrad 
would have never resisted’. Apart from the increasingly recurrent pseudo-
anthropological tirade, the Duce told his ministers that serious damage had been 
inflicted to factories and admitted to having asked Hitler for anti-aircraft guns.
48
 
In December British bombs hit Milan heavily. Again, confidential sources noticed 
that people did not curse the enemy airmen but directed their anger against 
Fascism, which was considered ‘solely responsible for this situation’. It was also 
reported that militia members did not react when they heard offensive remarks 
against Mussolini in the streets, perhaps because they feared ‘explosions of anger 
among the public’.49 Writing from Milan on 5 December, a police informant 
noted that people wondered why the Duce had not come to visit Milan and, 
echoing the rumours about the cold reception given to the royal couple in Genoa, 
speculated that the authorities feared ‘hostile demonstrations’.50 Moreover, there 
were reports of breaches of discipline in factories during alarms. In November the 
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questura informed Rome that at the Breda plant in Sesto San Giovanni around 
400 workers (out of 2,000) deserted the workplace when they heard the sirens. Six 
weeks later, groups of workers at the Breda, Alfa Romeo, Marelli and Isotta 
Fraschini plants briefly downed tools to protest at delayed payment of their 
wages.
51
 
 In Southern Italy, especially in Naples, American aircraft had superseded 
the RAF in people’s memories. On 4 December the US air force struck, hitting the 
port and industrial areas in Naples, whose closeness to the city centre caused 
hundreds of civilian casualties. Taking off from Egyptian bases, 27 bombers 
escaped radar and look-out points, unassailed by Italian fighters or artillery. 
Inadequate defence again caused heavy casualties, as overcrowding and 
suffocation killed 286 people at the Porta San Gennaro shelter. People began to 
think of the Americans as a worse enemy than the British and to foresee more 
damage and death.
52
  
 At the end of the year, following the new turn the war had taken, the MCP 
sought to develop a more articulate strategy – which was, nonetheless, destined to 
have negligible effect on Italians. Pavolini again asked newspapers to abandon the 
usual pattern of restricting themselves to accusing the enemy of barbarity, moving 
instead to a ‘general critique’ of responsibility for the air war. ‘Always 
remember’, he told the press representatives on 11 December, 
 
the history of bombing in this war, that is that the British were the first to bomb towns and 
civilians and the German attack on London was a large-scale retaliation. It is historically 
established that the first air raids were the RAF attacks on the German cities and people. Then the 
German bombing followed. So, without indulging in pious and lamenting tones, one must always 
bear in mind that the first initiative and the first responsibility are those of the British.
53
    
 
Yet despite Pavolini’s exhortation, propaganda did not stop its usual rigmarole 
about the barbarous enemy. Andrea Damiano, on seeing walls in Milan covered 
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with posters of an enemy bomber leaving a trail of blood-red smoke and a caption 
reading, ‘Why we must hate the enemy’, noted in his diary:  
 
They want to rouse hatred taking the enemy bombing as its starting point. This is a huge 
psychological mistake, as enjoining hatred by means of posters on street corners is tantamount to 
conceding that, in fact, there is no hatred. Actually, any falling British bomb does not cause 
revulsion against those who drop it so much as against those who led us to suffer the blows.
54
 
 
In the last few months of 1942 even satirical magazines, which struggled to 
preserve an autonomous style for portraying the enemy, could not refrain from 
falling in with the prescribed rhetorical stereotype, turning to particularly trite or 
coarse jokes. The Roman magazine Marc’Aurelio, for example, carried verses 
about the ‘British heroes’: ‘Cynical and cruel deeds/Are their pride/They stifle 
women and toddlers/While lecturing the world on civilisation’.55 Gioacchino 
Polizzi, a popular illustrator working under the pseudonym ‘Attalo’, drew a scene 
depicting an English lady meeting Winston Churchill in a park and asking him 
whether he preferred fair- or dark-haired children. ‘I prefer them dead’, is the 
British prime minister’s response.56 When not focused on searching for new 
adjectives to describe the ruthlessness of the enemy, even the mainstream 
newspapers sought to enliven their pages with lighter, but self-defeating, material. 
For example, La Stampa published a poem on life in the shelters on 11 November: 
  
‘Long live the shelter/Long live a gathering/Distinctive of new times/These dynamic modern 
wars,/Which make us mourn caverns and caves/They make people less demanding:/Long live the 
shelter/A cosy place’.57 
  
One constant theme in Italian propaganda became the reproduction of foreign 
(and generally pro-Axis) media reports on the supposed firmness of morale in 
Italy. Pavolini seemed to have a penchant for the Scandinavian press: on 8 
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December, for instance, he referred to an article in Aftonbladet, a Swedish pro-
German tabloid, devoted to the Italian internal situation that stated there was no 
sign of the country giving in. Editors were told to report that such ‘truthful voices’ 
should be set against Anglo-American propaganda, which based its ‘ridiculous 
rumours’ on ‘apocryphal hints fabricated hundreds of kilometres away’.58 
Similarly, Stampa Sera reported the correspondence of another Swedish daily, 
Svenska Dagbladet, two weeks later, which claimed that in spite of the Allied 
landing in Africa, the home front in Italy was strengthened, the PNF was crucial in 
helping civilians and evacuation from big cities was not an indication of fear but a 
collective display of solidarity.
59
 Another ploy was to single out specific speeches 
by British politicians or pundits, generally those who argued for the pressure on 
Italy to be intensified or those who were considered to be cautious in assessing 
Italy’s collapse of morale. On 10 December 1942, for instance, the Italian press 
was instructed to emphasise a recent statement by Lord Cranborne, the British war 
secretary, who had said there was no breach in Italian morale. According to 
Pavolini, that statement was ‘an official admission of Churchill’s glaring blunder 
and of the idiocies of enemy propaganda’. Newspapers complied, commenting 
that Cranborne’s words made conspicuous Churchill’s failure to bring about a 
crisis in Italian morale.
60
  
 British analysis of the Italian situation did not foresee Mussolini’s internal 
collapse. According to a new intelligence report received by the war cabinet, the 
only way to break down morale in Italy was by frightening people ‘more than the 
Fascist police did’. The heavy raids on the northern towns had caused great 
material destruction; large-scale evacuation and ‘general dissatisfaction’, resulting 
in ‘some anti-Fascist demonstrations’, had been caused by inadequate defence and 
ARP measures. Also morale in the Italian air force was said to be weakened by 
events on the home front and the realisation that Italy’s defences had been 
neglected. All these factors were seriously affecting morale in Italy, war 
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weariness had increased and the desire for peace was ‘stronger than ever’. But 
there had been ‘no large-scale disorders, and so long as fears of repression is 
stronger of fear of the RAF and of the extension of military operations to Italy, it is 
unlikely that the people will be ripe for seditious movements’.61   
 
5.4 The Debacle of Evacuation 
Mussolini decided to go public with the war situation after a long silence at the 
end of 1942, while many Italian cities were taking stock of damage and rumours 
were spreading about his health.  On 2 December he made a speech to the Camera 
dei fasci e delle corporazioni which was intended to answer British propaganda 
(Churchill had given a powerful radio address the previous Sunday), to reassure 
the Germans that he was still in control and most of all to arouse the country, in 
particular  those elements in the regime who were demotivated in his view, and 
resigned to losing the war.  He gave some figures and details about the 
consequences of the recent enemy bombing, mainly to show that the British had 
damaged areas with no military or industrial objectives. Referring openly to the 
need of fighting a war in which there was no longer a division between the front 
and civilians, Mussolini pretended that he retained confidence in the character of 
his people. While in private or in closed circles he was given to inveighing against 
the weakness of his compatriots, he stated before the members of the House that 
he refused to believe the Italian people were ‘of a frailer temper than the British or 
the Russians’. With one eye on the enemy’s ambition of hastening Italy’s internal 
collapse, the Duce conceded that it was not feasible ‘to ask for unending displays 
of enthusiasm’, but he boasted that no act of sabotage or demonstration against 
the war had been carried out.
62
  
 From the Duce’s words and the echo they received in the Italian press, 
London observed with satisfaction that ‘the elaborate refutation’ of British 
assertions suggested that ‘views obtained from British sources – especially 
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through the radio – have been circulating very widely in Italy’.63 The speech was 
massively inflated by the Italian media, but police reports of public reactions 
revealed almost immediately that the propaganda effort was fruitless in terms of 
boosting civilians’ morale. The statistical section of the address was disbelieved, 
primarily in the worst damaged cities where people had a first-hand knowledge of 
the facts. Carlo Chevallard, for instance, in his diary contrasted the official 
version with what he was witnessing in Turin, where for 20 days the registry 
office had been issuing ‘endless lists’ of dead, ‘whole families had disappeared’ 
and ‘groups of people were still buried in three shelters’.64 From Mantua a police 
informant reported that the ‘rough realism’ of the Duce’s speech, far from being a 
boost for morale, had increased pessimism and despair among citizens.
65
    
 Mussolini had boasted about alerting Italians early in the war that it was 
necessary to leave cities exposed to the threat of enemy air raids. In response, 
people were reported as complaining that since the first warning the regime had 
done almost nothing to promote and organise evacuation, that Italian provinces 
had not enough space to house evacuees and that public transport was not 
sufficient for workers to commute. Many were particularly enraged at Mussolini’s 
statement that ‘hundreds of millions’ were being spent building anti-aircraft 
shelters, they suspected that officials and profiteers had made large gains. It was 
rumoured, for instance, that in Rome the authorities had strangely contracted out 
the shelters’ construction not to builders but to a trader in glassware. Informants 
also reported sharp criticism of Mussolini’s assertion that it was impossible to 
wage war without hating the enemy: ‘Only now do they realise that, despite the 
night talks of Ansaldo, Appelius and Alessi, the Italian people do not hate the 
British?’ The OVRA agent who gathered this information summarised by writing, 
‘the hatred for the regime has replaced the hatred for the enemy’.66          
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 Dealing with evacuation was complicated for the MCP and the press, since 
they had to keep people calm and give the impression that the situation was under 
control, although public awareness of the government’s and party’s organisational 
faults was by now ubiquitous. Newspapers were given a few directives, which 
illustrated the habitual intent of avoiding the uncontrolled diffusion of information 
and conveying the illusion of a righteous and supportive society: in order to 
publish any material that did not come from the Ministry or the Party, they had to 
obtain the prefect’s approval. They were forbidden from discussing profiteering at 
the expense of evacuees looking for housing, transportation or help in repairs, 
with the excuse that the high prices requested by landlords or transporters was due 
‘to unconsidered offers from wealthy people’. Moreover, they must not mention 
compulsory evacuation.
67
  
 Sometimes readers, though aware that their letters would never be 
published, wrote to newspapers hoping that the problems they raised might be 
brought to the authorities’ attention. For example, the editor of Il Messaggero, 
Fausto Boninsegni, informed Pavolini’s chief of staff that the paper had received 
many letters from Rome dealing with a report it had published a few days earlier 
about evacuation. At this stage of war the capital and the surrounding areas were 
deemed relatively immune from the enemy air threat, and Italians from dangerous 
northern and southern cities sought shelter there. Yet Boninsegni forwarded one 
of them that he considered particularly telling, as it summarised all the aspects of 
the evacuation problems that the public were experiencing. The anonymous 
correspondent agreed with the government’s intention to favour departure to the 
neighbouring countryside, but he suggested that at least five problems must be 
dealt with immediately: the number of commuter trains was insufficient; 
restrictions on bus and trolleybus traffic were a major hindrance to displacement; 
weekly and monthly tickets for public transport were too expensive; ration cards 
were only valid in a person’s place of residence; and villages where people sought 
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refuge levied a tax on visitors as if they were tourists. None of these suggestions – 
apart from the visitor’s tax, on which the government tried to persuade local 
authorities – was taken into consideration.68                 
 Mussolini was aware that the Fascist hierarchy, which ought to have been 
the cornerstone of mobilisation, was busier fighting internal feuds than working 
for the party’s contribution to the war effort.69 After his speech to the Camera dei 
Fasci he addressed the Fascist directorate in the afternoon of 2 December 
explaining that the party had ‘to bet on people’s morale in order to prevent it from 
being poisoned’ and that ‘this mixing of regions, provinces, classes will be 
beneficial to our unity’. The Duce observed that evacuees ought to be regarded in 
the same way as refugees during the Great War and should ‘be supported with 
total, open, fraternal solidarity’. The best way to help them, he added, was ‘to 
keep red tape to the minimum’.70 On 10 December the Party sent Mussolini an 
account of its efforts on the home front, asking the MCP to emphasise its activities 
in the press.
71
 Actually, newspapers routinely reported this, always finding 
pretexts to praise the militia members maintaining discipline during alarms, 
gruppi rionali giving shelter to homeless people and branches of the Gioventù 
italiana del littorio distributing ‘hot and hearty meals’ to bombed-out families. By 
requesting greater attention from newspapers, the Party hierarchies wanted to 
substantiate the view that their efforts were being underrated and sought to avoid 
rebuke from the Duce. Yet the replacement of the federali of Genoa, Milan and 
Taranto in the wake of the British raids in October showed that Mussolini did not 
consider the Party structures to be beyond reproach.
72
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 Pavolini immediately fulfilled the Party’s wish by briefing editors to 
illustrate in detail the work of Fascist organisations in order ‘to give our camerati 
legitimate satisfaction’. While Mussolini had suggested drawing a pedagogic 
analogy with the contribution of Italian civilians in the Great War, the Minister of 
Propaganda told journalists that they could compare ‘the atmosphere of vivid 
national solidarity‘ apparent in bombed cities and among evacuees with the 
generous and patriotic mood of the Ethiopian war, when Italian women offered 
their wedding rings to the fatherland. Pavolini reiterated his earlier instruction that 
editors must agree any news on evacuation with prefects and party authorities.
73
 
Yet the members of the press were at their wits’ end as a result of the lack of clear 
and precise direction to civilians about evacuation from the top, while police 
related that huge, startled crowds were spontaneously leaving their cities. Some 
reports attributed the exodus to the Radio Londra announcement of imminent air 
raids, or to deliberate rumours spread by unscrupulous profiteers. According to 
other information, it was the Duce’s speech to the Chamber of Corporations that 
scared people. All sources unanimously reported that people were leaving in 
disorderly and unruly fashion.
74
  
 In spite of the propaganda insistence of an atmosphere of generosity and 
unselfishness on the home front, panic and greed ruled everywhere. In Milan, 
‘sharks came out and transport prices went sky-high’, Andrea Damiano 
commented in his diary, adding three weeks later that, ‘people crammed onto 
buses and tramcars show an obtuse and viperish wickedness’.75 Police related that 
people who did not have enough money were forced to stay behind because, as 
had happened in the first wave of spontaneous evacuation in June 1940, only 
wealthy people could afford transport and inflated accommodation costs.
76
 Even 
the satirical press adopted paternalistic tones, portraying an idyllic image of a 
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country where the war effort was transcending the social divide.
77
 At the end of 
1942 the government had to issue a directive underlining that employees were not 
allowed to desert the workplace and preventing public officers from leaving the 
most damaged cities. The MCP was told to circulate this warning widely, 
emphasising that transgressors would be punished under the harsh rules on civil 
mobilisation that came into force when Italy entered the war.
78
          
  
5.5 Radio, Cinema and Relics from the Past  
The harder the Allies hit Italy, the more the media was trapped in the paralysing 
consequences of an internal struggle in the regime’s hierarchy. In November 1942 
Pavolini submitted to Mussolini a list of broadcasters for the programme 
Commento ai fatti del giorno, primarily to get the Duce’s approval for his 
intention to retain Mario Appelius, whose thundering speeches were deeply 
controversial even in Italy. According to the minister, the journalist was ‘one of 
the most effective commentators, especially for common people’ and the criticism 
he received ‘came from defeatists who would be happy to reduce us to silence or 
to hesitant and anodyne tones’.79 Pavolini got his way with Mussolini, but his 
decision to stand by Appelius quickly led to open disapproval even from friendly 
quarters – for example, the MCP had to punish the magazine Bertoldo for carrying 
an attack on the EIAR’s most infamous speaker. The editor of the satirical 
magazine, Giovanni Mosca wrote in response to a letter from the theatre critic 
Gilberto Loverso, that what was needed was 
 
a propaganda setting forth the plain facts, even commenting on them, though not with the aim of 
gilding or inflating them, but in order to make clear their meaning and importance to all, to steer 
ideas, to strengthen feelings, to put misfits and doubters back in their place.   
 
Mosca took the chance to outline an agenda for the younger and less 
compromised sections of the Italian press: 
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Even if as recently as yesterday we managed to endure rhetoric, today we cannot stand it anymore. 
And if yesterday we thought we could fight it by humorously mocking it, now we no longer have 
hope and we deem it necessary to speak seriously, without lecturing, shouting, waving arms.
80
 
 
Pavolini ordered the seizure of the issue of Bertoldo that dared to call for a change 
in war propaganda. The reason he gave was the umpteenth example of the 
authoritarian routine: Bertoldo’s journalists were showing ‘a limited sense of 
political opportuneness’, giving the enemy ‘a dreadful weapon’ to present Italy as 
‘a country in crisis, under threat from internal division and differences in public 
opinion’.81 The Minister’s censure echoed the reproval of the Fascist youth 
organizations’ press, which denounced the bureaucratisation of the regime and 
shared with Bottai’s cultural newspaper Primato a criticism of the rhetoric and the 
pompous tones still adopted by the Italian media during that phase of the war.
82
   
 New instructions often contradicted previous ones from MCP. In January 
1943 the Ministry dressed down some newspapers which had on their own 
initiative written in flattering language about the fighters and the anti-aircraft 
artillery engaged in defending Naples. Censors explained that such deeds could be 
talked about only when the Ministry issued reports or unofficial notes through the 
Stefani agency. That line seemed devoid of any logic and could be explained only 
through MCP’s anxiety that any autonomous press decisions might cause 
unmanageable consequenced in the public domain. For that reason, as a rule 
newspapers were prevented from making unauthorised reports and from 
publishing readers’ letters. For example, some dailies calling for an increase in 
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food rations for people living in bombed areas earned a stern rebuke.
83
 Articles 
reporting signs of normality in the ordinary life of civilians were instead welcome. 
When the Minister for National Education asked the press to cover the reopening 
of schools in the cities targeted by the enemy raids on 16 February 1943, Celso 
Luciano, Pavolini’s chief of staff, was happy to oblige.84 But when Roman dailies 
observed that cinemas were dangerously overcrowded, the MCP ordered them to 
stop.
85
 Critics were told not to talk of a cinema crisis, because in one year theatre 
revenues had risen 3 percent, notwithstanding the increased enemy attacks against 
inhabited areas.
86
 In this particular case, Pavolini had some reason for wishing 
people to continue to visit the cinema: in this phase of the Fascist war some films 
had a greater impact on the public than any other form of propaganda, though 
never achieving the enormous popularity of German films like Die grosse Liebe 
(The Great Love), which was seen by 27 millions people. The romantic plot - a 
love story between a young pilot fighter and a singer who meet during an air raid 
warning - presented a realistic account of everyday life on the home front 
explicitly portraying air raids as a test for civilians.
87
 
 Nothing similar was attempted by filmakers in Italy, but since the second 
half of 1942, when the reality of total war worried almost all Italians, feature films 
began to include scenes of the ongoing air war and of life under bombing. In 
Gente dell’aria, for instance, the Regia Aeronautica airmen were portrayed as 
good, humane and valiant soldiers. The film - directed by Esodo Pratelli and 
cowritten by Bruno Mussolini, the Duce’s son who had been captain in the Regia 
Aeronautica and died in 1941 in the crash of his plane near Pisa - was first shown 
on 24 March 1942 and in three months made more than 5 million lire at the box 
office.
88
 The film Bengasi, directed by Augusto Genina and set in Tripolitania 
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during the British siege and occupation of the African-Italian city in early 1941, 
showed instead people in shelters inveighing against the British for their 
cowardice in targeting civilians and deliberately causing the death of children. 
Bengasi came out on 5 September 1942, when Italy no longer had colonies, and in 
the same month won the Coppa Mussolini at the Venice cinema festival. It earned 
more than 16 million lire in three months, and Pavolini exhorted the critics to 
emphasise its ‘most powerful political value’, explaining that ‘the greatest 
prominence must be given to this film’, which should be considered not only as a 
work of art, but ‘as a real act of politics and propaganda’. Il Giornale d’Italia’s 
critic, Fabrizio Sarazani, complied enthusiastically with the Minister’s will, 
writing that Bengasi was ‘a vivid testimony’ showing the Italian people (though 
obviously not the inferior Africans, who were in the same predicament as their 
rulers) bearing ‘their martyrdom with the most fiery nobility’ and ‘the  blind and 
sterile anger of the enemy mob, carried away by a gratuitous and reckless hatred’. 
However, the propagandistic content of most film reviews could not hamper the 
immediacy and identification that the visual medium offered viewers.
89
        
 Less appealing in balancing art and propaganda were the performances of 
Futurist artists during the last phase of the Fascist war. Indeed aeropittura and 
aeropoesia – which in the years before and immediately after the Great War were 
powerful artistic vehicles for the myth of Italian air power – began to lose their 
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grip on the public following the first Fascist imperialist ventures in Africa, Spain 
and Albania. Paintings and poems concentrated on the exaltation of war, military 
heroism and ultimately on the Duce’s leadership virtues.90 When the war became 
a concrete experience in their lives, most Italians became more susceptible to 
magniloquent propaganda and intolerance of such bombast increased even among 
Fascist ranks. Rosario Bentivegna, then a student in Rome who was to become 
one of the leaders of the anti-Fascist movement in the capital, remembered in his 
memoirs that in 1941 the GUF to which he belonged demonstrated against a group 
of Futurist poets who met in Piazza Venezia, near Mussolini’s office. ‘Because of 
our uniforms they did not dare to react and begged us to leave them in peace’, he 
wrote.
91
  
 For two years the EIAR’s executives Raoul Chiodelli and Ettore Bernabei 
begged the MCP to end programmes in which Marinetti and his favourites 
declaimed the ‘aero-poetic beauty of mechanised war’, explaining that incensed 
listeners  phoned to protest, verbally abusing the innocent girls on the 
switchboard. Pavolini tried in vain to contain Marinetti, but the poet was under 
Mussolini’s direct protection.92 Even Piero Bellanova, Marinetti’s personal 
doctor, wrote Futurist poems, a collection of which, Bombardata Napoli canta 
(‘Naples sings while it is bombed’), came out in 1943 when the city was suffering 
terribly under enemy air raids.
93
 Yet, the Duce was unfailingly supportive of 
Marinetti and his movement, even during the most difficult months of the war. In 
August 1942, for example, he endorsed the establishment in Rome of a ‘Galleria 
nazionale di arte futurista e aeropittura di guerra’ which was to show 600 works.94    
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5.6 Exit Pavolini 
On 5 February 1943 Mussolini reorganised his government, dismissing nine out 
of 12 ministers including political heavyweights like Bottai, Ciano and Grandi.
95
 
Pavolini was replaced as Minister of Popular Culture by Gaetano Polverelli, a 
journalist turned politician who had briefly led Mussolini’s press office at the 
beginning of the 1930s.
96
 Polverelli continued the practice of secret press 
conferences and the prescription of keeping to a minimum reports on crimes, 
accidents and violent deaths. On 3 March he opened his first meeting with 
newspaper editors by paying his respects to the camerati who ‘were keeping their 
posts in spite of the risks and damage of air attacks’ in bombed-out cities.97 
Polverelli had to contend with an enemy propaganda that spared no effort in 
targeting the Italians. In the first eight months of the year the US, which had been 
bombing Italy from North African bases since December 1942, dropped 64 
million leaflets, which its Psychological Warfare Branch believed would 
complement bombs in increasing opposition to Mussolini, Germany and the war. 
The MCP tried to counter this challenge in the spring by exploiting rumours 
recorded a few months earlier, when authorities had preferred to suppress them 
for fear that they would increase apprehension among civilians.
98
 In June 1942, 
for instance, the postal censors intercepted a letter directed to a member of the 
blackshirts telling him about wounds sustained by a child he knew: 
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Those damned British were not satisfied with bombing our cities, but what’s more they used 
poisoned bombs. As it happened, because of intervening gangrene, they had to amputate his leg. 
Otherwise he would have suffered just a small injury.
99
 
 
As incidents provoked by unexploded devices occurred frequently in wartime 
(often Italian boys looked for bomb splinters to sell), it is plausible to infer that 
the censored letter contained a partial truth and that rumours transforming 
accidents into attacks from treacherous and insidious weapons were spread as part 
of a propaganda effort to stain the image of the enemy’s air power.100 At the end 
of 1942 stories began to circulate about American planes dropping explosive pens 
as a lethal lure for children, but the deluge of such news in the press started only 
some months later. La Stampa wrote that, ‘this new form of barbarous snare’ 
showed once more ‘the evil of the enemy who aims at civilians, and in particular 
at young people and children’. When Il Messaggero reported that two children in 
Campania had been wounded after picking up an explosive fountain pen, the 
Vatican’s undersecretary of state, Domenico Tardini, wrote to the archbishop of 
Naples asking for information. Cardinal Alessio Ascalesi made inquiries and 
replied that the children had been wounded not by pens that fell from the sky but 
by handling a machine-gun bullet their father had found in the countryside.
101
  
 In February, the MCP still recommended that editors pay attention to the 
wider psychological consequences of printing ‘certain photographs’, but in May, 
for the first time since June 1940, pictures of injured Italian children began to 
appear in newspapers. The Corriere della Sera put on its front page an image of 
six children sitting on a hospital bed after being wounded in an enemy raid on 
Grosseto and crudely described the effects of an attack on Reggio Calabria. The 
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latter resulted in nuns praying in the church of a nursery school that had been 
‘torn to pieces’, while 33 ‘innocent children’ living in an orphanage ‘had been 
‘ripped apart’.102 On 2 May, La Stampa carried on its front page two photographs 
of Francesco Romeo, a five-year-old child from Sant’Alessio in Aspromonte in 
Calabria, whose hand, according to the captions, ‘had been horribly mutilated by 
an explosive pencil dropped by American planes’. The previous day the MCP had 
required editors ‘to develop very vividly’ the story of the explosive devices, ‘by 
avoiding pious tones and pointing to the barbarity and cowardice of the 
aggressors’. Publication of the photograph showing the injured child over two 
consecutive days was ‘obligatory’. L’Illustrazione Italiana carried a cover 
showing the mutilated hand of a child with a caption blaming the United States, 
describing their history as ‘a story of barbarity’ and observing that, ‘all targets are 
alike for the cynical killers sent by Roosevelt’.103 Some newspapers went beyond 
ministerial instructions. The daily Il Tevere, for instance, demanded  retaliation in 
the shape of the execution of some American airmen who had parachuted after 
their four-engined aircraft was shot down, and argued that prisoners of war be 
used to dispose of unexploded bombs or act as human shields in the bombed-out 
cities.
104
  
 On 6 May the Italian Service of the BBC reported RAF command’s 
refutation of the Italian allegations. A senior RAF officer was quoted as saying 
that, ‘every effort had been made to trace any possible cause of such suggestions, 
but without success’ and that, ‘the RAF’s object in their bombing raids was to 
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smash factories, not maim children’. The Times, giving perhaps the Italian reports 
too much credit, went so far as to look for rational explanations, reporting on an 
announcement from Danish radio that a number of pencils believed to have been 
dropped by RAF aircraft passing over Denmark had been found on the east coast of 
Jutland and were being examined at an army laboratory in Copenhagen. The 
London daily concluded by quoting a Danish news report that, ‘the objects found 
had been proved by examination to be ordinary pencils containing no 
explosives’.105      
 The Italian propaganda expedient received mixed reactions among the 
public. On 3 May, for example, Alba Bedogni, a teacher at the primary school in 
Castelnovo ne’ Monti in the northern Emilia region, recorded in her class register 
that after showing her pupils the picture of Francesco Romeo, they felt ‘horror and 
indignation against the barbarous enemy aviators’. Three days later she stressed 
the episode, warning the children that enemy planes carried new devices ‘against 
which they had to defend themselves: incendiary badges, explosive balloons, 
pencils and fountain pens’. As other entries in her papers show, Alba Bedogni was 
a committed Fascist who was very diligent in repeating the official mantra to her 
class, but in the registers of her colleagues who were less governed by Fascist 
discipline, there was no hint of the Francesco Romeo story.
106
 
In some cases the news fed the public imagination. Postal censors blocked a letter 
from Rome claiming that the Americans had dropped ‘an unbelievable amount of 
fountain pens, pencils, lip liners, small tins and lots of other knick-knacks 
containing explosive in order to kill children’. According to the author, the enemy 
had also dropped ‘poisoned hams’ on Ostia, near Rome.107 Enrico Castelli, an 
academic in Rome, recorded in his diary that his father-in-law had found an 
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explosive fountain pen at the zoo, adding two days later that it was rumoured that, 
‘the explosive pens and poisoned sweets found after the last raids have been 
spread by the Germans and the Fascists in order to foment hatred against the 
British’.108 Others insinuated that subversive and anti-Fascist activists were the 
true perpetrators.
109
 Such creative rumours must have fueled the propaganda 
activities; over subsequent days the press reported that, ‘liberators’ had widened 
the range of their booby traps, dropping cigars, torches, penknives, brilliantine 
boxes and cough drops. ‘As you can see’, La Stampa commented, ‘no category of 
citizens, no class of people has been neglected by the gangsters of the air’.110                    
 Meanwhile, a new U-turn appalled the newsrooms when the MCP abruptly 
instructed the media on 17 May that the furore about the use of explosive devices 
must stop. Nevertheless, the articles continued to be published; La Stampa went 
as far as to reprint the story of Francesco Romeo as if it were fresh news. Satirical 
magazines joined in, depicting the Statue of Liberty holding explosive fountain 
pens.
111
 Over the course of a few weeks the story ran out of steam, although 
leading personalities such as Bottai and the industrialist Alberto Pirelli recorded in 
their diaries that the Vatican was still taking steps to ascertain the facts about the 
issue.
112
 
 As the surreal propaganda continued, the Italian authorities were facing 
serious challenges. The evacuation which in Mussolini’s expectation should have 
worked miraculously despite the government’s delays and indecision was turning 
out to be one of the major failures of the Fascist regime. The media reflected this 
uncertainty - focusing its attention on what the party boasted it was doing for 
evacuees - at least until the end of March 1943, when the Ministry of Interior told 
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prefects in the provinces that lack of transport and food, increased health risks, 
overcrowding and workers forced to stay behind made further evacuation 
unfeasible. Prefects were told to persuade people to stay put and, since the 
ongoing propaganda was based on calls for sacrifice and civic responsibility, to 
make this credible by providing people with material help.
113
 
 In the first months of 1943 Italy was rocked by increased air raids, mostly 
conducted by the Americans, who flew higher than the British and bombed less 
accurately. By March 122,000 buildings had been destroyed.
114
 Nevertheless, the 
press insisted on treading its well-worn route, praising episodes and selected 
people to exemplify Fascist virtues. The MCP persevered in pointing to the need 
for underlining the cowardly, barbarous and criminal behaviour of the Anglo-
American bombers and lamented that the press ‘lacked spirit’.115 Yet in May 
newspapers began to carry articles showing unprecedented human interest in 
stories from bombed areas. As ever, enemies were evil and victims were innocent, 
but suffering became more real, with unrestrained descriptions (and images) of 
harrowing scenes.
116
 In an effort to represent victims’ misfortune, photography 
and cinematography were used to an extent unknown thus far in the war: in 
Palermo, the figlio della lupa (young Fascist) Antonino Calì, seeing one of his ten 
brothers killed by British machine-gun fire, asked for a gun to shoot at the enemy 
aircraft; another bandaged child, Gino Carli, badly injured by American planes in 
Grosseto on Easter Monday; a brave nun in Livorno putting herself at risk to 
secure the sacrament after taking the children in her nursery class to a safe 
shelter.
117
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 The authorities feared that discipline and commitment were fading in the 
newsrooms and that many journalists were already looking for ways to preserve 
their jobs in case of changes in government or military defeat. Polverelli expected 
the press to hold firm and required both editors and senior writers to be committed 
to this task to the extent of signing their articles.
118
 The order that editorial 
comments and political articles be signed ‘primarily for moral reasons’ was 
repeated four times in June and July. The last instructions, on 6 July, specified 
that they were also directed at journalists and contributors who were not members 
of the PNF.
119
 War reports from the European, African and Russian fronts were 
always signed by special correspondents unless they were the result of an editorial 
assemblage of news agencies’ reports. The increase of signed reports in the press 
about the enemy attacks on Italian cities in the last three months before 
Mussolini’s removal from power made newspapers’ representation of the home 
front slightly more direct than the bureaucratic and scrupulous transcription of 
repetitive MCP instruction. La Stampa sent Attilio Crepas to Naples, Mario Bassi 
to Livorno, Pier Angelo Soldini to Sicily
120
. The Corriere della Sera fielded 
Virgilio Lilli and Anselmo Bucci.
121
 Dino Buzzati, who covered the Regia Marina 
during the war, was detailed to report on ‘unlawful’ British behaviour towards 
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Italian hospital ships.
122
 These articles, which showed varying levels of personal 
identification with the Fascist war, were not particularly original and very rarely 
truthful, but they did reveal the belated intention to humanise reporting from the 
home front.  
 
5.7 Bombing Rome 
The American air raid on Rome on the night of 19 July was the last chapter of a 
story in the war of words between Britain and Italy that had begun at least two 
years before. At the time of Mussolini’s invasion of Greece, journalists and 
politicians in London argued that if the Fascists ever violated Athens, reprisal 
should be directed against Rome. The same argument was put forward when the 
Regia Aeronautica bombed Malta and when the Italians reached Egypt, 
threatening Cairo. In the wake of Mussolini’s declaration of war, the Vatican 
enquired about British intentions; London made assurances that the Vatican 
would be respected, but retained freedom of action regarding the city of Rome. 
During 1940 the Pope and his aides feared that a British retaliation against Italy in 
reaction  to Mussolini’s boast of helping the Luftwaffe during the Blitz could 
accidentally hit the Vatican area, and requested that Rome be spared on account of 
its ‘very special situation’.123 
 Both public opinion and politicians in Britain urged the authorities not to 
give assurances of Rome’s immunity. On 7 November 1940 the Under-Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, Richard Austen Butler, when asked in parliament if 
the government intended to treat Rome as an open city free from aerial 
bombardment, replied that note had been taken of Italy’s statement on its 
participation in the bombing of London and that the latter ‘must accordingly 
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reserve full liberty of action in regard to Rome’.124 Newspaper readers also joined 
in demands for a firm stance against Mussolini.
125
 Once it was clear that the 
Italian expedition in British skies was no more than a pathetic, unsuccessful 
publicity stunt, threats against the Italian capital began to be used in response to 
the Italian raids on Malta (where slogans reading ‘bomb Rome’ appeared on the 
walls of wrecked buildings) and as a deterrent to protect Athens and Cairo from 
the Axis. While making clear that ‘the greatest care’ would be taken not to the 
bomb the Vatican City, Churchill’s government also wanted to pre-empt the 
enemy, warning that it was aware of ‘an Italian squadron’ being held ready in 
Rome ‘to drop captured British bombs upon the Vatican City should a British raid 
take place’.126       
 It was thus clear from the first year of war that the bombing of Rome was 
to become a major propaganda battle. The MCP ordered newspapers to reply to 
Churchill’s warning, commenting that it was ‘the alibi of a specialist in nefarious 
schemes’.127 Mussolini had a complex relationship with Rome and always wanted 
to portray himself as an outsider in the capital city. He was interested in Rome’s 
historical role as an imperial centre irradiating geopolitical and cultural power, but 
was less keen on Rome as a provincial capital, the seat of the petty bourgeois 
backbone of an eternal bureaucracy. During wartime, the fact that Romans kept 
living as normal got on the Duce’s nerves and he ordered that anytime there was 
an alarm in Naples, sirens must also be sounded and artillery guns fired in 
Rome.
128
  
 Mussolini was nonetheless prepared to take advantage of the city’s special 
status when it became clear at the end of 1942 that as the British intended to 
increase pressure on the regime, the battle of words was no longer effective and 
that Rome had entered the bombers’ sights. Calls intensified in the British 
parliament for a lethal blow against Italy that targeted its political centre and 
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Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had to state that there was no agreement ‘as to 
the avoidance of bombing certain towns and cities’.129 The MCP decided that the 
Italian press should play down statements from both British MPs and President 
Roosevelt. It also ordered that no hint be made about the possibility of evacuating 
Rome as a result of the Vatican’s diplomatic activity.130  
 The British officially denied making any approach, yet it was said that 
they would spare Rome if Italian government and military commands left and 
arms production based in the capital was shut down. Mussolini never considered 
such an option.
131
 In spring 1943, the Duce’s resolve in continuing to resist enemy 
pressure reached its peak, as did the hostility of the Italian public against Rome: 
people all over the country lamented that politicians in Rome were safe and had 
plenty of food and comfortable accommodation while in the rest of the country 
whole days and nights were spent in the dark of improvised and dangerous 
shelters.
132
 The only city where life went on as before, Carlo Chevallard noted in 
his diary, was Rome. Friends returning from a trip to the city told him of ongoing 
glamorous night parties. ‘It is hardly surprising’, he concluded, ‘that all Italians 
wish a bombardment on the Romans’.133 Curiously, material emerged in the press 
that was intended to spread reassurance but in fact gave fuel to such feelings, 
describing with amused levity the atmosphere of alarms in Rome, comparing the 
anti-aircraft fire to ‘a show of old-fashioned, peaceful entertainments’ and 
delighting in people rushing out to stroll in the streets even before the all-clears 
were given.
134
  
 On 11 July Arthur Harris, Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, 
suggested that a plan he had prepared in 1942 to bomb Mussolini’s office be 
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resurrected; it involved RAF squadrons being routed across France under cover of 
darkness, attacking 30 minutes after Mussolini’s usual time of arrival at work and 
then continuing to North Africa. The chief of the air staff, Charles Portal, 
supported the plan, but Foreign Secretary Eden turned it down with Churchill’s 
endorsement.
135
 A week later the Americans carried out the mission that had been 
discussed for almost three years: four waves of planes dropped 9,125 bombs on 
Rome in daylight, hitting San Lorenzo and Littorio freight yards, Tiburtina rail 
station and Ciampino and Tiburtino airports, and killing thousands of civilians 
trapped in buildings. When German ambassador von Mackensen went to see 
Mussolini after the air raid, he listened with dismay to the Duce’s assessment that, 
‘the ruins of the San Lorenzo basilica will be fatal to our enemies and from this 
fact their defeat will start’.136 
 Mussolini’s reaction meant that even under such circumstances the MCP’S 
conduct was erratic. ‘So the myth of papal Rome fell apart’, the Duce commented 
when he heard of the attack as he was meeting Hitler in Feltre, whereas what was 
actually in tatters, as Emilio Gentile has put it, was Mussolini’s myth of the ‘new 
imperial Rome’.137 The media were told to emphasise ‘destruction, not visits’, as 
Pope Pius XII arrived unannounced at the ruins and made an impact that obscured 
all other official reactions.
138
 Newspapers published pictures of buildings taken 
before and after the raid, as they were explicitly told to do. Two special radio 
programmes were broadcast. The LUCE institute filmed scenes that were later to 
become a crucial part of the Repubblica Sociale Italiana (RSI) propaganda. The 
media embued the image of destruction in San Lorenzo with an emblematic value 
which may have appeared disproportionate in relation to heavy damage inflicted 
on monuments and works of art (in addition to death and wide destruction) 
                                                 
135
 Henry Probert, Bomber Harris. His Life and Times (London: Greenhill Books, 2006, first publ. 
2001), p. 256. 
136
 Gioannini and Massobrio, Bombardate l’Italia, p. 335; Bastianini, Volevo fermare Mussolini, p. 
141.  
137
 Pirelli, Taccuini 1922-1943, p. 457 (entry of 23 July 1943); Gentile, Fascismo di pietra (Rome-
Bari: Laterza, 2007), p. 252. 
138
 La stampa del regime, ed. Tranfaglia with Maida, p. 200 (instructions of 20 July 1943); 
Schwarz, ’Fotografia del Duce possibilmente con l’elmetto’, p. 74 (instructions of 20 July 1943). 
191 
elsewhere in Italy but which reflected the symbolic impact of the propaganda 
battle over the bombing of Rome.
139
  
 Apart from people in the affected areas of Rome, the end of the Italian 
capital’s invulnerability was greeted in the rest of Italy with contented relief if not 
open delight. The editor of La Stampa, Alfredo Signoretti, remembered that  in 
Turin on the same evening, 19 July, the bombing of Rome was toasted in working 
class neighbourhoods.
140
 A few days later an OVRA informant from Milan 
provided a particularly vivid account of such feelings, reporting that the bombing 
of Rome caused in the masses from all social spheres ‘a monstrous sense of 
satisfaction’. He explained that ‘a Neronian perversion’ seemed to have invaded 
‘the soul of a great deal of our compatriots’ as a consequence of their belief that, 
‘the greatest number of people in Rome exploited wherever they could, both in 
peacetime and in war, the hard work, the sacrifices and the losses of the entire 
Italian people, not even giving in exchange the advantage of a good 
administration’.141 Not only did the American bombing of Rome give Italians a 
sense of vengeance, but it also represented a misleading portent that the war and 
Fascism were approaching their ends.
142
  
 
 
Conclusion 
The epilogue of the Fascist war was precipitated by the Allied decision to 
intensify air raids on Italy as part of a strategy to paralyse the country’s economic 
and military structure and break people’s morale. In the last phase of the war, 
when the collapse of the home front added to catastrophic defeats in the 
Mediterranean, Russia, North Africa and on Italian soil itself, not only was the 
role of the Italian propaganda machine largely irrelevant in countering enemy 
psychological warfare, but it also caused widespread resentment among the 
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public, which increasingly turned to foreign sources to stay informed about the 
war’s developments.  
 The shortcomings of the MCP reflected a wider defeat for the regime and 
the PNF. As shown by the campaign around the assumed Allied use of explosive 
devices against Italian civilians, the imposition of awkward techniques, topics and 
trends on the Italian media in the last phase of war – when civilians were plagued 
by lack of food, danger and death, and increasingly blamed their predicament on 
their rulers – confirmed that Fascist efforts to maintain public faith and belief was  
doomed to fail. Also, the development of the propaganda theme of the bombing of 
Rome made clear that previous insistence on the Italian bombing of England had 
been an ineffective and self-defeating campaign. In addition, changes in 
newsrooms during the first half of 1943 – when many editors and journalists 
began to detach themselves from the regime to preserve their future careers – 
reflected a pattern that was occurring within the regime as a whole.
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Conclusion 
The media played a crucial role in the construction of the regime’s image from the 
onset of Fascism in 1919. The press primarily targeted the small, but influential, 
minority of literate Italians as well as foreign observers while radio and newsreels 
made Mussolini ubiquitous, his voice and persona reaching even to peasants in the 
remotest villages. Propagandistic campaigns had always had a martial cast and 
were imbued with a sense of conquest, even those trumpeting peacetime 
undertakings like the drainage and urbanisation of marshes or the large-scale 
building enterprises like the provision of social housing.
1
 The MCP, under the 
Duce’s strict supervision, was in charge of constructing that narrative by 
maintaining control not only over the press, but also over cinema, theatre, the arts 
and all forms of popular culture. When this construction was confronted by the 
sense of vulnerability among civilians that total war brought following the first 
enemy air raids in June 1940, it fell apart like a house of cards. Literature on 
Italian Fascism has generally tended to provide an un-nuanced representation of 
the determining contribution that propaganda made to its fortunes. Instead, this 
work has analysed the crisis of the regime’s image in the years from 1938 to 1943 
in order to argue that propaganda’s failure to continue to bolster Fascist myths 
was due both to the catastrophic impact of the European crisis on civilians’ lives 
and to institutional and political flaws.
2
  
As Chapters 1 and 2 have illustrated, when Italy entered the war the crisis 
of the traditional communication policies was already conspicuous and the 
atmosphere of self-assurance that had pervaded drills and parades began to 
dissolve into widespread concern. The start of the enemy air raids on Italian cities 
increased fear and insecurity among civilians, while the first military setbacks on 
the battlefield showed that, even before the end of 1940, Mussolini’s hopes of 
joining in a rapid Axis victory were unfounded, as was his expectation of standing 
equal with Hitler. In particular, the ruinous participation in the Blitz of the Regia 
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Aeronautica made it clear that not only was the much-vaunted Italian air power a 
groundless myth, but also that the regime’s propagandistic aspirations had to 
make way for German priorities. As Chapter 3 has shown, inconsistent and surreal 
press campaigns, such as that recasting wartime nights as occasions for enjoying 
aesthetic experiences, added to the dispiriting effect that lies and bombast had on 
people’s feelings.  
The contradictions in propaganda emerged from the beginning and 
reflected a profound crisis in direction of the war. Following a conference with 
Hitler, Italy’s ambassador to Berlin, Dino Alfieri, reported to Foreign Secretary 
Ciano on 1 July 1940 that Mussolini’s offer of men and planes to take part in an 
attack on England remained unanswered and that the primary propagandistic 
concern of the Goebbels’ machine was to blame the enemy for starting the air-
raids on civilians. As far as the air war was concerned, the Germans were 
determined to give their people the impression that every effort was being made to 
avoid it and its calamitous consequences. In order to boost morale, air raids were 
presented as a last resort and, on all occasions, bombing attacks against France 
and Britain had to be characterised as legitimate acts of reprisal.
3
 Such a scheme 
implied a defensive posture, a ‘passive’ vision of air power that did not fit with 
decades of rhetoric about the all-powerful Ala Fascista. Nevertheless, the Duce’s 
propaganda was content to comply with the German will and from the outbreak of 
war it spun a story in which the first shot was unfailingly fired by Allied aircraft. 
As Chapter 3 has pointed out, the most popular war correspondents were enlisted 
to sustain this argument as early as summer 1940, presenting the Italian bombing 
missions on Malta and in the Middle East as a legitimate retaliation against the 
criminal English air raids on open cities.  
This work has argued that uneven and often inconsistent directives from 
propaganda controllers reflected similar attitudes within the regime as a whole. 
On the contrary, the enemy proved increasingly more effective at conveying, 
through use of leaflets and Radio Londra broadcasting, simple and direct 
arguments: that there was no aggression against Italy and Italians were paying an 
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increasing high price for the bad choice made by one man only.
4
 In comparison, 
the Fascist message in nationalist propaganda lent on anachronistic Anglophobic 
stereotypes, portraying Britons as the ‘five-meals people’ – a nation of greedy, 
arrogant, snooty, patronising and rapacious pirates.
5
 As Chapters 4 and 5 have 
illustrated in particular, when these remarks were exhumed from 1940 onward, 
typically by propagandists like Appelius, they had lost any residual appeal for 
most Italians. Deprivation, food shortages and bombs had unsettled their lives and 
such empty words were useless at providing a rationale for their suffering. The 
same was true of the declared war aims: in 1915 the presentation of alliance with 
Britain and France as the last stage of the Risorgimento had provided a patriotic 
and moral basis for participation in the Great War; the campaigns of the 1930s 
had provided the public with motivation, presenting the Fascist empire’s 
subjugation of Ethiopia and Albania as a symbol of national prestige and 
widespread economic prosperity, and the support of Franco in Spain as a new 
stage in the anti-communist struggle.
6
 However, Mussolini consorting with Hitler 
in 1940 lacked any ideal substance to feed Italians’ souls and elicit their will to 
face obstacles and sorrow.   
As this work has showed, one fundamental flaw of Fascist propaganda 
during the war was its relentless, monotonous uniformity. There was no 
substantial effort to adapt the output to heterogenous audiences. Even when the 
apparatus targeted specific sections of society (as it happened tipically with 
women, or when later in the war scepticism contaminated circles, groups and 
classes traditionally sympathetic with the regime),  it did so reiterating few, 
mostly obsolete, clichés. Journalist Giovanni Ansaldo, with his usual 
disenchanted cynicism, hit the mark when he wondered in his diary what the press 
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could do ‘against facts, bursting like bombs’.7 Yet the shortcomings of the MCP 
and its officials reflected a wider defeat for the regime and the Fascist party, 
which in wartime progressively confined its role to that of welfare provider, 
pulled apart by greed, corruption and feuds  - abandoning in this way two decades 
of totalitarian mobilisation.
8
 Before Mussolini’s dismissal very few – mainly the 
GUF papers and Bottai’s circles, as this work has shown – had dared to voice their 
doubts about the effectiveness of campaigns that obstinately refused to see, or 
report, the facts. Some realism did appear to obtrude on Pavolini’s mind at the 
beginning of 1942, and to cause (as Chapter 5 has explained) the Italian press to 
abstain for a few weeks from describing in morbid details the consequences of 
German raids on British cities. However, old habits resurfaced the following 
autumn as the enemy offensive drove out all rational explanations from the regime 
apparatus.    
Open criticism about the flaws in Fascist propaganda only spread after the 
Duce’s fall. On 25 July 1943, the day of Mussolini’s removal from power, Dino 
Grandi observed in the Grand Council meeting that, if the war was proving 
unpopular, the MCP was particularly at fault because, ‘it was only our propaganda 
which reduced it to a party war, restraining it and somehow stifling it under the 
Fascist label’.9 Two months later, the newspaper Fronte Unico remarked that the 
MCP’s control over the press and the habit of only reporting bulletins and Stefani 
dispatches ‘had taken all responsibility away from those who compiled the 
newspapers’.10 Readers, accustomed to mailing anonymous protests in previous 
years, began to sign the letters of rebuke sent to newspapers. In August, for 
example, a group of evacuees wrote to the new editor of Corriere della Sera, 
Ettore Janni, asking him to fire Dino Buzzati, who had written some articles 
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earlier in June praising the ‘special and cheerful impassibility of Naples under the 
bombs’ and arguing that nobody had fled the city, not even the rich. As Chapter 5 
has shown, such stories appeared frequently in newspapers during the first half of 
1943 but their impact on the public turned out to be the counterproductive:    
 
Please prevent Dino Buzzati from continuing to write, as before, such guff and bullshit about 
Naples, the bombardments, the caves and the spirit of the Neapolitans. He could write this 
nonsense before, because Fascism commanded it and, unfortunately, that was the fashion. But 
now, when you, rather than Borelli, edit Corriere, do not let Buzzati continue to write such things 
or even to write in Corriere at all.
11
 
 
A rare, candid, admission came from the anonymous compiler of a comment piece 
that greeted the end of the regime in the first issue of Corriere della Sera 
published after 25 July. ‘For us it is difficult’, he wrote, ‘to put together a 
newspaper on our own, when for 20 years a Ministry dictated it’.12 Yet this was 
not the beginning of a course of self-examination among journalists. The majority 
remained in their jobs, working under the supervision of the Badoglio government 
and, later, under Allied guardianship or at those newspapers (the big titles in 
Northern Italy, like Corriere della Sera and La Stampa) controlled by Nazi 
propaganda through the RSI’s new MCP. After the end of the war, the media was 
also sheltered by the overall failure of the process by which individual 
responsibility for connivance with the regime should have been ascertained. There 
was no substantial change in media ownership. Journalists and those who had 
worked for the MCP were not called to account.
13
 Indeed, the only people expelled 
from the professional register in April 1945 were those who had been prominent 
members of the regime or propaganda stars, like Bottai, Grandi, Appelius, 
Polverelli, Interlandi and Vittorio Mussolini. Pavolini followed Mussolini into the 
RSI as secretary of the new Fascist Republican Party, and was executed by 
partisans on 28 April 1945, the same afternoon as the Duce was shot on the orders 
of the Italian resistance general command. Another influential journalist, Manlio 
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Morgagni, owner and editor of the official news agency Stefani and particularly 
close to Mussolini, killed himself on 25 July 1943 when he heard that his boss and 
friend had been ousted from power. His suicide, Franco Contorbia observed, was 
‘an eccentric episode’ in comparison with ‘the strategy of adaptation’ of almost all 
Italian journalists.
14
 Only those who had actively cooperated with the Germans 
after September 1943 and were charged by the epurazione (the process of purging 
the most implicated layers of Italian society and administration) were sentenced to 
short prison terms. The majority survived and, in some cases after hiding out for a 
while, returned to their jobs and careers.
15
 The most popular among them - 
Monelli, Vergani, Lilli, Montanelli - did not pay for their fundamental 
responsibility: as brilliant writers, empowered from above to sound unprejudiced 
and daring, they had made Fascist propaganda seem less boring, so attracting a 
large number of readers who would previously have snubbed the press.
16
 
Moreover, owing to their persistent and unflagging popularity in post-war Italy, 
they supplied material that conveyed an indulgent image of Fascism, such as 
articles and books focusing on anecdotes or biographical sketches that caricatured 
and humanised the Duce and his hierarchs.
17
 
Very little changed during the transition from dictatorship to democracy in 
post-war Italy as far as government policies towards media and culture were 
concerned. The new managers of the state-owned radio, rechristened RAI in 1944, 
kept rigid control over the journalistic content of programmes. As late as 1945, 
the writer Corrado Alvaro resigned a few days after his appointment as the first 
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editor of radio news in liberated Italy, writing to the provisional administrator 
Luigi Rusca in protest against the ‘inopportune interventions’ he had received, 
‘aimed at limiting or annulling the independence of information’.18 The same was 
the case in the film industry, which inherited the legal framework that had 
established heavy censorship in 1923, and a control apparatus crammed with 
bureaucrats coming straight from the MCP ranks, while the government continued 
to seduce authors and producers with generous grants and loans. Shoeshine, the 
1946 film in which Vittorio De Sica portrayed the life of two boys after the 
liberation of Rome, was not given approval to be distributed abroad. Giulio 
Andreotti, then an under-secretary in the Ministry of Culture, commented in 1952 
on Umberto D. (when again De Sica was targeted for his work that showed an old 
man living in poverty and solitude) and rebuked the authors for presenting a 
negative image of Italy during the delicate phase of reconstruction.
19
 The works of 
Neorealismo, according to Italy’s new rulers, were slandering the country before 
the whole world as a place of misery, meanness, social conflict and 
unemployment. The process of victimisation, used in previous years to blame the 
enemy for the catastrophic conditions the war had forced on Italians, was no 
longer a useful instrument of propaganda and had to be transformed into a eulogy 
of the new times. Censorship, self-censorship, government influence and party 
meddling remained as an entrenched burden on the evolution of culture, politics 
and institutions in post-war Italy. 
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APPENDIX ON THE ITALIAN PRESS 
 
Quoted newspapers, magazines ad Journals 
 
Il becco giallo 
Illustrated satirical magazine first published on 20 January 1924. Owing to its 
anti-Fascist line, it was repeatedly suppressed and finally shut down in January 
1926. The title was revived in Paris by Italian political refugees in the same year 
and was published intermittently until 1931 when it folded due to lack of funds.  
 
Bertoldo 
Illustrated satirical magazine founded in Milan in 1936 by the publisher Rizzoli. 
During the Second World War it produced a great number of cartoons mocking 
Churchill and Britain under the German air raids. The last issue of the paper was 
published on 10 September 1943.    
 
Corriere della Sera 
First published in Milan on 5 March 1876. Edited from 1900 by Luigi Albertini, it 
soon became the most reputable Italian daily. It led the conservative opposition to 
Giovanni Giolitti, the politician who, as prime minister through most of the first 
two decades of the twentieth century, tried to adapt classical liberalism to the 
social and economic conditions of Italy. The paper supported the Libyan 
campaign and Italy’s entry into the Great War against the Central Powers. After 
Mussolini’s rise to power, its editor attempted to keep the paper independent from 
the regime’s influence, but in 1925 the Crespi family dismissed Albertini who 
only held a minority stake in the publishing company. Aldo Borelli was editor 
from 1929 to July 1943. The illustrated weekly magazine La Domenica del 
Corriere (from 1899) and the monthly literary review La Lettura (from 1901) 
were issued by the daily.  
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Critica fascista 
Fortnightly review founded, edited and owned by Giuseppe Bottai, Minister of 
National Education from 1936 to 1943. It was first published on 15 June 1923 
with the aim of increasing support for Fascism among Italian intellectuals, 
especially those of the younger generations.   
 
Cronache della guerra  
Weekly publication with wide circulation promoted in autumn 1939 by the MCP. It 
specialised in reporting on war operations and in the analysis of military topics. 
The magazine made ample use of photographs and tried to maintain an informed 
and technical tone, with articles commissioned from expert writers and generally 
compiled in a style combining specialisation with popularisation. From 1940 the 
press office of the supreme command also provided material for publication and 
in February of that year a new column on the home front in the belligerent 
countries was initiated.  
 
Il Giornale d’Italia 
First published in Rome on 16 November 1901. The daily was the voice of the 
conservative line, led by Sidney Sonnino, that opposed Giovanni Giolitti. It 
achieved prestige and wide circulation, mostly in central and southern Italy. On 30 
March 1926, a board under full control of the regime appointed Virginio Gayda as 
editor, a position he held until the fall of Mussolini. 
 
L’llustrazione Italiana 
Weekly illustrated magazine first published in Milan by Treves on 14 December 
1873. During the Great War it conveyed a patriotic vision of Italy’s participation 
in the conflict, praising the heroism of soldiers. In the 1920s the magazine 
attenuated its initial wariness towards Fascism, and contributed to a representation 
of Mussolini and the regime that reassured its middle-class readership. In 1938 the 
racial laws forced Treves to give up ownership and the magazine was taken over 
by Garzanti. 
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Il Lavoro 
Local socialist daily first published in Genoa on 7 June 1903. It advocated Italy’s 
intervention in the Great War against Austria and later opposed the rise of 
Mussolini. In 1922 its editorial office was repeatedly attacked by Fascists. In 1940 
its owner, Giuseppe Canepa, was forced to sell the title and Gianni Granzotto was 
appointed editor.  
 
Marc’Aurelio 
Illustrated satirical magazine founded in Rome in March 1931. It achieved huge 
success in a short time, hitting sales of 100,000 copies. The paper reinterpreted 
from a propaganda viewpoint the Fascist exaltation of the Roman past. It was at 
the forefront of the campaign against the sanctions imposed on Italy for its 
invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. In the late 1930s it published cartoons portraying 
Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary on the eve of the Munich crisis, as a 
jinx. During the Second World War, the magazine targeted Churchill and the 
British monarchy, in particular deriding the stammer of King George VI. 
 
Il Mattino 
Regional daily first published in Naples on 16 March 1892. Founded by Edoardo 
Scarfoglio and Matilde Serao, it was the daily most supportive of Giovanni 
Giolitti in Southern Italy. The newspaper backed the campaign against the 
Ottoman Empire in 1911 to acquire control of Libya and supported the 
intervention in the Great War alongside the Central Powers. By 1928 it was under 
the full control of the regime.  
 
Il Messaggero 
First published in Rome on 16 December 1878. A regional daily, it supported 
Italy’s attack on Libya in 1911 and the alliance with the Allied Powers in the 
Great War. In 1921 the paper relinquished its traditional liberal and democratic 
line, siding with the Fascists. Francesco Malgeri was editor  from 1933 to 
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February 1943 then succeeded by Alessandro Pavolini, who remained at the helm 
until 25 July 1943.  
 
L’Osservatore Romano 
Daily newspaper first published on 1 July 1861 in Rome. In 1885 it came under 
the direct administration of the Holy See. From the beginning of the twentieth 
century it fiercely opposed both liberalism and socialism and on the eve of the 
Great War it supported the line of neutrality advocated by Pope Benedict XV. 
Following the 1929 Lateran Pacts between the Italian government and the 
Catholic Church, the daily translated the Vatican’s increasing support for 
Fascism. From 1938, owing to its independence from MCP supervision, 
L’Osservatore Romano became the most reliable source of information about the 
international situation for Italians and, for that reason, its circulation was hindered 
by the regime.    
 
Il Popolo d’Italia 
First published on 15 November 1914 in Milan. It was founded by Benito 
Mussolini, who had been forced to resign as editor of the Socialist organ Avanti! 
for advocating Italy’s military intervention alongside Britain and France in the 
Great War in contradiction with the party’s neutralist line. After the March on 
Rome, the Duce kept ownership of the daily, while his brother Arnaldo managed 
it. The newspaper had an average daily circulation of around 200,000 copies, 
which increased consistently when it carried Mussolini’s articles. 
 
Il Regime Fascista 
Founded in Cremona in 1926 by Roberto Farinacci, head of the Fascist party in 
1925-1926, it gained national circulation as the organ of Fascist hardliners who 
opposed the normalisation of the regime. The paper crusaded for the adoption of 
the racial laws in 1938, was consistently pro-Nazi and carried violent attacks 
against the Catholic Church and L’ Osservatore Romano.  
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Il Secolo XIX   
Founded in Genoa in 1886, it quickly became the best-selling daily in Liguria. In 
1897 it was bought by the Perrone family who owned the Ansaldo industries, one 
of the companies that most benefited from war production in the Great War and 
which, together with Fiat, contributed to Mussolini’s army and air force during 
the Second World War.     
 
La Stampa  
First published on 9 February 1867 in Turin, the daily was, among Italian 
newspapers, the main supporter of Giolitti’s policies. It campaigned in 1911 in 
favour of the military campaign in Libya, but advocated neutrality in the Great 
War. At the beginning of the 1920s, the paper championed constitutional rights 
and freedoms against the violent actions of the Fascists. Its owner and editor, 
Alfredo Frassati, left in 1925, after the authorities had repeatedly suspended 
publication. In 1926 the senator Giovanni Agnelli, owner of the Fiat company, 
acquired and normalised the paper, which was edited from 1932 to 1943 by 
Alfredo Signoretti. From July 1945 to December 1958 the newspaper was 
rechristened as La Nuova Stampa.  
 
Il Telegrafo 
Regional daily founded in April 1877 in Leghorn by Giuseppe Bandi, a writer and 
journalist who had fought with Garibaldi. In 1925 the paper passed into the 
control of the Ciano family. From 1936 until 1943 it was edited by Giovanni 
Ansaldo, who was considered to be the unofficial mouthpiece of Italian foreign 
policy due to his close relationship with Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano.    
 
Il Tevere 
First published on 27 December 1924 in Rome, the daily was founded and edited 
by Telesio Interlandi, a Fascist hardliner who played a leading role in the anti-
Semitic campaign championing racial theories from 1934. Despite its small 
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circulation, the paper was particularly influential in promoting the political and 
military alliance with Nazi Germany.  
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